Eurasia

Eurasia is the world&rsquo;s most expansive region. It connects the East to the West, forming a land bridge that borders Europe, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and South Asia. Forming the borders of this massive tract of land are the Northern European Plain, the Carpathian Mountains, the Southern Caucasus Mountains, the Tien Shan Mountains and Siberia. At the heart of Eurasia is Russia, a country that throughout history has tried, to varying degrees of success, to extend its influence to Eurasia&rsquo;s farthest reaches &mdash; a strategy meant to insulate it from outside powers. But this strategy necessarily creates conflict throughout Russia&rsquo;s borderlands, putting Eurasia a near constant state of instability.

Eurasia connects the East to the West, forming a land bridge that borders Europe, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and South Asia. 

All eyes will be fixed on the White House this quarter as it launches a trade offensive whose collateral damage will span the globe. As economic and political pressure mounts against China, North Korea will use a temporary detente with the South to undermine the United States' containment strategy against it.

Quarterly

Building on a brief detente, South Korea will try to persuade the United States and North Korea to reconcile their mostly intractable positions on the issue of denuclearization. 

In today's world, nations are becoming increasingly interconnected by air, land, sea and cyberspace. As globalization has knitted countries and continents closer together, the borders of the map and the barriers of geography have been rendered, in some ways, obsolete. Now events in one region can more easily have consequences in another, at times even rippling across the globe. We explore those with the greatest impact on international decision-making during the forecast period below.

The White House is ready to take aim at the global economy this quarter, and the bull's-eye is sitting squarely on Beijing. 

Global Trends

As U.S. President Donald Trump&#39;s 2018 trade agenda put it, &quot;these are exciting times for U.S. trade policy.&quot; That may be the understatement of the year. The White House is ready to take aim at the global economy this quarter, and the bull&#39;s-eye is sitting squarely on Beijing.Trump is convinced that China&#39;s economic rise poses a national security threat. And when it comes to China&#39;s penchant for dumping goods, enacting unfair subsidy regimes, distorting the market and violating intellectual property rights, many countries in the developed world would agree. The United States, however, isn&#39;t willing to wait around for the European Union and Japan to address these challenges in a managed, multilateral forum. Instead it will follow an &quot;act now, talk later&quot; strategy that it believes &mdash; rightly or wrongly &mdash; will coerce Beijing into coming to the negotiating table on Washington&#39;s terms. The United States also hopes its tactics will galvanize free-trade advocates to reform institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) so that they, too, can bring China in line with international trade and investment norms. That&#39;s the idea, anyway.But just as the United States claims that China benefits from <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/globalization" data-tid="620" type="Themes" title="Globalization">a rules-based global trade order</a> by refusing to play by those rules, the White House is bending many of them to make its point. For instance, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/trumps-trade-challenges-revisited-steel-aluminum-tariffs" data-nid="287686" type="Guidance" title="Trump's Trade Challenges, Revisited" data-timestamp="1519948949">the sweeping tariffs on steel and aluminum</a>&nbsp;that Washington will use to combat overcapacity in the name of national security will produce a litany of legal challenges within the United States and at the WTO, as affected countries &mdash; including members of the European Union, China, Brazil, Japan and South Korea &mdash; protest the measures. In fact, many will retaliate with anti-dumping and countervailing duties of their own against the United States, taking care to target politically sensitive sectors like agriculture ahead of midterm elections in November. These reprisals may even take on an anti-American tone: The European Union has already threatened to crack down on iconic American imports, including Harley Davidson motorcycles, bourbon and blue jeans.

By using creative arguments to wield the most powerful trade weapons in its arsenal, the United States will&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/why-united-states-wary-wto" data-nid="286044" type="Reflections" title="Why the United States Is Wary of the WTO" data-timestamp="1513288571">back the WTO into a corner.</a>&nbsp;Legal challenges in the organization take years to play out, but if the arbitration ends in Washington&#39;s favor, it will endorse a dangerous precedent of invoking national security to justify economic protectionism. Should the WTO rule against the United States, the White House could opt to ignore the decision altogether by citing American sovereignty, undermining the institution&#39;s credibility in the process. (Notably, the White House will also&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/trumps-disruptive-approach-trade" data-nid="275465" type="Reflections" title="Trump's Disruptive Approach to Trade" data-timestamp="1488416919">continue to paralyze the WTO&#39;s arbitration system</a>&nbsp;by blocking new appointments to the appellate body.)In the meantime, steel and aluminum consumers in the United States will have to bear higher input costs. Contrary to Trump&#39;s logic that higher tariffs will reduce trade deficits, they aren&#39;t guaranteed to make Chinese steel less competitive in the United States. Metals exporters subject to U.S. tariffs will divert their goods to other markets around the world, which in turn will cause big metals importers to throw up barriers to protect their markets from a flood of foreign products. Amid the ensuing trade scramble, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/us-and-balance-power" data-tid="572" type="Themes" title="The U.S. and the Balance of Power">the United States</a> hopes to persuade the European Union and Japan to join its crusade to counter excess global steel capacity. But Washington&#39;s partners may instead choose to stand up to its blatant protectionism and push back against the United States under the auspices of the WTO.The United States&#39; opening trade move may be to target overcapacity, but intellectual property will be high on its list of concerns as well. Under a Section 301 investigation into whether China&#39;s technology transfer and investment requirements of American firms operating inside its borders are discriminatory, Washington will take action against Beijing &mdash; both within and beyond the bounds of the WTO. (The investigation must wrap up by August, but Washington may release its findings before then.) The United States is already entertaining some legally questionable moves, such as&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/who-would-lose-more-us-china-war-reciprocity" data-nid="286736" type="Assessments" title="Who Would Lose More in a U.S.-China War of Reciprocity?" data-timestamp="1516235334">declaring a national emergency</a>&nbsp;in response to China&#39;s intellectual property violations, to impose punitive measures and erect safeguards around certain U.S. industries like consumer electronics, household appliances and automotives. Along with Europe, it will also continue to block Chinese investments in the tech sector as it sees fit, pointing to national security as its motive.

China, of course, won&#39;t take Trump&#39;s trade jabs lying down. In addition to imposing its own restrictions on some U.S. agricultural goods, Beijing is likely to selectively apply regulatory pressure on American companies with stakes in China. And when the time comes for Beijing to negotiate with Washington, it will have a handful of concessions &mdash; expanding U.S. access to the Chinese market and boosting Chinese imports of U.S. goods in certain sectors, to name a few &mdash; to offer. The external pressure mounting against China&#39;s economy may even accelerate the country&#39;s ongoing attempts to tackle overcapacity at home.Though the White House may be willing to stomach the political risk attached to tariffs that ratchet up metals prices for U.S. industrial consumers, it will show more caution as it navigates North American trade negotiations. The ongoing NAFTA talks will stretch beyond this quarter, thanks to major sticking points on rules of origin requirements for the auto sector and to Canada&#39;s more assertive stance against the United States. So far, domestic political checks on Trump&#39;s actions have dissuaded the president from abruptly withdrawing from the pact. As he leans on more aggressive trade measures in the months ahead, overruling defenders of free trade within his administration, Congress will take on a more assertive role in regulating the country&#39;s commerce abroad. Though U.S. lawmakers will have greater room to insulate existing free trade agreements, including NAFTA, their ability to counter unilateral tariffs leveled by the executive branch will be limited.The White House&#39;s trade policy will be one of several factors&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/after-decade-calm-bigger-waves-may-batter-markets" data-nid="287187" type="Reflections" title="After a Decade of Calm, Bigger Waves May Batter the Markets" data-timestamp="1517964479">fueling market volatility</a>&nbsp;in the second quarter. Any uptick in expectations of inflation could lead to four hikes in U.S. interest rates this year instead of three. While by no means certain, this outcome would cause overvalued asset prices in U.S. equity markets to deflate. Higher interest rates could also strengthen the dollar and put more pressure on the central banks of the eurozone, Japan and China to tighten their monetary policies as they guard against the outflow of capital &mdash; with consequences for economic growth that could ripple across the globe.

The Bull in the China Shop

The president&#39;s approach to trade offers yet another example of his willingness to override the concerns of national security professionals within his administration on certain issues. Many have called for a more measured and targeted approach to avoid entrapping strategic U.S. allies and increasing the costs of U.S. defense. Still, as long as these voices remain in the White House, they will continue to restrain Trump&#39;s responses to thornier foreign policy matters.Among them will be nuclear containment. Despite worsening military friction between the United States and North Korea this quarter, a U.S. strike on the Korean Peninsula will remain an unlikely prospect &mdash; particularly given the promised summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Meanwhile, even as the United States urges Europe to threaten Iran with sanctions related to its ballistic missile program, Washington will stop short of tearing up Tehran&#39;s nuclear deal altogether. But new nuclear proliferation concerns are emerging in the Middle East. Having already secured Russia&#39;s stamp of approval for a preliminary roadmap, Saudi Arabia will use the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and global powers as a framework for a deal on a civilian nuclear program in the kingdom that includes domestic enrichment rights. Though it won&#39;t be thrilled with the idea, the United States will work to ensure that it &mdash; rather than a rival like Russia &mdash; is best positioned to partner with allies in the Arab world that seek civilian nuclear programs of their own.As it fends off <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/rebalancing-power-middle-east" data-tid="616" type="Themes" title="Rebalancing Power in the Middle East">Moscow&#39;s encroachment in the Middle East</a>, Washington will prepare for a more fundamental competition with Russia and China. At the beginning of the year, a series of U.S. defense reviews all but confirmed this by dubbing the two eastern giants the main strategic threats to the United States today. As <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/arms-race-toward-global-instability" data-nid="287464" type="On Geopolitics" title="An Arms Race Toward Global Instability" data-timestamp="1519146012">the great power competition</a>&nbsp;takes shape, countries caught in the middle will have no choice but to adapt. Some, like Ukraine and Taiwan, will use the contest to fortify their alliances with the United States. Others, like the Philippines, will find it increasingly difficult to balance their relationships with both sides.Spurred by their rivalry, the United States, China and Russia will continue to develop disruptive weapons technology. But rather than force all parties into compliance with existing arms treaties, this dangerous race is more likely to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/changing-rulebook-tame-new-global-arms-race" data-nid="278333" type="On Geopolitics" title="A Changing Rulebook to Tame the New Global Arms Race" data-timestamp="1490688012">further degrade the deals</a>&nbsp;as time goes on. Accusations of violations will continue to fly between the United States and Russia as the pivotal Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty steadily falls apart, undermining talks on the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the process.

