Since the fall of the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in October 2011, well-trained and well-armed Tuareg mercenaries left Libya to return home to Niger, Mali and Algeria. Malian-Tuareg negotiations broke down in October 2011, and a military coup in Bamako left Mali in disarray. Seizing the opportunity, Tuareg militias, most prominently the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and Ansar Eddine, were able to effectively extricate Malian military forces from Azawad in the northeast. The sudden takeover of Azawad has provoked calls for an immediate resolution from Mali's neighbors, which are concerned about similar rebellions at home. Militarily weak, Niger has advocated that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deploy 2,000-3,000 troops to intervene on its behalf. Whether ECOWAS deploys troops, Niger is better positioned than Mali to fend off a potential Tuareg rebellion. One of the most useful levers Niamey has in this regard is political and economic influence brought on by uranium mining. Producing almost 3,000 tons of uranium every year, these sites are crucial for Niamey's influence over the Tuaregs. They provide mining jobs for uranium-producing Tuareg communities, which receive a 15 percent commission on state uranium revenues. These government incentives have helped many Tuaregs, especially those disenchanted with or uninterested in the rising risks associated with the region's illicit economy, become participants in Nigerien state affairs. Despite the integration of many Tuaregs into Nigerien society, grievances within the Tuareg community remain. Some Tuaregs see illicit trading activity as the only viable alternative to earning income via their French and Nigerien "colonialists" and participate in the trade accordingly. Others may try to assume control of the uranium trade themselves by disrupting road access — though they lack the technological skills to extract, produce and export the element.
