Despite almost a decade of intervention by members of the African Union, Somalia still has serious internal security issues to contend with. A Jan. 15 attack in the southwest Somali region of El-Adde against forces from the Kenyan African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) illustrates this challenge. Somali militant group al Shabaab took credit for the attack and claimed to have killed 100 Kenyan soldiers as well. Although al Shabaab has been severely weakened over the course of several years, it still has the ability to mount attacks against AMISOM with such overwhelming strength that African Union forces are forced to abandon their positions altogether. These individual attacks are not defeating AMISOM, but they are incurring a significant cost. Every loss weakens the fiber of the peacekeeping operation and further damages the political process that depends on it.
The problem is not necessarily rooted in AMISOM's failures, or even the state of Somali politics, but that al Shabaab's "long war" strategy has undermined both. As AMISOM has ramped up its operations over time, al Shabaab has diminished its attempts to hold territory in order to concentrate on insurgent and terrorist tactics. It is an approach the group hopes will wear down the foreign forces. And, so far, the Islamist militants are clearly succeeding. Not only are they hitting AMISOM at will, they are also specifically targeting aid shipments and personnel as a way to disrupt the counterinsurgency effort.
This persistent risk has raised concern in other countries that are contributing troops to the mission. In Kenya, opposition politicians have latched on to the El-Adde attack, once again questioning the value of Kenya's commitment to military operations in Somalia. The government continues to maintain its stance on the need to play a key role in the AMISOM operation. However, persistent risk from Somali-borne terrorist attacks in Kenya's border regions and casualties taken within Somalia are making it difficult to legitimize the deployment. Still, being part of AMISOM raises Kenya's regional influence and prominence, which Nairobi takes into account. And al Shabaab attacks within Kenya continue to inform Kenya's overall commitment to the intervention.
Burundi Casts a Shadow Over the Mission
At the same time, another key contributor to the African Union mission has its own set of political problems and internal conflict to deal with. Burundi's embattled government is increasingly at odds with the African Union and has rejected proposals to allow African Union peacekeepers to subdue its own internal political strife. Thus, it is unlikely that peacekeeping troops will intervene in Burundi despite calls to that effect. Should forces be deployed, they would risk disturbing the cooperation between Burundi and the rest of the AMISOM contingent. Such a move could upset the ability of Burundian forces to operate in Somalia, and the government in Bujumbura does not necessarily want the 5,000 troops it currently has in Somalia to return home. Indeed, given a dispute between an African coalition and a president that may be violating term limits, it is not clear where soldiers' loyalties would lie. This is another reason for Burundi's government to maintain its commitment inside Somalia. Moreover, there are financial incentives to stay deployed in Somalia. Still, the crisis as a whole leaves Burundian cooperation with AMISOM in a fragile state.
While Kenya and Burundi are not at risk of immediately abandoning their role in AMISOM, their concerns highlight the inherent weakness of a peacekeeping force that depends on a limited number of contributors delivering the bulk of its troops. Ethiopia and Uganda make up the other half of the mission and are still very committed to the operation, but if a single troop contributor were to waver and pull out, it would leave a tremendous gap in the capabilities of the entire operation.