Reining in Rogues and Rivals

At the same time, the United States and China will jockey for the leading edge in artificial intelligence, which stands to have a profound impact on both military and civilian life. The United States is still ahead of China on this front, but Beijing is sprinting to catch up. And whereas big tech firms will have to contend with data privacy concerns and antitrust investigations in the West, China&#39;s corporate giants will be largely unfettered in <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/coming-tech-war-china" data-nid="287179" type="On Geopolitics" title="The Coming Tech War With China" data-timestamp="1517951718">the mad dash for technological dominance</a>.Data privacy and its role in <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/4th-industrial-revolution" data-tid="566" type="Themes" title="The 4th Industrial Revolution">the evolving relationship among citizens, companies and states</a> will take the spotlight in the European Union in the months ahead. Though European governments are particularly keen to protect the privacy rights of individuals, the Continent is simply too large a market for tech companies to avoid entirely. The General Data Protection Regulation set to take effect across the European Union on May 25 will thus set a global precedent for tech firms trying to navigate data privacy challenges.The financial tech sector will follow the same path. Now that the speculative bubble around cryptocurrencies has burst, states will have more space to craft rules for cryptocurrencies, distributed ledger technology and initial coin offerings. Other industries &mdash; from supply chain management to insurance to health care &mdash; are beginning to adopt and regulate distributed ledger technology as well, albeit at a slower pace. Pending regulatory approval, a recently announced joint venture between IBM and Maersk Line shipping will bear watching because it may pioneer the use of <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/could-blockchain-solve-brexit-ireland-border-eu" data-nid="287612" type="Assessments" title="Could Blockchain Solve a Brexit Sticking Point?" data-timestamp="1519759615">blockchain technology</a>&nbsp;in the management of global supply chains.As governments wrap their heads around the benefits of alternative currencies, more state-backed cryptocurrencies will crop up throughout the year, each driven by a different motive. For advanced countries, such as Estonia, cryptocurrency adoption is a natural step in digitizing their economies. For Iran and Russia, it could offer some insulation from the sanctions against them. Cryptocurrencies can also be useful to shambolic economies like Venezuela or Zimbabwe, where people have lost trust in fiat currencies, want to back their currencies with a commodity or hope to shield themselves from sanctions. And as small, dollarized countries like the Marshall Islands are discovering, cryptocurrencies can offer greater economic flexibility and an alternative to the dollar.

A Mad Dash to the Cutting Edge

The U.S. energy industry, a major steel consumer, will be hit hard this quarter by hefty steel tariffs that jack up its production costs &mdash; and at a time, no less, when U.S. oil output has broken records at over 10 million barrels per day. Though U.S. shale production may moderately decline as a result, it won&#39;t be enough to ease the concerns of OPEC and its external partners, which have trimmed back their output in an effort to balance out the growing supplies of their American competitors. So far, production dips in Mexico, China and Venezuela are helping to offset the relentless climb in U.S. and Canadian output. OPEC and non-OPEC producers will probably extend their cuts through the end of the year when they meet in Vienna in June. The details of a longer-term agreement, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, to counter U.S. shale production will likely emerge around the same time as well.Elsewhere in the energy realm, demand for <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/topic/future-energy" data-tid="560" type="Topics" title="_Energy">lithium-ion batteries</a> &mdash; and the corresponding need for cobalt and lithium &mdash; is on the rise. At its heart is China, whose environmental reforms and technological drive are fueling the development and demand for electric vehicle batteries. But <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/cobalt-metal-poised-peak" data-nid="286493" type="Assessments" title="Cobalt: A Metal Poised to Peak" data-timestamp="1515398415">the world&#39;s newfound appetite</a>&nbsp;for these resources will create a host of geopolitical challenges. This quarter, battery producers will have to grapple with new legislation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/congo-cobalt-copper-mining-kabila-batteries" data-nid="287711" type="Assessments" title="The Congo Is Set to Butt Heads With Mining Firms Over Cobalt" data-timestamp="1520173384">a major source of cobalt</a>, that will increase mining royalties owed to the government. And although Argentina and Chile are well-positioned to attract foreign investment into their lithium sectors, growing political instability in Bolivia will hurt its chances of doing the same.&nbsp;

For a Look at Related Trends We're Tracking This Quarter:

Old Challenges and New Appetites in Energy

Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific is home to more people than any other region. Centered on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean, this region includes the easternmost countries of continental Asia as well as the archipelagos that punctuate the coast. Several of these countries, most notably China, experienced rapid economic growth in the second half of the 20th century, giving the region a new sense of global economic relevance that continues today. That relevance, however, depends largely on China, a power in transition whose rise is testing the network of U.S. alliances that have long dominated the region. How effectively Beijing manages its transition will shape the regional balance of power in the decades to come.

Centered on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean, the Asia-Pacific region includes the easternmost countries of continental Asia as well as the archipelagos that punctuate the coast. 

For months, the nuclear threat rising from the Korean Peninsula has transfixed the globe, but during this quarter, a different issue will take center stage in Asia: China&#39;s brewing trade spat with the United States. With Washington determined to bring Beijing&#39;s behavior in line with its own agenda, it will ratchet up pressure by targeting China&#39;s economy and strategic interests in the region &mdash; including its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Rather than take these measures lying down, China will retaliate, sounding the bell for a boxing match that will determine the moves and countermoves of smaller nations caught between the sparring giants.The impending showdown has loomed for over a year. Throughout 2017, China parried most of the United States&#39; jabs by answering Washington&#39;s calls to ramp up economic pressure on North Korea. To that end, Beijing scaled back its trade ties and severed its lingering financial connections with Pyongyang. But as North Korea accelerated its weapons development, China&#39;s ability to shape events on the peninsula waned, eroding its ability to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/testing-depth-us-china-cooperation" data-nid="279037" type="Reflections" title="Testing the Depth of U.S.-China Cooperation" data-timestamp="1492132009">link trade matters to security issues</a>&nbsp;in the process. No longer able to fend off the United States&#39; blows, and faced with the maturation of several U.S. punitive trade measures against it, China could respond in kind by slapping tariffs on U.S. exports, including on agricultural and chemical products; by challenging U.S. measures at the World Trade Organization (WTO); and by pressuring American firms operating in China. All the while, Beijing will try to create room for negotiation with Washington by offering to open up Chinese markets and boost its imports of U.S. goods. Despite its best efforts, however, the United States will keep its sights trained on Chinese trade practices.The timing of this feud couldn&#39;t be worse for Beijing. On the heels of <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/china-transition" data-tid="577" type="Themes" title="China in Transition">a crucial quinquennial transition in political leadership</a>, China&#39;s elite face the daunting task of pushing through a raft of delayed socio-economic reforms. Over the past few months, the country has taken advantage of its robust economic growth and stable trade ties to advance important aspects of a plan <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/new-year-no-resolution-chinas-debt-problem" data-nid="286935" type="Assessments" title="A New Year, but No Resolution for China's Debt Problem" data-timestamp="1517064802">to shift its economic model</a>&nbsp;away from credit-based investment and toward domestic consumption. Among these steps are deleveraging China&#39;s financial system and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/chinas-corporate-reform-yields-different-kind-profit" data-nid="282910" type="Assessments" title="China's Corporate Reform Yields a Different Kind of Profit" data-timestamp="1503234352">deeply indebted state-owned enterprises,</a>&nbsp;eliminating overcapacity in resource-intensive industries, and increasing <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/red-china-goes-green" data-nid="278119" type="Assessments" title="Red China Goes Green" data-timestamp="1489742136">the enforcement of environmental regulations</a>.As Beijing expands its reforms in the months ahead, the central government will concentrate on making sure that local governments and industries effectively enforce them. So far China&#39;s attempts to curb informal lending and overhaul the bloated state-run companies at the heart of the nation&#39;s debt crisis have fallen short at the local level; governments and companies there collectively hold debt equal to about 80 percent of China&#39;s gross domestic product. Likewise, the implementation of environmental laws has been lackluster across the southern provinces and among a handful of industries, including steel and coal. Beijing will try to rectify these problems by stressing the importance of compliance, but doing so will carry the risk of widespread failure caused by overly hasty implementation or by local resistance stemming from a desire to preserve economic growth and jobs.Having <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/chinas-president-xi-jinping-trades-off-risks-abolish-term-limits" data-nid="287645" type="Reflections" title="China's President Trades One Set of Risks for Another" data-timestamp="1519848304">cemented his grip on power</a>, President Xi Jinping will have few excuses left for such failures. He will rely in part on the new National Supervision Commission to keep a sharp eye on local officials&#39; performance and ensure that they don&#39;t botch the job. One issue will draw particularly close attention from Beijing: <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/china-there-no-painless-escape-debt" data-nid="277576" type="Graphics" title="For China, There Is No Painless Escape From Debt" data-timestamp="1483643486">easing China&#39;s massive local debt burden</a>&nbsp;by correcting an imbalance between the fiscal responsibilities of the central and local governments. Since the start of the year, Beijing has made significant headway on its long-delayed tax reforms, in part by <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/china-goes-local" data-nid="287268" type="Assessments" title="China Goes Local" data-timestamp="1518280946">shoring up local tax bases</a>. Though its centerpiece property tax likely won&#39;t emerge until 2020, the Chinese government will continue to enact fiscal reforms, encourage domestic consumption, reallocate resources to underdeveloped regions and lighten corporate debt loads in the coming months &mdash; all with the aim of setting the Chinese economy down a more sustainable path.Of course,<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/future-us-foreign-policy-trade" data-nid="286618" type="Contributor Perspectives" title="The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy? Trade" data-timestamp="1515855815"> a deepening trade dispute with the United States</a>&nbsp;will present a formidable obstacle on the road to reform. On March 23, Washington will impose high tariffs on U.S. steel and aluminum imports to protect itself from what it deems to be unfair trade practices by other countries, including China. Because only about 2 percent of U.S. steel imports come from China, the volume of these imports will remain fairly steady. But China, which accounts for roughly half of the world&#39;s steel production, will still be hit hard as steel prices tumble and major exporters divert their supplies from the United States, snatching up a portion of China&#39;s market share along the way. To make matters worse, Washington&#39;s actions could inspire European countries and Japan to erect their own trade barriers against China to protect producers at home. Each new source of strain could damage China&#39;s steel industry, potentially reducing employment in the sector and undermining Beijing&#39;s ability to address stubborn overcapacity issues.

