Weighing the Geopolitics of the Vietnam War

May 3, 2015 | 13:01 GMT

A cyclist pauses next to a billboard in Ho Chi Minh City featuring the 40th anniversary of the communist victory over former South Vietnam on April 30, 1975.



South Vietnam's capital city, Saigon, fell to invading North Vietnamese troops on April 30, 1975. The image of an overloaded Huey helicopter on top of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, frantically loading refugees, was forever seared into the American mind. It was the ignominious end of more than a decade of involvement by the United States in Vietnam.

Ultimately, Washington's failure to win the war in Vietnam resulted from factors beyond the conflict zone. The United States was heavily constrained by its global commitments — principally its need to secure Western Europe against Warsaw Pact invasion. Washington could not align military capabilities with realistic political goals to justify bringing the full might of U.S. armed forces to bear to defend its peripheral interests in Vietnam. Unable to comprehend North Vietnamese resolve and incapable of bringing about a swift victory, the United States' will to continue the war crumbled as the human cost mounted. Today, the dominant narrative among the American public is that Vietnam was a crushing American defeat. Forty years after the fall of Saigon, however, it is apparent that Vietnam had only a limited impact on the overall U.S. position within the broader context of the Cold War.

Despite the human cost, the conflict had only a limited impact on the overall U.S. position in the broader Cold War context....

Keep Reading

Register to read three free articles

Proceed to sign up

Register Now

Already have an account?

Sign In