Hoping to stretch the Islamic State's fighters and resources thin by forcing the group to fight for its Iraqi stronghold, Mosul, and its Syrian stronghold, Raqqa, simultaneously, the United States is eager to launch an offensive on the northern Syrian city as quickly as possible. Having already encountered stiff resistance around Mosul, Washington will seek to capitalize on the momentum against the extremist group to batter its remaining positions in Iraq and Syria. But not all of the United States' coalition allies share its desire to start targeting Raqqa in the next few weeks. For the most part, their dissent stems from the city's composition: Raqqa is predominantly Arab, which means a sizable Arab force would be needed to seize and hold it. Though the Western-backed Syrian Democratic Forces include several Arab units, the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) continue to make up an overwhelming share of the group.
In an effort to remedy this problem, the United States deployed 250 special operations forces to Syria in April to speed up the recruitment and training of Arab fighters ahead of the push for Raqqa. According to the congressional testimony of U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford, the Syrian Democratic Forces had about 6,000 Arab fighters (20 percent of the force) at the time. By September, Dunford had updated his statement to say that 14,000 Arab fighters had been identified. Nevertheless, the United States has had to admit that the Kurdish YPG — still the largest component of the Syrian Democratic Forces — will, by necessity, play a decisive role in the operation to retake Raqqa. Yet that will pose a significant risk in itself, raising the possibility of inflaming the country's deeply rooted sectarian tensions.
Aware of the risks, the United States has had little choice but to lower its expectations. Though a Raqqa operation will probably still begin in the coming weeks, it will open with an isolation phase instead of a direct assault on the city. This approach will restrict the Islamic State's movements while avoiding the bigger gamble of driving straight into the heart of Raqqa until more Arab fighters can be found. Meanwhile, the United States will decide whether to boost the number of U.S. special operations forces in Syria. Should Washington send hundreds of additional troops, they would likely focus their efforts on managing the coalition's shaky structure in northern Syria. Their presence would become all the more critical if Turkey, which staunchly opposes Kurdish involvement in the operation, elects to send its own force toward Raqqa. In the end, the United States may yet come up with a compromise whereby the Kurds help to surround Raqqa while Turkey's allies and other Arab fighters spearhead the capture of the city itself.