Steel and aluminum tariffs aren&#39;t the only weapon at the United States&#39; disposal, either. Washington could opt to establish tariffs or import quotas on major Chinese exports, such as electronics. It may also charge hefty fines intended to alter China&#39;s market restrictions and intellectual property practices. Each of these tactics would become even more effective if the United States were to join forces with the European Union and Japan &mdash; a scenario China is undoubtedly eager to avoid. But try as it might, Beijing&#39;s efforts to open up its services, finance and manufacturing industries to the rest of the world won&#39;t satisfy Washington&#39;s demands or discourage its scrutiny of Chinese investment in the high-tech sector.&nbsp;&nbsp;

Regardless of which means the United States uses to achieve its ends, China will have to expend more and more resources to prop up its precarious economy. And as its funds run low, Beijing will be forced to compromise on some of its key economic objectives. For instance, should Washington&#39;s measures chip away at China&#39;s growth or employment figures, Beijing may back off its planned production cuts and environmental reforms, or it may use lines of credit to buoy the economy. In the direst circumstances, the central government could even&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/chinas-property-sector-groans-under-weight-its-debt" data-nid="286298" type="Assessments" title="China's Property Sector Groans Under the Weight of Its Debt" data-timestamp="1514365207">bolster the real estate market</a>, potentially creating a real estate bubble and, in the long run, the heightened risk of a national debt default.&nbsp;

The Bell Heard 'Round the World

North Korea is convinced that the only way to avoid foreign military action against it is to develop a viable nuclear deterrent — and it is now in the final stages of developing one. Sanctions and negotiations have failed to persuade Pyongyang to abandon this strategy, so world powers have only two options for coping with North Korea: militarily intervene before it acquires a deterrent or begin to shape defense strategies based on the assumption that it will inevitably acquire one. The dilemma is forcing China, Pyongyang’s only ally, to redefine its North Korea policy and is compelling countries such as South Korea, Japan and the United States to increase military cooperation.

North Korea is convinced that the only way to avoid foreign military action against it is to develop a viable nuclear deterrent — and it is now in the final stages of developing one.

While the consequences of the United States&#39; trade tiff with China could spread across the global economy, its attempts to contain North Korea &mdash; and to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/us-and-balance-power" data-tid="572" type="Themes" title="The U.S. and the Balance of Power">enlist China in its campaign</a>&nbsp;&mdash; will have an only marginally narrower impact. Ahead of the 2018 Winter Olympics, North Korea&#39;s relationship with the South appeared to warm as Washington and Seoul delayed their <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/south-korea-protect-olympic-games-seoul-wants-delay-war-games" data-nid="286179" type="Snapshots" title="South Korea: To Protect the Olympic Games, Seoul Wants to Delay War Games" data-timestamp="1513806105">joint military exercises</a>&nbsp;and Pyongyang continued to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/history-north-koreas-arsenal" data-nid="283911" type="Assessments" title="The History of North Korea's Arsenal" data-timestamp="1511904671">postpone its controversial missile tests</a>. But preserving the peninsular detente was <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/koreas-place-history" data-nid="286686" type="On Geopolitics" title="Korea's Place in History" data-timestamp="1516089640">an uphill battle from the start</a>, thanks to the United States&#39; refusal to accept North Korea&#39;s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent.The second quarter will thus be marked by <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/bridging-divides-between-washington-and-seoul" data-nid="281649" type="Assessments" title="Bridging the Divides Between Washington and Seoul" data-timestamp="1498756956">South Korea&#39;s attempt to manage its relationships</a>&nbsp;with the United States and North Korea as Pyongyang relies on its tried-and-true tactic of using outreach to Seoul and Washington to break the U.S. pressure campaign against it. At the center of this approach will be <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/cheeseburgers-workers-paradise" data-nid="287853" type="On Geopolitics" title="Cheeseburgers in the Workers' Paradise" data-timestamp="1520622320">the promised meeting </a>between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Seoul, for its part, will seek tangible steps toward confidence-building measures with Pyongyang. However, because the United States will refuse to ease up on the North until it makes notable strides in <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/warpath-paved-rational-decisions" data-nid="282011" type="Assessments" title="On a Warpath Paved With Rational Decisions" data-timestamp="1500282907">abandoning its nuclear weapons program</a>, the window for outreach between the two Koreas will be narrow. Though the United States may take North Korea up on its offer of so-called &quot;talks about talks,&quot; they might not get far in the face of Washington&#39;s persistent offensive against Pyongyang&#39;s nuclear program and North Korea&#39;s insistence on the easing back of U.S. defense architecture in the region. At the end of the day, ensuring North Korea&#39;s denuclearization will be a tall order, fraught with American suspicions of Pyongyang&#39;s duplicity and challenges in verifying its compliance.As it attempts to balance between neighbor and ally, South Korea will carefully consider its long-term reliance on U.S. security guarantees &mdash; even if it means risking the North&#39;s ire, which could take the form of sudden cancellations in negotiations, reversals of agreements and preconditions for further concessions. Pyongyang will alternate punishment and outreach to Seoul in hopes of maintaining leverage over Washington. Keen to signal that North Korea cannot dictate its behavior, the United States will press for the quick resumption of its military exercises with South Korea.

North Korea, in turn, will have the chance to conduct more weapons tests as the weather gets warmer. Whether it will actually do so, however, is unclear, since such tests would risk undermining Pyongyang&#39;s attempts to relieve the strain it is under. For its part, the United States will continue to weigh the option of launching a full military strike against the North, but it is unlikely to conduct one in light of the costs associated with the operation. Instead, Washington will keep up the economic and diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang while eyeing the attractive option of&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/bloody-noses-and-black-eyes-whats-limited-strike-north-korea" data-nid="287182" type="On Geopolitics" title="Bloody Noses and Black Eyes: What's in a Limited Strike on North Korea?" data-timestamp="1518082210">the limited strike</a>, which could take many forms &mdash; including covert action. This approach, if selected, would aim to delay or disrupt North Korea&#39;s nuclear program in an effort to avoid a policy of perpetual containment and the threat of war. Yet even the limited strike would be tough for the United States to pursue amid North Korea&#39;s diplomatic overtures.For all its bluster, North Korea will proceed with caution as well. As it nears the finish line in its race toward a nuclear deterrent, North Korea will try to break the resolve of the international community and the United States&#39; allies to adhere to the crippling sanctions regime against it. Pyongyang&#39;s recent good behavior and high-profile outreach to Seoul, coupled with Washington&#39;s aggressive rhetoric, have only supported China and Russia&#39;s argument in the United Nations that the United States is needlessly provocative and should show more restraint. If the United States rejects North Korea&#39;s advances or keeps its harsh measures in place before entering into talks with Pyongyang, China and Russia will have an opportunity to weaken the sanctions regime against the North. Moreover, Beijing, driven by the need to&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/china-weighs-costs-volatile-friendship" data-nid="269974" type="Assessments" title="China Weighs the Costs of a Volatile Friendship" data-timestamp="1477300510">avert a complete collapse in governance on its doorstep</a>, will use any opening in the dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang to assert its influence once more. Even if the United States manages to secure more sanctions against North Korea, the penalties won&#39;t deter Pyongyang&#39;s pursuit of the nuclear ambitions it has long held dear.&nbsp;

Coping With a Nuclear North Korea

It’s difficult to ignore some of the benefits of globalization. Goods became cheaper, markets became more accessible, and people moved more freely across borders. But those benefits came at the expense of jobs and, depending on whom you ask, national identities throughout the developed world. It is little surprise, then, that globalization is now an object of contempt in the countries that were once its biggest advocates — countries that have begun to elect leaders who promise to right the wrongs globalization has wrought. International trade will continue, of course, but governments will replace ambitious globe-spanning trade deals with smaller ones, even bilateral ones, as the political challenges to negotiating free trade agreements grow.

The benefits of globalization came at the expense of jobs and, depending on whom you ask, national identities throughout the developed world.

