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The world is connected, but even the broadest topics deserve an individual look. Below are our latest and most relevant security and terrorism analyses.

A world without banks was once impossible to imagine. As recently as 2007 banks were more powerful than they had ever been. But the 2008 financial crisis proved just how dangerous that power could be. Less then a decade later, new fines and regulations have severely curbed the influence of the world’s biggest banks. Low interest rates, meanwhile, have cut into banks’ profits even as advancements in digital currencies have threatened to disrupt the traditional banking model. Put simply, banks will soon play a much smaller role in the global economy.

When it comes to technological advancement, the most important question is not what goods will be produced but where they will be produced — and how quickly they move around the world. Ports are operating more efficiently, more things are being automated, and companies are reducing and adapting their inventories for speedier delivery. These developments will naturally have political repercussions as job markets and regulations change.

Mosul, Iraq’s energy-rich second city, is vital to the Islamic State. The operation to retake it from the jihadist group took more than a year to plan, and it has already taken several months to execute. But another competition will take place once the city falls, and it will be fought by the very players — Iran, Iraq and Turkey, to name a few — who once banded together to save it in the first place.

Few things confer more global power than control of the seas. And since the end of World War II, the seas have belonged to the United States, which in that time has been free to project its forces virtually anywhere at a moment's notice. It has similarly been impervious to seaborne invasion. So long as the United States controls the world’s waterways, it can shape the global order to its designs. The instrument of U.S. maritime power — its fleet of carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups — is tracked weekly in our Naval Update Map.

Climate and weather are overlooked agents in geopolitics. They govern the production of agriculture, disrupts supply chains and, in some cases, takes lives. And the ways in which climate changes will dramatically, if unpredictably, affect the behavior of nations, especially the behavior of those that have fewer resources than others. In some cases, however, change will come slow, and when it does the more immediate political and economic concerns will overshadow and even impede measures to mitigate it. How countries’ adapt to these changes, however, will depend not only on the advancements in new energy technologies but also on the affordability of current ones.

Though Nigeria boasts Africa’s largest economy, its march toward prosperity has always been a struggle, shackled as it is by political division, ethnic rivalry, militancy, theft and corruption. Its single biggest source of revenue is oil, most of which is found in the Niger Delta, a hotbed of militants and disaffected residents. Solving this region’s problems would help to keep oil flowing, but it won’t give Nigeria what it needs to be truly prosperous: a more diverse economy.

South America is a continent divided, at least when it comes to trade. Its countries fall into one of two blocs: the Common Market of the South, more commonly known as Mercosur, or the Pacific Alliance. That nearly every South American country relies on commodities for economic growth presents a much more serious problem to Mercosur, traditionally the more protectionist of the two, than it does to the Pacific Alliance, which has more potential partners with which to trade. The leaders of Mercosur understand as much, and they are considering liberalizing some of their policies accordingly. In the meantime, however, the bloc’s fate will be left to fluctuations in commodity prices and in regional trade.

Egypt’s modern history dictates that the military, battle-tested for decades by conflict at home and abroad, reigns supreme. And its geography dictates that it is uniquely influential in the region: Removed somewhat from the tumult of the Middle East, the country is a key ally in the United States' bid to maintain the Arab-Israeli balance of power. Now that Egypt has dealt with the political upheaval of the Arab Spring, it is looking to reclaim its regional influence. But doing so is no small task. Its persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood has driven political Islamists to militancy, and the public has grown restive of the structural reforms Cairo has implemented to try to reduce its dependency on foreign aid — and all the obligations that come with it.

As the European Union’s political order breaks down, so too will its monetary union, the eurozone. At the core of the crisis is the struggle over the good of nations versus the good of the whole. Put simply, richer nations are tired of shouldering the financial responsibility of the entire union. And as some eurozone members become increasingly weighed down by high debt and deficit levels, fragile economies and weak banking sectors, other eurozone members are turning to Euroskeptic and nationalist parties that want to leave the currency union altogether.

