Themes

The United States is an empire, albeit a reluctant one. So vast are its interests that it is invariably drawn into conflicts, even difficult, faraway conflicts, it might otherwise avoid were it a weaker nation. But the United States cannot involve itself in every situation that impinges on its power; doing so would exhaust its resources and leave it vulnerable to challenges from potential rivals. It will instead use its military, economic and political influence to exploit regional rivalries around the world, rivalries that will keep larger countries consumed with one another rather than unified in their efforts to undermine the United States. Managing the interests of competing powers in volatile regions can be messy business, but such is the business of empire.

Mexico’s geography is a blessing and a curse. Its proximity to the United States has given it a rich, powerful and stalwart trading partner right across its northern border. But this has made Mexico dependent on the United States — vulnerable, in other words, to changes in U.S. policy. And changes over immigration and trade policies may well be in the offing. The more protectionist the United States becomes, the more it will aggravate tensions with Mexico. But ties between the two countries are simply too tight to unravel. North America will continue to thrive from its integration, of which Mexico is an important part.

At the center of the international order stands North America. The great power on the continent — and, by extension, the world — is the United States. Buffered by vast oceans, integrated by extensive river networks, blessed with arable lands and awash in natural resources, the United States is uniquely suited to capitalize on its geographic advantages — and to project the power those advantages confer. And it will maintain its power as long as it maintains unity on the continent in which it resides. Even if other nations rise to challenge the United States in the coming decades, the United States will be the first among equals.

Economies that rely too heavily on commodities are hostages to the marketplace. When prices are high, the governments that manage these economies can afford the costs of political stability. When prices are low, however, their people get restless. Opposition mounts. Policy choices dwindle. Prolonged periods of low revenue sow the seeds of political crisis — something countries like Nigeria, Angola, Ecuador and Venezuela know all too well.

Immigration presents leaders a difficult dilemma: How do you weigh the stewardship of your own people against the moral imperative — and in some cases the economic need — to allow foreign peoples to cross your borders? The answer to this question is growing increasingly complex as instability and economic duress drive migrants from the developing world to the developed world. When native populations oppose immigration, as they often do for economic reasons, their leaders often ride a wave of nationalism to political power. But this elides the fact that many of these same countries will need immigrants to offset some of the demographic problems aging, shrinking societies will soon face.

The belief that supply and demand will determine price is perhaps the most fundamental tenet of a market economy. But finding the equilibrium between supply and demand takes time, particularly in a market as temperamental as the oil market. That market, having been wrecked by overproduction in 2015, is slowly but surely beginning to recover. And though the speed with which it recovers will depend on U.S. shale production, the technology used in that production will continue disrupt the oil market writ large and, by extension, undermine the power of OPEC, which has for decades been the arbiter of oil prices.

It’s difficult to ignore some of the benefits of globalization. Goods became cheaper, markets became more accessible, and people moved more freely across borders. But those benefits came at the expense of jobs and, depending on whom you ask, national identities throughout the developed world. It is little surprise, then, that globalization is now an object of contempt in the countries that were once its biggest advocates — countries that have begun to elect leaders who promise to right the wrongs globalization has wrought. International trade will continue, of course, but governments will replace ambitious globe-spanning trade deals with smaller ones, even bilateral ones, as the political challenges to negotiating free trade agreements grow.

Urbanization. Higher education. Lack of female participation in the workforce. Longer life expectancies. The causes are many, but the effect is the same: The world is headed toward a demographic crunch. Aging societies deplete labor pools and raise entitlements costs, the payments for which are passed on to a shrinking number of people able to afford them. Economies with fewer but more expensive workers tend to resist stimulation, and as economic growth slows, only the governments with the innovative spirit, and the political will, to adapt to the times will able to do more with less.

Over the next two decades, robotics, 3-D printing, automation, the Internet of Things and other related technologies will radically change the way economies behave — just as the advent of manufacturing did centuries ago. But the efficiencies these technological advances create will also leave many low-skilled workers without jobs, creating political unrest in countries that struggle to adapt to the new order. The fourth industrial revolution will also deny, to some degree, developing countries the opportunity of using cheap manufacturing as a vehicle to economic prosperity.

If space is endless, then so too are the opportunities for exploiting it. The military and commercial applications are simply too great to ignore. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union understood as much, so they tried to best each other as much outside the planet as inside it. But other countries, not to mention private companies, have since entered the fray. As more players compete in the second space race, they will aggravate existing geopolitical tensions on Earth and, in some cases, create paths for cooperation.