Despite the tension running high on the Korean Peninsula, the top two U.S. allies in Asia &mdash; <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/united-states-reassures-its-asian-allies" data-nid="270181" type="Assessments" title="The United States Reassures Its Asian Allies" data-timestamp="1486112656">South Korea and Japan</a>&nbsp;&mdash; have been unable to escape its wrath in the realm of trade. Like China, they have become the targets of a White House bent on reducing U.S. trade deficits and increasing its access to foreign markets.The United States dealt a blow to South Korea during the first quarter of the year by introducing new global safeguards on washing machines and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/us-shedding-light-trumps-solar-panel-tariffs" data-nid="286859" type="Snapshots" title="U.S.: Shedding Light on Trump's Solar Panel Tariffs" data-timestamp="1516736396">solar panels</a>. Now South Korea is staring down the barrel of steel tariffs that will hurt its own producers, in addition to those of China and Japan. During ongoing talks on the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), Washington will likely keep insisting on concessions from Seoul in the automobile and agricultural sectors, too. That said, the United States will be more focused on China and on negotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement in the coming months, as long as those talks aren&#39;t suspended in the runup to the U.S. midterm and Mexican presidential elections. South Korea &mdash; nearing local electoral contests of its own in June &mdash; will seize the chance to push back against Washington&#39;s demands where it can. But faced with a flagging economy and stagnating Chinese trade ties, South Korea will have every reason to compromise to prevent the United States&#39; withdrawal from KORUS.Japan&#39;s automobile, agricultural and pharmaceutical industries have come under fire from the United States as well. So far Tokyo has eased Washington&#39;s concerns somewhat with concessions and promises of big-ticket purchases in the U.S. energy and defense sectors. However, Japan will do what it can to sidestep the United States&#39; calls for a bilateral trade deal. With Australia&#39;s help, it will instead urge the United States to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, where Tokyo could count on having more leverage against Washington. But the current U.S. administration is unlikely to give in. With or without U.S. participation, Japan will concentrate on the revived version of the pact &mdash; the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership &mdash; as a way to lead the charge toward free trade in Asia. Once the fledgling bloc&#39;s remaining members have signed the deal in March, they will embark on the legislative process of approving the agreement, an undertaking that is poised to go smoothly.

Globalization

As its military power grows, China will struggle to balance its desire for friendly relations with its neighbors against the more fundamental need to secure its maritime interests — a need Beijing believes is best served through unilateral action. China’s rivals are doing all they can to contain this expansion, in part by leveraging economic cooperation with Beijing and in part by forging alliances with outside powers such as the United States, Japan and Australia. But as more powers enter these contested waters, the risk of confrontation will only rise.

China’s rivals are doing all they can to contain its expansion

While scrambling to respond to U.S. trade tactics, China will have to protect its interests on a second front as well: its own backyard.Determined to check China&#39;s rising power, the United States will <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/taiwan-thrust-unwanted-spotlight" data-nid="287153" type="Assessments" title="Taiwan Is Thrust Into an Unwanted Spotlight" data-timestamp="1517994058">increasingly challenge Beijing&#39;s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan</a>. Over the past few months, two bills have advanced in the U.S. Congress that would permit official visits between U.S. and Taiwanese leaders while lobbying to enhance the island&#39;s status in international organizations. In the months ahead, Taiwan will be an observer at U.S. military exercises in March and June, will host <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/us-taiwan-why-military-conference-matters-china" data-nid="287542" type="Snapshots" title="U.S., Taiwan: Why a Military Conference Matters to China" data-timestamp="1519335119">a defense conference with the United States</a>&nbsp;in May for the first time, and will make politically sensitive requests for purchases of military equipment such as F-16 and F-18 fighter jets. Each of these moves will only widen the diplomatic chasm between the United States and China, prompting Beijing to isolate Taipei, threaten the Taiwan Strait and perhaps even downgrade its military exchanges with Washington. However, none of these responses will dissuade Washington and Taipei from deepening ties.To hedge against external meddling elsewhere in the region, China will forge ahead with negotiations on a code of conduct for the South China Sea, which began in March. Distracted by <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/could-federalism-smooth-southeast-asia-s-rough-edges" data-nid="286895" type="Assessments" title="Could Federalism Smooth Southeast Asia’s Rough Edges?" data-timestamp="1516957240">constitutional reforms</a> and Islamist militancy this quarter, the Philippines can&#39;t afford to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/philippines-china-pursuing-natural-gas-oil-south-china-sea" data-nid="287710" type="Snapshots" title="Philippines, China: Pursuing a Rocky Partnership in the South China Sea" data-timestamp="1520023660">end its detente with China </a>over the disputed waters. But Washington may still throw a wrench in Beijing&#39;s plans as some countries, such as Vietnam, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/southeast-asia-burdened-consensus" data-tid="617" type="Themes" title="Southeast Asia: Burdened by Consensus">grow bolder in their foreign policies</a>&nbsp;because of their strengthening partnerships with the United States. At the same time, the members of <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/indo-pacific-defining-region" data-nid="285345" type="Reflections" title="The Indo-Pacific: Defining a Region" data-timestamp="1510708662">the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue</a>&nbsp;&mdash; the United States, Japan, Australia and India &mdash; will focus on using regional infrastructure development and diplomatic gestures to smaller Asian powers to contain China&#39;s maritime expansionism.Faced with the tricky problem of juggling their relationships with China and the United States, and vulnerable to the secondary effects of the two countries&#39; trade spat, Indonesia and Malaysia will hold elections this quarter. Economic issues will feature prominently in both races as opposition parties criticize the unequal distribution of economic wealth. In Indonesia, whose local elections in June will set the stage for national races in 2019, the opposition has also censured the ruling party for outreach to the United States and Australia that it deems overly eager. The opposition in Malaysia has directed similar accusations &mdash; but about the government&#39;s ties with China &mdash; toward the long-ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, whose parliamentary majority will be on the line in the next general elections. Neither race is likely to end in an upset, but both will give critics of the government a platform and will force the ruling parties to react accordingly.With the shared goal of insulating themselves from U.S. encroachment on their peripheries, China and Russia will place an even greater premium on cooperation, rather than competition, in areas of mutual interest. During the first quarter, the two powers made notable progress on several joint energy projects, including the Arctic Yamal natural gas project and the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. They will build on these gains in June when China hosts <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/can-shanghai-cooperation-organization-live-its-name" data-nid="280987" type="Reflections" title="Can the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Live Up to Its Name?" data-timestamp="1496966698">the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)</a> summit. There, both countries will demonstrate their common goals of stabilizing Central Asia and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/afghanistan-china-pakistan-can-china-end-americas-longest-running-war" data-nid="286299" type="Snapshots" title="Afghanistan, China, Pakistan: Can China End America's Longest-Running War?" data-timestamp="1514323950">Afghanistan</a>&nbsp;and spurring deeper integration among the bloc&#39;s members, perhaps even raising the oft-discussed proposal of establishing SCO banks and a free trade zone. Meanwhile, Beijing will use its sizable coffers to outstrip Japanese financing of projects in Russia&#39;s Far East and Arctic regions in hopes of driving a wedge between Moscow and Tokyo.&nbsp;

Asia-Pacific: Among Great Powers

Japan will try its best to foil China&#39;s plans, and on economic matters it will have some success. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will likely meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in May. That visit will yield progress on more energy, infrastructure and information technology deals centered on the Russian mainland. Though the two leaders will also discuss their nations&#39; territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands, they probably won&#39;t make a breakthrough on the issue because of Russia&#39;s determination to maintain sovereignty there.

Back home, Abe will spend most of his energy trying to advance his legislative agenda ahead of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elections in September. The prime minister has set the ambitious goal of passing a raft of constitutional amendments this year, including the alteration of Article 9, which enshrines the principle of pacifism by&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/normalizing-japans-military-isnt-straight-sprint-its-set-hurdles" data-nid="283003" type="Assessments" title="Normalizing Japan's Military Isn't a Straight Sprint, It's a Set of Hurdles" data-timestamp="1503566125">outlawing the use of force in foreign policy</a>. He will take care not to pursue this goal too aggressively (and risk a dip in the polls) or too timidly (and risk empowering hard-line critics in the LDP) as Japanese lawmakers work to finalize the defense budget in April. The ruling party will also seek out <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/japanese-awakening" data-tid="581" type="Themes" title="A Japanese Awakening">reforms</a> on income, inheritance and pension taxes to offset the pain of a consumption tax hike planned for October 2019, which will amount to double the rate it was in 2014. In addition, Japanese officials will formalize a long-debated immigration policy in a bid to alleviate&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/trade-profile-japan-adapts-its-aging-population" data-nid="280834" type="Assessments" title="Trade Profile: Japan Adapts to Its Aging Population" data-timestamp="1496713018">the country&#39;s looming demographic crisis</a>.

As it stands, Abe is well-positioned to secure another appointment to his post at the head of the LDP that would&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/japan-after-elections-prime-minister-preserves-power" data-nid="284715" type="Snapshots" title="Japan: After Elections, the Prime Minister Preserves Power" data-timestamp="1508798962">extend his tenure through 2021</a>. But he will use the September leadership race as an opportunity to check any political rivals rising within the party ranks.

Japan's Prime Minister Protects His Position

Americas

The Americas stretch from the Arctic Circle in Canada to the southern tip of Chile. This geographically, culturally and politically diverse region is home to the United States, a nation whose geography helped it become the foremost economic and military power in the world &mdash; an ascendance aided in part by bringing Mexico and Canada into its sphere of influence. Farther south, the nations of South America are like islands, separated by vast spaces of impenetrable mountains, rivers and jungles. Try though these countries may to integrate more closely, deeper ties such as those that characterize North America will prove elusive.

This geographically, culturally and politically diverse region is home to the United States, a nation whose geography helped it become the foremost economic and military power in the world

The U.S. approach to trade will take center stage this quarter as President Donald Trump&#39;s America First policies lead to action. After imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, the White House may also move to punish Chinese trade practices through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and unilateral tariffs. And pressure from lawmakers will push negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) beyond the quarter.Unless they are granted exemptions, some of the countries targeted by the new tariffs will soon start retaliating against the United States. South Korea, Brazil, Japan and the European Union, for example, will launch challenges in the WTO and take other retaliatory measures, which could lead to new or higher tariffs on U.S. exports, mainly in the agricultural sector. Overseas, meanwhile, the oversupply of aluminum and steel will worsen as exporters shut off from the U.S. market scramble to divert their products elsewhere, prompting other governments around the world to erect additional barriers against imports of the metals.

