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Changing U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Plans

Mar 19, 2013 | 17:22 GMT

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Changing U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Plans

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced March 15 that the United States would cancel the fourth phase of its European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense plan and "restructure" the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB program — a highly advanced interceptor expected to shield against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The European Phased Adaptive Approach involves incremental increases in ballistic missile defense systems on the Continent. The original plan called for deployment of shorter- and medium-range interceptors in the first three phases and longer-range interceptors in the fourth phase. The first phase, which involved radar stations in Turkey and ship-based missile defense systems in the Mediterranean, has already been implemented. Under the second and third phases, more-advanced interceptors capable of targeting short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles would be deployed to Romania by 2015 and Poland by 2018. In the fourth phase, the longer-range SM-3 Block IIB missiles would be deployed in Romania and Poland around 2022. Essentially, Hagel was announcing that development of the interceptor, a central component part of the fourth phase, would be scrapped. There are several possible reasons for the move, most notably U.S. hopes for a thaw in tensions with Russia, which fiercely opposes the entire missile defense plan. Washington needs Moscow to cooperate on a range of issues, and talks between the two countries have stalled in recent months. But while the decision to scrap the fourth phase of the plan could lead to progress in negotiations, the move will not assuage all of Russia's concerns about the U.S. missile shield in Europe. Various disputes will remain unresolved between Washington and Moscow and continue to preclude a long-elusive comprehensive reset in U.S.-Russian relations.