Illicit drugs and mass migration — these are two of the most pressing security challenges for the United States when it comes to Latin America. Washington has struggled to stem the flow of both across U.S. borders for years, and it will continue to do so for years to come. Its efforts in that regard will, for better or worse, define its relationships with countries as close as Mexico and as far as Colombia — not to mention several in between, from which most U.S.-bound immigrants originate.

When the Cold War ended, many African nations lost their foreign benefactors in the United States and the Soviet Union. Multiparty democracies, particularly the democracies that exist in name only, forced some leaders to search for more creative ways to extend their terms in office. But though tactics such as extended term limits will, in fact, prolong a leader’s time at the top, they will also increase the chances of their violent removal — and that their removal will destabilize their countries.

That countries act in their own interests and not the interests of others is a fact that has always haunted EU foreign policy. It is for this reason that its foreign policy is reactive, not proactive as it was meant to be. And this dynamic is not lost on other foreign powers such as Russia, Turkey and the United States, which exploit EU divisions for their own benefit.

China’s military — a collection of unprofessional soldiers just a quarter century ago — has modernized more quickly than nearly any other in history. And its ascendance has caused nothing but concern for the powers of the region, forcing them to adapt their security policies to what they see as a growing power hostile to their interests. It will also continue to invite U.S. involvement in the region, encourage Japan to regain its military strength and spur defense acquisitions.

China’s remarkable economic growth requires a remarkable amount of raw materials — more materials, in fact, than the once self-sufficient country can now produce on its own. And in an effort to procure these materials closer to home, Beijing has enacted the One Belt, One Road initiative, parts of which follow the ancient Silk Road trading route that connected the Far East to Europe. The initiative is a development strategy meant to integrate resources and markets throughout Eurasia, create new trading partners, ensure employment for Chinese workers and diversify the Chinese currency. Perhaps the ultimate goal of One Belt, One Road, however, is to insulate the Chinese economy from sudden disruptions — all the more important now that growth is finally slowing.

The breakup of the European Union isn't random or scattered: It's happening along distinct lines. The more prosperous northern European countries are tired of picking up the tab for southern Europe and are fighting for more control over the south's fiscal policies. Southern European countries want the opposite. Some countries in the east, meanwhile, see the European Union solely as a trade bloc and are becoming increasingly irritated by many of its other policies. As the economic and political environment in Europe becomes more contentious, these fundamentally opposed interests will come into conflict more and more often, further destabilizing the union.

Pipelines are veins of geopolitical power. For nations that export oil products or natural gas, pipelines are essential to turning raw energy into profit. Russia’s attempts to control the flow of energy in Europe and Asia, for example, is as much a political strategy as it is an economic strategy. But in the politics of pipelines, new technologies and resources and more tightly integrated pipeline systems will give countries new tools to counter overbearing suppliers.

For proof that the Cold War never fully died, look no further than Ukraine, the site of a much broader standoff between the West and Russia. After the Euromaidan uprising of 2014, protesters replaced a government allied with Moscow with one allied with the West — an act to which Russia responded by annexing Crimea and by supporting separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine. The West has since levied sanctions against Russia. The government in Kiev is still viable for now, but security, economic and political support from the West will ultimately determine whether Ukraine can stay intact.

At the height of its power, the Ottoman Empire stretched from Central Europe to the Arabian Peninsula. Turkey, the country that sprang from the Ottomans’ demise, is not an empire, but it is a country on the rise. Strategically located between East and West, the country is using its economic clout, its military might and its cultural weight to expand its influence throughout the Middle East. Larger powers such as the United States, Europe and Russia will therefore have to alternately work with and against Turkey as they pursue their interests in the region.

After 2008, when financial crisis wrecked the global economy, central banks needed a way to artificially stimulate economic growth. And so many of them enacted quantitative easing, a policy in which a central bank expands monetary supply through a bond-buying program. That policy, however, has run its course. The road beyond quantitative easing will be littered with higher rates of government spending — a daunting prospect for governments that are already dealing with elevated debt levels.

