The U.S. strikes against al Qaeda targets in Aleppo are noteworthy because they demonstrate the need for al Qaeda groups to seek sanctuary in places such as Syria. The strikes also serve as a reminder that while the campaign against al Qaeda has weakened the group since 9/11, the group can revive if it has time and space within which to operate.
Jihadist militants have long operated in lawless areas in countries such as Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mali, Libya, Iraq and Syria. However, it is important to understand that sanctuary alone is not enough to produce sophisticated transnational terrorist attacks. Indeed, there are many jihadist groups that are operating in lawless areas across a wide arc of the world stretching from West Africa to the Sulu Archipelago. However, only a small number of these groups possess the requisite combination of intent and capability needed to conduct transnational attacks. Many of these groups are nationally or regionally focused and therefore have no aspiration of striking targets beyond their areas of operation. Friction between nationally focused and transnationally focused jihadists has resulted in rifts and infighting among the members of groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab. But even those jihadist groups that aspire and threaten to commit transnational attacks have been constrained by their limited capabilities. Projecting terrorist power across continents is not as easy as it appears in the movies.
Frustration over their inability to project power from their areas of sanctuary has led al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the al Qaeda core to call for jihadists living in the West to conduct simple attacks close to home — to "build a bomb in the kitchen of your mom," as the Boston Marathon bombers almost literally did. Simple attacks do not require advanced terrorist tradecraft. However, these simple attacks cannot create the type of mass carnage the terrorist groups aspire to inflict. Furthermore, the calls for simple attacks have not produced many attacks, and those advocating them have certainly been disappointed by the meager response to their call.
Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its allies have been able to weaken the al Qaeda core and erode its battlefield effectiveness. Washington has also experienced success against several regional jihadist groups. But the world is a big place and there will always be lawless areas where jihadist groups can find sanctuary to survive, regroup, plan and scheme. At its heart, the battle against jihadism is essentially an ideological battle. While military, law enforcement, intelligence, financial and diplomatic tools can be used to contain or reduce the power and reach of particular jihadist groups on the physical battlefield and capture or kill key individuals, as long as the jihadist ideology persists and continues to attract adherents faster than they can be killed or arrested, it will not be possible to end the threat using traditional counterterrorism programs.