Beyond its move on metals, the White House may take action against China this quarter after a separate trade investigation into some of the country&#39;s business practices. The inquiry, opened under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, focuses on activities among Chinese firms, such as pressuring foreign companies operating in China to share intellectual property, conducting unauthorized technology transfers and illegally intruding into commercial business networks. The investigation may well continue beyond this quarter; the United States has until August to render its decision on the matter. When it does take action, though, the United States will bring WTO cases against China and will try to do so in coordination with Japan and the European Union. It will also pursue measures outside the WTO &mdash; probably tariffs or quotas in sectors in which Chinese companies have forced technology transfer from U.S. firms, such as consumer electronics, appliances and automotive parts. In response, Beijing is likely to impose tariffs of its own on key U.S. agricultural exports like&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/china-us-weighing-options-future-trade-measures" data-nid="287160" type="Snapshots" title="China, U.S.: Weighing the Options for Future Trade Measures" data-timestamp="1517872587">sorghum and soybeans</a>, while tightening regulations on American companies investing in China.On the domestic front, too, the White House will face challenges to its agenda. Lawmakers up for re-election will be loath to support many of the administration&#39;s policy proposals. Even&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/us-immigration-reforms-may-hit-wall-congress" data-nid="286588" type="Assessments" title="U.S. Immigration Reforms May Hit a Wall in Congress" data-timestamp="1515626414">the president&#39;s watered-down immigration reforms</a>&nbsp;stand little chance of reaching the 60 votes required to pass in the Senate.&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/cracks-trumps-infrastructure-plan" data-nid="287344" type="Assessments" title="The Cracks in Trump's Infrastructure Plan" data-timestamp="1518640796">Trump&#39;s infrastructure funding plan</a>&nbsp;will likewise run up against high hurdles, given that Congress has already approved a two-year budget deal.

The White House Raises the Stakes on Trade

November&#39;s midterm elections will also limit the Trump administration&#39;s leeway in negotiations to revamp NAFTA this quarter. The White House will at first keep a hard line in the negotiations to get the best deal it can from Canada and Mexico. In time, however, Republican members of Congress concerned about the economic and political consequences of <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/preserving-order-amid-change-nafta" data-nid="277733" type="On Geopolitics" title="Preserving Order Amid Change in NAFTA" data-timestamp="1489480228">failed NAFTA talks</a> will push the administration to compromise on some issues, including rules of origin on automotive products. Their pressure will probably work: As the elections approach, lawmakers are threatening to use legislative means to prevent the United States&#39; withdrawal from NAFTA, making the move unlikely for now.The United States isn&#39;t the only NAFTA member facing an election this year. Mexico&#39;s government will be in a similar bind ahead of the next presidential vote in July. Consequently, President Enrique Pena Nieto&#39;s administration will resist Washington&#39;s demands in the negotiations. Mexico City will continue with the talks. But whether it can quickly reach a final deal over NAFTA will depend on how it handles disagreements with the United States over rules of origin, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and a proposed sunset clause to establish periodic review of the trade agreement.Aware of the political considerations constraining its fellow NAFTA members, Canada will keep<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/canada-goes-toe-toe-us-trade-policy" data-nid="286587" type="Assessments" title="Canada Goes Toe-to-Toe With U.S. Trade Policy" data-timestamp="1515622931"> an aggressive stance toward U.S. policies like these</a>. Ottawa, for example, will press for a deal on automotive rules of origin in the next rounds of NAFTA negotiations. Its aim in doing so will be to persuade Washington to compromise in <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/north-america-trade-talks-will-progress-tepidly" data-nid="286997" type="Snapshots" title="North America: Trade Talks Will Progress, Tepidly" data-timestamp="1517261677">its quest to tighten regional content requirements</a> for tariff-exempt vehicles in the bloc. (Provinces such as Ontario may follow the central government&#39;s lead and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/us-canada-trade-disputes-between-ottawa-and-washington-arent-just-national" data-nid="287512" type="Snapshots" title="U.S., Canada: Trade Disputes Between Ottawa and Washington Aren't Just National" data-timestamp="1519254358">adopt laws</a>&nbsp;to counter U.S. protectionist measures at the provincial level.) The Canadian government will agree only to a slight increase in rules of origin requirements in the automotive sector, and Mexico will let it take the lead on challenging the United States.

NAFTA: To Be Continued

For Mexico, NAFTA negotiations are hardly the only issue at stake in the approaching presidential election. The hotly contested race for the presidency will intensify this quarter as the leading candidates enter the final stretch. Though <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/mexico-treads-familiar-path-toward-populism" data-nid="285739" type="Assessments" title="Mexico Treads a Familiar Path Toward Populism" data-timestamp="1512378040">populist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador</a> capitalized early on public dissatisfaction with the government, the ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) will try to narrow his lead, drawing on its extensive political networks to mobilize voters. The conservative National Action Party (PAN), by contrast, will continue to struggle to overcome its divisions. Margarita Zavala, a former first lady of Mexico who left the party in October 2017 to run as an independent, is sure to siphon off votes from PAN&#39;s candidate, Ricardo Anaya &mdash; to the benefit of the other contenders. The split could help push Lopez Obrador that much closer to clinching the presidency in July.Before then, Colombian voters will cast their ballots in <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/double-edged-sword-brazil-and-colombias-presidential-elections" data-nid="286569" type="Assessments" title="The Double-Edged Sword in Brazil and Colombia's Presidential Elections" data-timestamp="1515595478">a highly competitive presidential election</a>. Six major candidates are vying for the office. With such a crowded playing field, odds are good that even a party carrying only a fraction of the vote, such as the right-wing Democratic Center, could advance from the election&#39;s first round, slated for May 27, to the runoff in June. Whatever the outcome, however, the next government will have a legal obligation to proceed with implementing the peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, since Congress approved the agreement last year.In the meantime, the Colombian government will try to salvage its peace negotiations with the country&#39;s second-largest militant group,<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/situation-report/colombia-president-suspends-peace-talks-guerrilla-group" data-nid="287005" type="Sitrep" title="Colombia: President Suspends Peace Talks With Guerrilla Group" data-timestamp="1517264318"> the National Liberation Army (ELN)</a>, having suspended the talks Jan. 29 after members of the group repeatedly attacked security forces. A peace deal with the ELN would drastically reduce violence against energy infrastructure, private companies and energy contractors in oil-producing regions of Colombia, such as Norte de Santander, Putumayo and Arauca. But the government will be hard-pressed to move the negotiations forward. At best, it will simply manage to resume the talks before handing them off to the incoming administration, which will then decide whether to continue them.Neighboring Brazil will spend the second quarter gearing up for its own presidential election, set for October. In the wake of a wide-ranging corruption probe, the country&#39;s outsider politicians will have a better shot at victory this year. The leading candidate, former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, faces an all but certain criminal conviction that will take him out of the running &mdash; leaving a gap that onetime dark horse contenders will emerge to fill. Candidates such as former Supreme Court President Joaquim Barbosa, TV personality Luciano Huck and Sao Paulo Gov. Geraldo Alckmin of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party could all gain ground in the opinion polls this quarter. Ahead of the elections, the Brazilian government will try to pass economic reforms &mdash; such as an initiative to privatize state assets, including state electrical company Eletrobras &mdash; to draw investors to the country as its economy slowly recovers.

Election Races Heat Up in Mexico, Colombia and Brazil

<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/brazil-and-argentina-politics-picks-where-left-left" data-nid="284153" type="Assessments" title="In Brazil and Argentina, Politics Picks Up Where the Left Left Off" data-timestamp="1507232930">Economic reform</a> will also be a top priority for Argentina&#39;s government this quarter. President Mauricio Macri&#39;s administration will press for a partial labor reform to lower costs and remove red tape for businesses in the country. A comprehensive labor bill to amend Argentina&#39;s strict laws on firing workers and to grant companies major tax breaks will be difficult to push past the country&#39;s powerful labor unions and the leftist opposition&#39;s sizable minority in the Senate. Instead, Macri may opt to work with the unions to hammer out sector-by-sector reforms.In addition to their focus on domestic reform, Argentina and Brazil also share a concern on matters of foreign trade. The two countries &mdash; the largest economies in the Common Market of the South (known by the Spanish acronym Mercosur) &mdash; are reluctant to expose their local automakers to greater competition. The issue will be a lingering point of contention in Mercosur&#39;s negotiations with the European Union over a free trade agreement and could drag the talks out beyond the second quarter.

Argentina Attempts Domestic Reform

Venezuela is one of Latin America's most dynamic and troubled countries. It had been relatively stable during the administration of President Hugo Chavez, but when he died, stability died with him, aided in no small part but the fall of the price of oil. His successor, Nicolas Maduro, is now being challenged not only by Venezuelan citizens, who are angry as they struggle to obtain the most basic living staples and foodstuffs, but also by politicians inside and outside his own political party. His ruling party may not survive the coming collapse, but if it does, it will have the daunting challenge of trying to rebuild the economy.

Venezuela had been relatively stable during the administration of President Hugo Chavez, but when he died, stability died with him, aided in no small part but the fall of the price of oil.