European geography lends itself to political and economic fragmentation. Fundamental differences among Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western Europe have always prevented wholesale cooperation on the Continent, and the creation of the European Union never really reconciled those differences. If anything, it aggravated them when, beginning in 2008, it proved incapable of guaranteeing prosperity during times of economic and political duress. The people of Europe have since found sanctuary in the notion of the nation-state and, in doing so, have resurrected feelings of nationalism, Euroskepticism, protectionism and isolationism. Those forces will tear the very fabric of the European project, leading to smaller alliances of like-minded countries.

Though the Middle East has never been a picture of stability, the region has had at least a semblance of order for the past hundred or so years, held together as it was by authoritarian regimes that for all their failings managed to keep the region from devolving into outright chaos. That is no longer the case. The fall of Saddam Hussein gave Iran, the Middle East’s premier Shiite power, an opportunity to extend its influence from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. Its rise has galvanized the region’s Sunnis, led by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, against Iran in a series of proxy wars throughout the region. The disarray has given extremist groups the space to operate and has all but invited outside powers like Russia and the United States to intervene and exploit as they see fit. And though these powers may intend to avoid the quagmire that is the Middle East, competing agendas and transnational threats will challenge those intentions.

The political order of the modern Middle East, one that has stood in place through the strength of autocratic regimes for more than century, is under threat. The threat comes not from Western democracy or from Islam but from a potent combination of the two: political Islam, whose mere existence undermines the monarchies and military dictatorships that have so often suppressed its adherents. Some governments will continue to suppress them, of course, but the ones that work with them will eventually gain influence at the expense of those who do not.

An unspoken social contract keeps the peace throughout much of the Middle East. The terms of the contract are simple: Governments give their constituents a high quality of life, and their constituents give their governments their absolute loyalty. But the economic model that contract depends on — a model that features heavy subsidies, bloated public sectors and high commodities exports — has run its course. Thanks in part to low oil prices, governments have been forced to cut expenditures, raise taxes and diversify their economies, creating conditions for political unrest in some of the world’s most autocratic countries.

North Korea is convinced that the only way to deter foreign military action against it is to develop a nuclear weapon — and it is now in the final stages of developing one. Sanctions and negotiations have failed to persuade Pyongyang to abandon this strategy, so world powers have only two options for coping with North Korea: militarily intervene before it acquires a weapon or begin to shape defense strategies based on the assumption that it will inevitably acquire one. The dilemma is forcing China, Pyongyang’s only ally, to redefine its North Korea policy and is compelling countries such as South Korea, Japan and the United States to increase military cooperation.

It’s tempting the think of jihadism as monolithic, but nothing could be further from the truth. The movement may be dominated by just two groups, al Qaeda and the Islamic State, but they have ideological differences that cannot be reconciled. Each of these groups, moreover, comprise a core organization, franchise groups and grassroots supporters, all of which present a distinct threat to their enemies. And though the coalition this threat has galvanized against it has had its fair share of victories, it has struggled to defeat jihadism as an ideology. And until it does, jihadists will be able to recruit and train new adherents to their cause. But the persistence of jihadism cuts both ways: The longer it lasts, the more the movement will crack under the weight of personal disputes, doctrinal differences and conflicting objectives.

From the battlefields of the Middle East to the borders of Eastern Europe, Russia and the United States are clashing once again. As a global power, Russia is a shadow of its former self, but that won’t stop Moscow from using every means at its disposal — its military, security services, financial tools, cultural ties, propaganda, political connections and cyber-capabilities — to defend itself from what it sees as Western encroachment on its border, on its borderlands, on its interests around the world.

History shows that all too often the biggest threats to Russia come from within. Such is the case in the current era, a time when Moscow must manage a standoff with the West, a weak economy, limited financial resources, social unrest, demographic shifts and political infighting in the highest echelons of power. As its leaders try to prevent Russia from collapsing altogether, the country will cease to be the nominal democracy it is now and become an outright autocracy. But Moscow can use its alienation from the West to its advantage: Demonizing an external enemy is an effective way to shore up national support.

The Iron Curtain is gone, but the competition for the lands that once shielded the Soviet Union from the West lives on. The Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Baltics and Central Asia are just as important now as they were during the Cold War — and for nearly the same reasons. Russia is compelled to use them to protect its borders, and the West is compelled to use them to halt the rise of Russian power. The survival of the countries that occupy these lands will depend on agile diplomacy, economic diversification and flexible security relationships.

