On Oct. 4, the administration of Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki extended the state of emergency in Tunisia until Oct. 31 to ensure the security of diplomatic missions. Two days earlier, Marzouki called Tunisian Salafist group Ansar al-Sharia a "cancer," according to Al-Hayat news agency, and later expressed concern about militant threats present in southern Libya and Algeria. A prolonged militant threat similar to that faced in Egypt, Algeria or Libya is unlikely to take root in Tunisia due to the nature of the country's political transition in 2011 and to its unique geography. Although longtime Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was removed from government in 2011, the country's basic structures of power, including the military and intelligence services, remained intact. In contrast, Libya underwent a grueling civil war that ruptured former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's network of tribal alliances and institutions, uprooting the entire system. Tunisia therefore has a more mature and cohesive security apparatus that is well equipped to contain Islamist threats. The Tunisian government also benefits from the country's compact geography, which denies jihadist groups ideal territory for bases. This contrasts with places such as Algeria's mountainous Kabylie region, a stronghold for al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Similarly, Libyan militants exploit the lack of authority around Benghazi, which is separated by 600 miles of desert from the central government in Tripoli. Jihadists in Sinai benefit from the Gulf of Suez, which separates the peninsula from mainland Egypt. Such geographic bases help militant groups sustain prolonged insurgencies by complicating the ability of security forces to project authority or mobilize security forces to the areas. The reach of Tunisia's security establishment, by comparison, extends fully to its borders. Moreover, unlike in Algeria and Libya, Tunisian Salafists have a political voice through the recently licensed Reform Front Party, the membership of which likely overlaps considerably with Ansar al-Sharia. If a more militant Salafist element does arise in Tunisia, the party could perform the same function as the Salafist Nour Party in Egypt, which has served as an intermediary between the government and jihadists in Sinai. Combined, these factors will likely prevent an insurgent-style threat from emerging in Tunisia.
