Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan are preparing to hold two important referendums that could each impact the fate of the region's Kurds, albeit in very different ways. In Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is trying to gather more power under the presidency in the name of addressing the threat posed by Turkey's unruly Kurdish minority. In Arbil, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani is hoping to renew his electoral mandate by reviving the issue of Kurdish independence.
The two presidents' primary goal is to use the popular votes to consolidate their own power bases at a time when both are struggling to contain dissent. But if they are not careful, they could upset the delicate relationship that Ankara and Arbil have worked so hard to establish.
In late 2009, Erdogan began to seek closer diplomatic ties to the KRG as part of his broader strategy for solving Turkey's domestic Kurdish problem. In exchange for greater leeway in striking against Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan, Erdogan started to encourage Turkish investment into the region and allowed Kurdish energy exports to flow through Turkey. The new relationship also created opportunities for Turkish construction and energy firms in northern Iraq.
Though both sides benefit from close ties with each other, their relationship is nevertheless fragile. Turkey has an interest in empowering Arbil, but only to the extent of pulling it further from Baghdad's — and by extension, Iran's — grasp. Because of its own restive Kurdish minority, Ankara remains wary of the idea of an independent Kurdish state.
Both of these referendums are aimed at domestic audiences, but each could have repercussions beyond the Turkish and Kurdish borders. For the KRG, the establishment of an executive presidential system in Turkey may become cause for concern, especially if it were to enable Erdogan to take more aggressive action against Kurdish militant groups in the region. Turkey, for its part, would be wary of an independent Kurdish state forming just south of its border, particularly as it struggles to contain its own Kurdish insurgency. Immediate independence is an unrealistic goal for the KRG: Barzani himself has cautioned that the referendum is not intended to lead to a declaration of independence right away. More important, Kurdish independence would undermine Arbil's own relationships with Baghdad and the United States.
In all likelihood, this complicated web of interests and constraints will ensure that neither referendum ruffles the relationship between Ankara and Arbil. However, both votes will undoubtedly have a significant impact on the Kurds they rule.