Individuals, companies, governments and militaries alike all depend on computers. And as is so often the case, these dependencies create vulnerabilities that have made cybersecurity all the more important as proficiencies in cyber warfare and cyber crime improve. That technology constantly improves only adds to the problem of staying safe in the internet age. How governments and their constituents attune themselves to this brave new world will ultimately shape their relationship with the internet — and with each other.

In 1947, British India was partitioned into two independent states: India and Pakistan. Nearly seven decades later, the two countries — now both nuclear powers — are still fierce rivals. As Pakistan works to develop its tactical nuclear weapons, and as India seeks new means of deterring their development, South Asia will be uniquely vulnerable to the threat of military miscalculation. Pakistan’s ongoing struggle to rein in militants, some of whom have turned against the government in Islamabad, will only make matters worse. The ongoing spat over the disputed territory of Kashmir, meanwhile, will prevent New Delhi and Islamabad from normalizing ties. But though the prospect of conflict can never truly be ruled out, the states' mutual need for economic growth will temper their hostilities toward each another, much as it has for the past few years.

Between the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea lies North Africa, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, a region of high youth unemployment, militancy, porous borders and resource scarcity. The Arab Spring may have empowered the region’s political opposition movements, which have since pushed for a variety of reforms, but governments are pushing back, some more successfully than others. Restructuring social contracts under such conditions will be difficult task, one that will test the stability of governments that naturally want to stay in power.

Israel lives under difficult geopolitical circumstances. A small country with limited resources and surrounded by potentially hostile neighbors, Israel survives by allying with powers that do have the resources to manage the balance of power in the Middle East — namely, the United States. Its geographic position also means that Israel must manage complex relations with its Muslim neighbors by quiet collaboration, by exploiting divisions and by parlaying its technological and economic advantages into strategic dependencies. To navigate all the challenges presented by its position in the Middle East, Israel will remain agile in its diplomacy and, when the situation warrants, steadfast in its pre-emptive strikes, its covert activities and its economic relationships.

Of all the conflicts left over from the Cold War, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute may be the most enduring. Control of this territory, strategically located in the Caucasus, has changed hands throughout history, but it became a de facto independent republic in the 1990s, when Armenian forces defeated the Azerbaijani forces that until then had governed it. Azerbaijan wants it back. The Armenians want to keep the status quo. And Russia tries to arbitrate between the two. The web of political relationships and alliances in the Caucasus — relationships that involve not just Russia but also Turkey, Iran and the West — will prevent the conflict’s resolution.

Iran’s domain in the Middle East stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. It maintains this arc of influence through its use of militant proxies, political agents and economic relationships, fending off challenges to its power from Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iran’s nuclear program, meanwhile, will continue to test relations with the West. But for all the program’s controversy, it is unlikely to spark a serious confrontation with the United States — Iran will instead leverage its control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of all globally traded crude oil passes. In fact, some of the biggest challenges to Iranian power will come not from without but from within as new generations of Iranians drift further from the religious principles — principles guarded by the still-strong clerical elite — on which the revolution was founded.

After five decades of conflict, the Colombian government is making peace with insurgents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army. And although the peace agreements they have forged will effectively reduce the threat of militancy and organized crime in the country, other illicit activities such as drug trafficking and illegal mining will continue largely unabated.

Roughly 25 million Kurds occupy a tract of land that includes parts of Turkey, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Armenia — but they have no state of their own. The nations they inhabit simply cannot allow an independent Kurdistan to exist, for its existence would threaten theirs. One of the ways they prevent the rise of such a state is by exploiting natural divisions among the Kurds, pitting some factions against each other and, when the situation warrants it, using Kurdish factions to undermine one another. And even though the Kurds have defied history by forming an autonomous region in northern Iraq, they are simply too divided and weak to become masters of their fates.

