Russian forces' evacuation from Snake island is entirely for military reasons and does not constitute a goodwill gesture, nor does it significantly improve the chances of reopening Ukrainian grain exports via the Black Sea. Russia had attempted to use the island to more easily project force into the western Black Sea. But Ukrainian forces repeatedly destroyed Russian anti-air missile systems on Snake Island, which ultimately forced Moscow to withdraw on June 30 by barring Russian forces from establishing control of the skies overhead. Russia’s withdrawal from Snake Island in theory creates a corridor along the western edge of the Black sea outside of the immediate reach of Russian forces that could be used for shipping. Russia, however, has numerous other military capabilities at its disposal — including mines, aircraft or even submarines — that it could use to blockade Ukrainian ports, should it come to that. Moscow will thus still be able to maintain its blockade, despite the loss of surface warships and missile systems on Snake Island.
Therefore, the reopening of Ukraine’s exports for grain and other goods via the Black Sea shepherded by Turkey, the United Nations, and other actors as part of a negotiated settlement remains essential to ending the blockade. While these talks will likely continue in any case, numerous obstacles to an agreement remain, including the demining of areas near Ukrainian ports and Russia’s insistence on extensive control measures for any ships entering or leaving Ukraine. Furthermore, despite statements from Moscow suggesting Russia supports the urgent conclusion of a deal, the Kremlin likely believes restricted Ukrainian commodity exports will act as essential leverage in Moscow’s favor by increasing expenses and war fatigue among Kyiv’s Western backers.