Cut off from the West by economic sanctions and by soured relations, Russia has begun to build bridges with the East. To that end, Moscow has expanded its trade ties throughout the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with China, South Korea and Japan. But those ties come at a price: Moscow has begun to involve itself in the affairs of others, jumping into contentious regional issues to gain influence and to challenge the United States. Meanwhile, Eastern powers are also encroaching on Moscow’s sphere of influence in Far East Russia and in Central Asia — a presence Russia will struggle to curb as it spends more time and resources managing its long-term internal problems.

For the past three decades, cheap exports and government-led investment have sustained economic growth in China. And in doing so, they have ensured political stability in one of the world’s largest and most populous countries. But leaders in Beijing understand that that model is unsustainable, and they have therefore begun to develop a new economic model, one built on consumption, an expanded services sector and technological innovation. The move from the old to the new will test the Communist Party’s will to reform and shake the very foundations on which its legitimacy stands.

Kept dormant for two decades by the weight of economic malaise, Japan has awoken again, ready to reclaim its place in the international order. Standing in the way, however, are unprecedented economic and demographic problems, the solutions to which will require radical changes to the country’s technological, political, social and economic structures — changes that will difficult to accept, let alone implement. But if it does, Japan will be a case study for governments that find themselves in similar predicaments.

As its military power grows, China will struggle to balance its desire for friendly relations with its neighbors against the more fundamental need to secure its maritime interests — a need Beijing believes is best served through unilateral action. China’s rivals are doing all they can to contain this expansion, in part by leveraging economic cooperation with Beijing and in part by forging alliances with outside powers such as the United States, Japan and Australia. But as more powers enter these contested waters, the risk of confrontation will only rise.

Few countries are better positioned to capitalize on the opportunities created by China’s economic transition than the 10 states that constitute the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Its members understand that what is good for one is, in theory, good for the whole — so much so that unanimity was made a central tenet of their founding charter. But domestic political considerations often prevent them from acting as one. And it is this discrepancy between collective interests and individual interests that will determine how quickly their economies grow — and how deeply they integrate.

The countries of Central Asia are predisposed to instability. Their economies are in disrepair, itinerant workers are returning from Russia and militants from neighboring countries spill across their borders. More important, however, is their geographic location, which throughout history has been an arena in which greater powers have vied for influence and, in more recent years, competed for natural resources. That competition will continue to play out so long as there is economic opportunity in this troubled region.

Militancy is a fact of life in South Asia. Taliban insurgents, Islamic State jihadists, Baloch rebels and Kashmiri separatists all operate there, and they are able to do so because South Asian governments simply cannot control the farthest reaches of their territories — or the porous borders that define them. In some cases these governments even sponsor militant groups to work against their regional rivals. Whatever the cause, South Asian militancy will endure as long as governments refuse to grant the kind of autonomy for which these groups are fighting.

India is its own worst enemy. The world’s largest democracy is not only a nuclear power but also one of its fastest growing economies, one that is supported by a massive labor pool flush with tech-savvy and English-speaking workers. And though this has created pockets of prosperity throughout the country, it ignores India’s high rates of poverty and corruption and inadequate infrastructure — problems that are difficult to solve with a political system as diffused, disruptive and bureaucratic as India’s. Leaders in New Delhi understand that economic growth is the key to absorbing the 12 million Indians who enter the job market every year, but growth is difficult when India’s services and manufacturing sectors are so vulnerable to workplace automation. As India tackles these domestic challenges, it will have the equally daunting foreign policy challenge of pursuing energy security and courting foreign investment while maintaining its nonaligned status.

Pakistan is a military with a country, not a country with a military. Even when it is not formally in control — as has been the case off and on for nearly half the country’s history — the military has still been singularly influential in Pakistan’s political affairs, endowed as it is with the power to make or break the heads of the civilian government. And though there are signs that the civilian government is growing more assertive, history is still on the military’s side.

East Africa is a potential success story on a continent that tells too few of them. Improved economic and transportation supply chains have brought the region closer together, and the countries that constitute it have experienced rapid economic growth. Among the few obstacles to continued growth are the rivalries that plague the region, most notably the one between Kenya and Tanzania. But cultural commonalities, historic ties, shared demographic trends and, most important, an imperative to band together will ultimately prevail, making them more attractive investment destinations.

Sub-Saharan Africa has long intrigued foreign powers; its resources are simply too abundant for them to ignore. And though the attention the region receives is not new, the political dynamics that command their attention are. No longer beholden to the politics of colonialism or of the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa now has more suitors than it once did. These suitors, most notably China, Japan, India and Turkey, see the region as a commodity-rich, economically dynamic destination for investment opportunity. Western countries will be drawn to the region, too, albeit for different reasons: They are compelled by security imperatives to stop illegal migration and potential terrorist threats.