Oil made Saudi Arabia rich, but it also stunted its ability to diversify its economy — much more so than its fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The government in Riyadh has therefore embarked on an ambitious reform plan to lure investment to the private sector — investment it will sorely need to ensure the comfort levels to which its citizens have grown accustomed. But the plan, as envisioned, is untenable, mostly because the government has set an unrealistic timetable for its completion. But all the time in the world wouldn’t make it any less difficult to recruit and train native workers and attract foreign businesses.

The world is connected, but even the broadest topics deserve an individual look. Below are our latest and most relevant politics analyses.

The world is connected, but even the broadest topics deserve an individual look. Below are our latest and most relevant military analyses.

The world is connected, but even the broadest topics deserve an individual look. Below are our latest and most relevant economics analyses.

The world is connected, but even the broadest topics deserve an individual look. Below are our latest and most relevant energy analyses.

The Islamic State is in decline. Under pressure from all the enemies it has made in its rise to power, the group continues to lose territory in Iraq and Syria — and thus its claim as a legitimate caliphate. But for all its losses on the battlefield, it has lost none of its potency as a terrorist group, one that will continue to attack its foes in the Middle East and beyond. The Islamic State’s degradation, meanwhile, is fueling a competition for the lands it used to control, pitting the Iranians, Turks and Kurds against one another for influence in the absence of another authority.

Though Yemen has always suffered from instability, its recent history has been especially violent. What started as protests during the Arab Spring eventually developed into open warfare. One president was replaced by another. Cease-fires were declared but later ignored. The economy is in shambles. Water is scarce. The extremist groups that thrive in such an environment are now the object of U.S. counterterrorism policy, not to mention a problem for Saudi Arabia, which is more exposed to spillover violence and displaced refugees than any other country. Saudi Arabia has no choice but to shoulder the burden of the conflict, even if its policies for doing so clash with those of its erstwhile allies.

The fall of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi shattered the country he left behind. No longer is there a central government but three competing ones, each with its own militia to support its claim to power. Caught in the crossfire of the conflict stands Libya’s oil industry, over which rival factions compete to secure the country’s largest source of revenue. There’s no question that the road to reconciliation will be long; the only question is how violent it will be.

For some, the Syrian civil war is a fight for survival. The minority Alawites that dominate the government — such as it is — face the prospect of persecution if they lose, and the assorted Sunnis who oppose them face the prospect of violent reprisal if they lose. But for others, the Syrian civil war is an opportunity. Turkey is using the conflict to advance its interests in the region — interests that include curbing Kurdish expansion. Iran is trying to preserve its arc of influence, which extends to the Mediterranean Sea, in the face of staunch Sunni opposition. Russia is using the war as leverage in broader negotiations with the United States, which is itself working to disable terrorist organizations there. Conflicting agendas in such an already chaotic environment will keep an enduring resolution to the conflict beyond reach.

Venezuela is one of Latin America's most dynamic and troubled countries. It had been relatively stable during the administration of President Hugo Chavez, but when he died, stability died with him, aided in no small part but the fall of the price of oil. His successor, Nicolas Maduro, is now being challenged not only by Venezuelan citizens, who are angry as they struggle to obtain the most basic living staples and foodstuffs, but also by politicians inside and outside his own political party. His ruling party may not survive the coming collapse, but if it does, it will have the daunting challenge of trying to rebuild the economy.

Diseases are the ultimate mercenaries: They are impersonal, impartial, godless, stateless, apolitical. Every citizen from every country will eventually contract one, or more than one, sometimes to tragic effect. And when outbreaks grow so large that they disrupt supply chains, stunt economic growth, dictate technological development or affect the relations of nations, death from disease becomes something other than personal tragedy — it becomes a geopolitical crisis.

The African National Congress has ruled South Africa since Nelson Mandela became the country’s first president of the post-apartheid era. But its support is dwindling, thanks in part to generational changes, structural economic issues, and the rise of a black middle class that demands improved service delivery and governance. And while it will continue to be the first among equals in South African politics, the cracks that have emerged in its base may force the ANC to revert to the more socialist policies of its founding. Were that to happen, it would be less inclined to accommodate the businesses that keep its economy afloat.