To the north in Venezuela, the enduring political and economic crisis will become a source of growing concern for the surrounding region. President Nicolas Maduro will <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/venezuela-election-announcement-kills-negotiations" data-nid="286894" type="Snapshots" title="Venezuela: An Election Announcement Kills Negotiations" data-timestamp="1516828025">seek a second term in office</a>&nbsp;in May in an election that will be neither free nor fair by the U.S. government&#39;s standards. Because Maduro&#39;s military and civilian allies won&#39;t allow an election that would jeopardize their hold on power, the administration will manipulate the vote as needed to ensure a favorable outcome, despite <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/us-sanctions-wont-drive-out-venezuelas-government" data-nid="287209" type="Reflections" title="U.S. Sanctions Won't Drive Out Venezuela's Government" data-timestamp="1518047537">the threat of heavier sanctions </a>from Washington. Even if the United States <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/plan-steady-venezuela-falls-apart-again" data-nid="283445" type="Assessments" title="A Plan to Steady Venezuela Falls Apart, Again" data-timestamp="1505302317">offers the president an amnesty deal</a>&nbsp;to leave his post, officials around him will probably make sure that the arrangement includes a carefully managed transfer of power to a candidate of their choosing.All the while, Venezuela&#39;s economy will <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/venezuela-theres-little-light-end-tunnel" data-nid="286892" type="Assessments" title="For Venezuela, There's a Little Light at the End of the Tunnel" data-timestamp="1516892142">continue its decline</a>, pushing <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/who-will-take-venezuelas-huddled-masses" data-nid="282473" type="Assessments" title="Who Will Take Venezuela's Huddled Masses?" data-timestamp="1501578023">tens of thousands of Venezuelans abroad</a>, mainly to Colombia and Brazil. Lawlessness and emigration will only accelerate as their country sinks ever deeper into crisis. The governments of Brazil and Colombia both see Venezuela hurtling toward a point of no return. Yet they will differ in their approaches to the issue. Bogota will back Washington&#39;s efforts to pile more sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector, while Brasilia will resist them. Nevertheless, Brazil and Colombia alike will tighten their border controls in the coming months to stem the flood of Venezuelan migrants, who will compete with local workers for jobs and, in some cases, engage in criminal activity.The threat of a Venezuelan military incursion into Guyana will also put neighboring countries on edge. As economic and political problems weigh on the Maduro administration, such a maneuver will become more likely, either as a bid to seize land for illegal mining or as an attempt to delay an International Court of Justice ruling on the Guyana-Venezuela border. The incursion could even occur as the unsanctioned act of a local military unit. Were that to happen, Caracas would probably allow the incursion to continue, since military disloyalty is a growing worry for Maduro&#39;s administration.&nbsp;

Venezuela's Unraveling

Across the Caribbean, Venezuela&#39;s main security ally, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/venezuela-falters-cuba-works-avoid-another-special-period" data-nid="284378" type="Assessments" title="As Venezuela Falters, Cuba Works to Avoid Another 'Special Period'" data-timestamp="1507915970">Cuba</a>&nbsp;will experience a momentous transition this quarter. President Raul Castro, who succeeded his brother, Fidel Castro, in 2008, will step down April 19 and appoint Miguel Diaz-Canel to lead in his stead. The transition will bring an end to the Castro brothers&#39; rule after 59 years. But major changes in Cuba&#39;s foreign policy are unlikely. Diaz-Canel&#39;s new title notwithstanding, real control of the island nation will lie with Cuba&#39;s armed forces, which control much of the economy. The military will remain wary of U.S. intentions &mdash; particularly since <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/situation-report/cuba-us-partial-rollback-obama-policy-likely-could-include-travel-restrictions" data-nid="281044" type="Sitrep" title="Cuba, U.S.: Partial Rollback Of Obama Policy Likely, Could Include Travel Restrictions" data-timestamp="1497127243">the Trump administration tightened sanctions against it</a> in June 2017. And so, the U.S. trade embargo will stay firmly in place. Lifting the embargo would require the military to loosen its grip on Cuban politics, and Havana simply isn&#39;t ready to take that step.

In Cuba, Castro Bows Out

Europe

To the west of Eurasia lays Europe, a region predisposed to division. It is surrounded on nearly all sides by islands and peninsulas that make it difficult for Europe to cohere. The northern half of the continent, moreover, sits on a plain whose short, meandering rivers tend to empower countries without forcing them to work with others. The southern half is situated on more mountainous terrain that has historically impeded the creation of strong, unified economies. As a result, Europe is a continent riven by pockets of distinct cultures whose differences are all too often irreconcilable.

Europe is a continent riven by pockets of distinct cultures whose differences are all too often irreconcilable.

The European Union has long suffered an identity crisis, but this quarter the evergreen debate about where the bounds of national sovereignty end and supranational authority begin will consume most of the Continent&#39;s attention. The bloc&#39;s members and institutions will present their grand designs for reform, offering plans to increase spending, share risk, overhaul governance structures and fill in budgetary gaps left by the United Kingdom&#39;s eventual departure. All of these ideas aim to deepen European integration, but thanks to the enduring divisions within the bloc and an abiding resistance to transferring more power to Brussels, members will struggle to move any closer together on the issues creating such controversy among them. So although plenty of proposals for change will be made, most won&#39;t be implemented within the next three months.Many of the suggestions will come from France and Germany, the European Union&#39;s leading political and economic powers. Driven by a growing economy and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/france-macron-sets-his-political-agenda-2018" data-nid="286289" type="Snapshots" title="France: Macron Sets His Political Agenda for 2018" data-timestamp="1514311244">its own plans for reform back home</a>, France will push for an ambitious road map to greater cohesion. But Germany, whose government is split between a center left that supports many of Paris&#39; views and conservatives who are skeptical of its intentions, will do what it can to moderate French proposals.In addition to their own differences of opinion, the two powers will have to wrestle with wider rifts among European Union members. Like France, Southern European states want to increase EU spending, protect their economies from foreign competition and more evenly distribute financial risk within the eurozone. Their neighbors in Northern Europe, however, are eager to make the bloc smaller and less bureaucratic, lift barriers to trade and investment, and reduce financial risk in the currency area. Concerned about the compromises Germany might make with France, some hard-liners, such as the Netherlands and Austria, will pressure Berlin not to give too much ground to Paris. (Anxiety stemming from political instability in Italy will only reinforce these members&#39; desire to effect change with care.) As a result, Southern Europe appears to be headed for disappointment as the European Union will likely focus on measures that will take years to introduce, require reducing financial risk before sharing it, and settle on a lower spending cap than France and its allies hope for.Money will be on many members&#39; minds as the European Commission presents its proposal for <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/eu-countries-draw-lines-upcoming-budget-battle" data-nid="286551" type="Snapshots" title="EU: Countries Draw Lines for an Upcoming Budget Battle" data-timestamp="1515516825">the bloc&#39;s next multiyear budget</a>. The plan will probably ask members to contribute more funds, suggest new sources of revenue for the commission and offer ways to adjust how money is spent in the bloc. Unsurprisingly, the European Union&#39;s net contributors (most of which are in Northern Europe) will push back against calls for higher payments, while net receivers (most of which are in Eastern Europe) will throw their weight behind the motion. Meanwhile, countries across the Continent will resist the idea of strengthening the bloc&#39;s institutions, fearing that their sovereignty would weaken in the process.

Budget talks will naturally lead to discussions about agricultural subsidies, which account for the biggest portion of the bloc&#39;s spending and can be a hot-button issue, given the industry&#39;s propensity for actively defending its interests. The European Union will probably alter how it uses agricultural funds, but states in Southern and Eastern Europe will staunchly oppose any deep spending cuts in the sector.&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/eu-east-and-west-are-falling-out-tune" data-nid="286613" type="Assessments" title="In the EU, East and West Are Falling Out of Tune" data-timestamp="1515747620">Countries in Eastern Europe</a>&nbsp;will also be reluctant to link the disbursement of cohesion funds to recipients&#39; respect for the rule of law. Because the next multiannual budget won&#39;t enter into force until 2021, both debates will extend well beyond the quarter.<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/digital-tax-proposals-produce-new-discord-eu" data-nid="287332" type="Assessments" title="Digital Tax Proposals Produce New Discord in the EU" data-timestamp="1518622624">Corporate taxation</a>&nbsp;will be high on Europe&#39;s agenda as well, especially with regard to the digital realm. The European Commission and countries with large economies, such as Germany and France, will try to make sure that internet companies pay higher taxes to the states in which they operate. But countries with smaller economies, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, believe such taxes run counter to their economic models, which rely on special tax deals with multinational firms. This issue, too, will likely go unresolved in the months ahead. Should the European Union fail to reach a unanimous decision on the matter, a smaller group of members could choose to closely coordinate their tax policies &mdash; an approach that will not be as effective, particularly if many countries with low taxes opt out.

Debating the Future of Europe

As the European Union’s political order breaks down, so too will its monetary union, the eurozone. At the core of the crisis is the struggle over the good of nations versus the good of the whole. Put simply, richer nations are tired of shouldering the financial responsibility of the entire union. And as some eurozone members become increasingly weighed down by high debt and deficit levels, fragile economies and weak banking sectors, other eurozone members are turning to Euroskeptic and nationalist parties that want to leave the currency union altogether.

As the European Union’s political order breaks down, so too will its monetary union, the eurozone.

Tricky negotiations will also take place in Italy this quarter. After general elections on March 4 produced <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/italy-elections-euroskeptic-five-star-movement-forza-italia" data-nid="287741" type="Snapshots" title="Italy: Elections Leave Mainstream Parties Grasping" data-timestamp="1520271222">a divided Parliament,</a>&nbsp;the country&#39;s mainstream parties will have to come to terms with the strong performance of their anti-establishment opponents &mdash; and their subsequent demands for a say in the next Italian government. Until a government emerges (coalition talks will take months to complete), a caretaker administration will run the country. The interim body will be limited in its ability to introduce economic and political change, and the delay in much-needed reforms could create problems for Italy down the line. However, the country&#39;s parliamentary fragmentation will also reduce its chances of severely disrupting the eurozone in the coming months &mdash; and temporarily drive down the financial risk that the elections posed to the bloc. Once Italy has cobbled together a ruling coalition, however, Rome will test Berlin&#39;s resolve by advocating the revision of EU fiscal rules.Greece, too, will try to figure out what its future looks like this quarter. The country&#39;s lenders will insist on maintaining some degree of oversight over the Greek economy once Athens&#39; bailout program expires in August. Greece will try <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/greece-athens-looks-say-goodbye-its-creditors" data-nid="285026" type="Snapshots" title="Greece: Athens Looks to Say Goodbye to Its Creditors" data-timestamp="1509646783">to minimize that supervision</a>&nbsp;as much as possible, and it will likely reach a compromise with its creditors toward that end, accepting light oversight that lacks the stringency of a bailout program. In addition, the parties will talk about the future of Greece&#39;s debt. Though lenders won&#39;t agree to write down a portion of it, they will be open to the idea of extending repayment periods or linking payments with Greece&#39;s economic growth. Considering the complexity of these issues, negotiations will probably stretch past the first half of the year.

