![](https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/wv_small/public/main/images/645A05D2-26E1-4F4D-BD8B-F257CC2EBC0D-365-00000C4AEF4DFF94.png?itok=sQ-OoN3b)
When the Allies defeated Japan at the end of World War II, they dismantled the Japanese security apparatus and deliberately left the country dependent on outside powers. This entailed not only taking apart the military but also the extensive imperial intelligence apparatus that had facilitated Japanese expansion in Asia. As it reconstituted itself, postwar Japan opted for a decentralized intelligence system as an alternative to its prewar model. The result was more a fragment of an intelligence apparatus than a full system, with Tokyo outsourcing the missing components to its allies. This system worked through the Cold War, when Japan was more essential to U.S. anti-Soviet strategy. Since then, however, Japan has found itself unable to count on its allies to provide vital intelligence in a timely manner. The Islamic State hostage crisis in January, during which Japan depended on Jordanian and Turkish intelligence, reinforced this lesson.
In response to the incident, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party has started drafting a proposal to create a new agency specializing in foreign intelligence. To address Japanese dependence on outsiders, the new system will shift away from a decentralized model with limited collection capacity to a centralized system with in-house capabilities. The plan would support Japan's slow normalization of its overall military capabilities in order to face new threats.
Japan's current intelligence apparatus is fragmented among five organizations. The Cabinet Information and Research Office focuses on open-source and geospatial intelligence. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs collects diplomatic intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters gathers signals intelligence, including electronic and telecommunications systems. Under the Ministry of Justice, the Public Security Intelligence Agency mainly conducts internal investigations and monitors subversive domestic groups. The most powerful of these is the National Police Agency, which is responsible for domestic law enforcement, counterterrorism and combating transnational crime. It also has personnel positioned in the four other institutions as high-level intelligence directors.
This system lacks two key components: Its greatest weakness is the absence of a clandestine intelligence arm, depriving Japan of reliable access to human intelligence. The country also does not have an institution that pools the intelligence gathered by the different branches. Such an institution would provide comprehensive analysis to top policymakers and ensure effective information-sharing among agencies. Instead, Japan's intelligence agencies each report directly to the prime minister's office. The absence of these two key nodes has left Japanese policymakers with huge gaps in awareness, forcing them to react to crises instead of pre-empting them. Time and again, this has led to tragic consequences for Japanese citizens.
The United States is likely to encourage Japan throughout the reform process by sharing its own experiences and expertise. This will ease Japan's growing pains as it builds its missing capabilities from scratch. For its part, the United States wants to empower Japan to shoulder more alliance burdens. However, the long-term effect will be to afford Japan the autonomy needed down the road to independently pursue and protect its own interests abroad.