The Fate of the Eurozone

The United Kingdom may have voted to leave the European Union, but it can’t escape geography; it will have to define its political and economic relationships with the countries closest to it no matter what. And the process by which it does so will take years to complete. Immigration, membership in the EU internal market and the future of the British financial sector will all be points of negotiation — and of contention. Going forward, the United Kingdom will turn to a familiar strategy, one that it has employed since the end of World War II: balancing its relations with Continental Europe while strengthening ties with the United States.

The United Kingdom may have voted to leave the European Union, but it can’t escape geography; it will have to define its political and economic relationships with the countries closest to it no matter what.

As the European Union tries to knit itself closer together, the United Kingdom will work to cut itself free from the bloc. Over the next few months, the two parties will negotiate the future of their trade relationship after the Brexit is complete. London will angle for a comprehensive free trade agreement and a special customs deal that would protect the United Kingdom&#39;s access to EU markets while preserving its independence in trade and immigration policy. But Brussels, determined to safeguard the integrity of the single market, will argue that the United Kingdom cannot participate in some parts of the bloc and not others. Coupled with the European Union&#39;s reluctance to include the financial services sector in any trade deal, the dispute will probably prevent London and Brussels from reaching an agreement this quarter.

Meanwhile, questions about&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/brexits-potential-fracture-uk" data-nid="278526" type="Assessments" title="Brexit's Potential to Fracture the U.K." data-timestamp="1491138060">the future status of the Irish border</a>&nbsp;are getting harder to ignore. The United Kingdom and European Union still have time to hash out a settlement that keeps the border open in the wake of the Brexit, but it will be tough to do in the face of London&#39;s contradictory desire to leave the EU customs union. Though calls from within the United Kingdom to remain in the customs union will spread, the British government won&#39;t heed them. All the while, the Republic of Ireland will threaten to veto the Brexit process unless a satisfactory solution is found.One thing could stall the talks between London and Brussels: the replacement of the British prime minister. Disputes within the governing Conservative Party about how to handle the Brexit as well as displeasure with Theresa May&#39;s performance could prompt the change in leadership. Though May seems unlikely to resign within the quarter, the possibility can&#39;t be ruled out.

Brexit

The breakup of the European Union isn't random or scattered: It's happening along distinct lines. The more prosperous northern European countries are tired of picking up the tab for southern Europe and are fighting for more control over the south's fiscal policies. Southern European countries want the opposite. Some countries in the east, meanwhile, see the European Union solely as a trade bloc and are becoming increasingly irritated by many of its other policies. As the economic and political environment in Europe becomes more contentious, these fundamentally opposed interests will come into conflict more and more often, further destabilizing the union.

The breakup of the European Union isn't random or scattered: It's happening along distinct lines.

To the east, Central and Eastern Europe will face their own dilemmas. If left unchecked, the European Union&#39;s ongoing friction with such countries as Hungary, Poland and Romania could someday reduce their influence in EU decision-making and threaten their access to bloc funds. But because these dangers aren&#39;t imminent, the countries won&#39;t feel pressured to change their ways.Hungary&#39;s policies, for instance, probably won&#39;t change much after the country holds general elections on April 6. The polls will certainly test the popularity of the ruling center-right Fidesz party and the right-wing opposition Jobbik &mdash; both of which hold nationalist and Euroskeptic views. But in the likely event that voters re-elect the Fidesz party, Hungary&#39;s strategy at home and abroad won&#39;t significantly shift. To maintain the support of its constituents, Poland&#39;s government will stick to its guns as well. Though Warsaw will try to balance the defense of its domestic policies, such as a controversial judicial reform, with the easing of tension with the European Union, its overtures to Brussels and Berlin will likely be cosmetic. Finally, in Romania, the government&#39;s biggest challenge will come not from the European Union but from the streets, as its people stand ready to demand a stronger effort to combat corruption.

EU: Regional Blocs

That countries act in their own interests and not the interests of others is a fact that has always haunted EU foreign policy. It is for this reason that its foreign policy is reactive, not proactive as it was meant to be. And this dynamic is not lost on other foreign powers such as Russia, Turkey and the United States, which exploit EU divisions for their own benefit.

That countries act in their own interests and not the interest of others is a fact that has always haunted EU foreign policy.

The European Union&#39;s lasting divides will be clear in how it handles the ever-pressing issue of immigration. The Continent will work with countries of origin in Africa and the Middle East to try to prevent migrants from reaching its borders. EU members will also mull plans to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/italy-demands-immigration-solution" data-nid="268771" type="Assessments" title="Italy Demands an Immigration Solution" data-timestamp="1434531772">modify the Dublin system</a>, which stipulates that the country of a migrant&#39;s first entry is responsible for processing his or her application for asylum, and to more proportionally distribute asylum seekers throughout the bloc. Southern Europe will lobby for greater solidarity, while Eastern Europe will reject proposals for migrant relocation. Though a compromise is possible, Central and Eastern Europe won&#39;t be able to stomach the introduction of a system that automatically spreads asylum seekers across Europe.So, the Continent will keep relying on Turkey as a means of stemming the tide of migrants reaching its shores. To ensure Ankara&#39;s continued cooperation, the European Union will balance its criticism of Turkey&#39;s domestic policies with talks aimed at deepening bilateral trade. But tension may flare amid <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/eastern-mediterraneans-new-great-game-over-natural-gas" data-nid="287481" type="Assessments" title="The Eastern Mediterranean's New Great Game Over Natural Gas" data-timestamp="1519291825">Turkey&#39;s brewing territorial dispute with Cyprus</a>&nbsp;over the energy resources of the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Should a Turkish drill ship enter Cyprus&#39; exclusive economic zone, Europe would have no choice but to react. However, because the Continental bloc lacks the appetite for a showdown with Ankara, it would limit its reaction to symbolic moves, such as the suspension of bilateral summits or temporary cuts in financial aid to Turkey.&nbsp;

Divided EU Foreign Policies

Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa is the world&#39;s crossroads. It encompasses the Arabian Peninsula, the mountains of Iran, the plains of Turkey, the deserts of the Levant, the lands north of the Sahara and all coasts in between. The story of the region, as is so often the case of places stuck between foreign players, is the story of trade, exchange and conflict. The traditional powers of the region are Turkey and Iran &mdash; Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the current Arab powers &mdash; and their competition for influence over the region&#39;s weaker states makes the Middle East and North Africa an arena of violence and instability.

The Middle East and North Africa encompasses the Arabian Peninsula, the mountains of Iran, the plains of Turkey, the deserts of the Levant, the lands north of the Sahara and all coasts in between.

The Middle East has never been known for its stability, but Iran&#39;s fondness for meddling in its neighbors&#39; affairs has made peace in the region all the more difficult to preserve. At least, that&#39;s the belief that will fix Washington&#39;s gaze squarely on the Islamic republic this quarter. As the United States <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/us-iran-nuclear-deal-survives-another-120-days" data-nid="286643" type="Snapshots" title="U.S., Iran: The Nuclear Deal Survives Another 120 Days" data-timestamp="1515790362">steps up its efforts </a>to counter Tehran&#39;s activities abroad, Iran will devote its attention to digging in its heels and defending its turf. For the most part, it will succeed, standing its ground on the Syrian civil war and preserving its political influence in Iraq and Lebanon as each country holds elections.Still, Iran will have little control over one aspect of its fate: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Rather than having much say in the future of its nuclear deal with the global powers, Tehran will have to wait to see what legislation U.S. lawmakers and European diplomats craft to increase international oversight of Iran&#39;s nuclear program and facilities. Hoping to fend off attempts by the West to constrain its behavior, Iran will probably keep its long-range ballistic missile tests and provocations in the Persian Gulf to a minimum in the months ahead. But when all is said and done, Tehran won&#39;t be willing to compromise its own strategic interests by hamstringing its weapons program at home or by curbing its support for militant groups abroad.

It All Comes Back to Iran

U.S. President Donald Trump issued an ultimatum in January to Congress and the European Union: Fix &quot;the disastrous flaws&quot; in the JCPOA by May 12 or the United States would withdraw from it. Despite this vow, however, the White House doesn&#39;t want to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/iran-trump-and-art-nuclear-deal" data-nid="284307" type="On Geopolitics" title="Iran, Trump and the Art of the Nuclear Deal" data-timestamp="1507668657">give Tehran a reason</a> to resume its nuclear program by triggering the agreement&#39;s collapse. Instead, to keep the JCPOA intact while working to strengthen it, the United States will put in place mechanisms to automatically reinstate sanctions if Iran violates its commitments to the accord. Washington will also slap new sanctions on entities that support Tehran&#39;s ballistic missile program, though it will take care to avoid flagrantly violating the nuclear deal itself.Iran may even agree to minor constraints on the range and testing of its ballistic missiles. However, it probably won&#39;t enshrine these limits in a formal pact, especially as it clings to its professed need for a weapons programs amid the threats mounting against it elsewhere in the region. Iran will make its case to<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/deviating-plan-iran" data-nid="270023" type="Assessments" title="Deviating From the Plan in Iran" data-timestamp="1479287704"> friendly partners in Europe</a>, such as France and Germany, as they work with the United States to draw up a supplemental agreement aimed at discouraging some of Iran&#39;s more controversial activities.

In the end, the European Union will back parts of Washington&#39;s plan for discouraging further strides in Iran&#39;s long-range missile program. But the bloc will ensure that the bargains it makes do not blur the line between Tehran&#39;s nuclear and ballistic missile activities or reinstate sanctions against the latter &mdash; measures the Continent promised to abandon under the nuclear deal. Because Europe considers the JCPOA to be a cornerstone of Middle East security, it will make sure that any allegations of violations by Iran filter through the deal&#39;s dispute-settlement mechanism. The United States will hardly get everything it wants, but the new measures will be enough to persuade it to keep waiving certain sanctions, in spite of its deep misgivings about Tehran&#39;s intentions.

The Art of the Nuclear Deal

Iran’s domain in the Middle East stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. It maintains this arc of influence through its use of militant proxies, political agents and economic relationships, fending off challenges to its power from Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iran’s nuclear program, meanwhile, will continue to test relations with the West. But for all the program’s controversy, it is unlikely to spark a serious confrontation with the United States — Iran will instead leverage its control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of all globally traded crude oil passes. In fact, some of the biggest challenges to Iranian power will come not from without but from within as new generations of Iranians drift further from the religious principles — principles guarded by the still-strong clerical elite — on which the revolution was founded.

Iran’s domain in the Middle East stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea.

The uncertainty surrounding the nuclear deal will reaffirm Iran&#39;s desire for a robust defense policy that includes the very activities fueling U.S. fears: ballistic missile development, covert operations and support for regional militias. But these outward objectives will clash with Iran&#39;s need for domestic economic development &mdash; much of which can stem only from closer trade ties with the world at large.

Iran can&#39;t afford to ignore&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/when-protests-die-down-irans-economic-problems-will-live" data-nid="286472" type="Assessments" title="When the Protests Die Down, Iran's Economic Problems Will Live On" data-timestamp="1515109956">the economic grievances</a>&nbsp;of its citizens, either. The country, still reeling from some of the largest protests to sweep across it since 2009, appears to be nearing a potential turning point in its politics. The financial strain caused by lingering sanctions has triggered a debate about how to reform the political and economic model that has defined Iran for the past 40 years. Though an answer won&#39;t emerge this quarter, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/finding-path-post-revolutionary-iran" data-nid="286543" type="On Geopolitics" title="Finding a Path to a Post-Revolutionary Iran" data-timestamp="1515525881">the conversation will unfold</a> over the next few months.That Iran&#39;s elected and appointed <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/predicting-unpredictable-iranian-politics" data-nid="270242" type="Assessments" title="Predicting the Unpredictable in Iranian Politics" data-timestamp="1488967324">officials don&#39;t see eye to eye </a>on the issue will drag out the discussion even more. Though the administration will pay lip service to economic and social change, it won&#39;t have the leeway to take action as Iran&#39;s hard-liners use the precarious state of the nuclear deal to undermine President Hassan Rouhani and his moderate allies. Moreover, the government will have little attention to spare for domestic discourse while it&#39;s distracted with the many military and political challenges abroad that lie before it.

Iran's Arc of Influence

For some, the Syrian civil war is a fight for survival. The minority Alawites that dominate the government — such as it is — face the prospect of persecution if they lose, and the assorted Sunnis who oppose them face the prospect of violent reprisal if they lose. But for others, the Syrian civil war is an opportunity. Turkey is using the conflict to advance its interests in the region — interests that include curbing Kurdish expansion. Iran is trying to preserve its arc of influence, which extends to the Mediterranean Sea, in the face of staunch Sunni opposition. Russia is using the war as leverage in broader negotiations with the United States, which is itself working to disable terrorist organizations there. Conflicting agendas in such an already chaotic environment will keep an enduring resolution to the conflict beyond reach.

For some, the Syrian civil war is a fight for survival. For Turkey, Iran, the United States and Russia, it is an opportunity.

The greatest military threat to Iran&#39;s wide reach across the Middle East will arise in Syria. Turkey, Israel and the United States will each confront Iran there, but they will do so in their own ways and in pursuit of their own interests, rather than as a united front.The most prominent clash will pit Turkey against Iran&nbsp;in northwestern Syria. Turkey is determined to weaken the Kurdish People&#39;s Protection Units (YPG) in the region, and it has pressured the United States to support the withdrawal of those fighters from the city of Manbij, east of the Afrin canton. (Ankara will not launch a military offensive against the district while Washington&#39;s allies are still in the area.) But Iran will seek to curb Turkey&#39;s influence in the war-torn country by aiding Syrian troops and YPG militias in Afrin. Just to the south, Iran will also try to undermine the &quot;de-escalation zones&quot; that Turkish troops currently monitor in Idlib province, where Ankara hopes to bolster its influence by fortifying its Syrian rebel allies in their battle against extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Though the conflict between the Iranian and Turkish proxies will intensify in the months ahead, it won&#39;t <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/turkey-and-iran-push-and-pull-over-syria" data-nid="287276" type="Assessments" title="Turkey and Iran Push and Pull Over Syria" data-timestamp="1518466570">spill into the two countries&#39; trade relationship</a>.

Russia, for its part, will work hard to make sure the fighting dies down. Having failed to translate peace talks into <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/russia-wends-its-way-toward-exit-syria" data-nid="284173" type="Assessments" title="Russia Wends Its Way Toward an Exit in Syria" data-timestamp="1507280419">an exit from the protracted civil war</a>, Moscow will settle for a conflict frozen in place instead. De-escalation zones will offer a means to that end. But Syrian President Bashar al Assad and foreign patron Iran won&#39;t be willing to recognize these areas, throwing a wrench into Russia&#39;s plans.Troops loyal to al Assad, along with their Iranian allies, will also risk coming face to face with Israel as they conduct operations against rebel positions in southern Syria. Israel has a narrow window in which it can <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/israels-next-war-hezbollah-will-be-worse-last" data-nid="270036" type="Assessments" title="Israel's Next War With Hezbollah Will Be Worse Than the Last" data-timestamp="1479891615">strike at its longtime adversary</a>, Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, and at Iranian targets across its northeastern border with Syria. Israel will probably take it, with the aim of preventing the entrenchment of Iranian-backed fighters along the edge of the Golan Heights.&nbsp;

The Syrian Civil War

Iran&#39;s rivalry with its neighbors and the United States will seep into the region&#39;s political battlegrounds in the months ahead as well. Iraq will hold general elections on May 12, and the bloc that emerges with the most votes will win the premiership &mdash; the country&#39;s most influential political position. Iran&#39;s local allies, who are well-placed and well-connected, will vie for the post alongside Iraqi nationalists and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/iraq-saudi-arabia-riyadh-backs-media-battleground" data-nid="287412" type="Snapshots" title="Iraq, Saudi Arabia: Riyadh Backs the Media Battleground" data-timestamp="1518819014">politicians backed by the Gulf Arab states.</a>Iran will count on Iraq&#39;s mostly Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces and their associated political parties to perform well in the races. The fighters have become popular among Iraqis, thanks to their lengthy battle against the Islamic State. However, their growing presence nationwide has also elicited backlash from Iraq&#39;s minority groups. To complicate matters, the Popular Mobilization Forces lack the full support of Iraq&#39;s Shiite community. Nationalist parties and factions hoping to insulate Iraqi policymaking from external interference have split the country&#39;s Shiite majority. These nationalists will cross ethnic and sectarian lines in search of <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/tipping-scales-political-power-iraq" data-nid="282838" type="Assessments" title="Tipping the Scales of Political Power in Iraq" data-timestamp="1502840938">coalition partners that will preserve the state&#39;s sovereignty</a>.And therein lies Tehran&#39;s deeper problem: Iraqi Shiites will not unite behind it, no matter how strategically positioned Iran is within its neighbor&#39;s borders. Of course, that doesn&#39;t mean Gulf states will be able to translate Tehran&#39;s predicament into meaningful gains for their preferred candidates. Though these countries will try to use <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/iraq-war-rebuild-reconstruction" data-nid="287319" type="Assessments" title="The Tricky Business of Rebuilding Iraq" data-timestamp="1518547247">hefty investment into reconstruction and development projects</a>&nbsp;in Shiite and Sunni regions to build relationships with Iraq&#39;s citizens and political parties, the elections will likely still bring to power a weak government that favors Iran.Iran&#39;s allies will likewise stay in power in Lebanon, despite the best efforts of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States. While the first two states <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/lebanon-saudi-arabia-attempts-impossible" data-nid="285382" type="Assessments" title="In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia Attempts the Impossible" data-timestamp="1510852746">compete for control </a>over Lebanon&#39;s fragmented Sunni constituency, the latter two will try to weaken the grip of Tehran&#39;s partner &mdash; Hezbollah &mdash; by threatening the group, sanctioning it or aiding its Lebanese opponents. But in the absence of a viable challenger within the country&#39;s Shiite community, none of these actions will strip away seats from the ruling party or, by extension, its Iranian backer.&nbsp;

Iraq and Lebanon Vote for Iran

At the height of its power, the Ottoman Empire stretched from Central Europe to the Arabian Peninsula. Turkey, the country that sprang from the Ottomans’ demise, is not an empire, but it is a country on the rise. Strategically located between East and West, the country is using its economic clout, its military might and its cultural weight to expand its influence throughout the Middle East. Larger powers such as the United States, Europe and Russia will therefore have to alternately work with and against Turkey as they pursue their interests in the region.

Turkey, the country that sprang from the Ottomans’ demise, is not an empire, but it is a country on the rise.

Wading into its neighbors&#39; elections won&#39;t be the only play for influence the Turkish government makes this quarter. As Ankara reveals its reach in northwestern Syria, popular support at home for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will swell, perhaps even distracting citizens from <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/rough-seas-ahead-turkish-economy" data-nid="269991" type="Assessments" title="Rough Seas Ahead for the Turkish Economy" data-timestamp="1477990807">the country&#39;s foundering economy</a>, which remains plagued by high inflation. The public&#39;s approval could encourage the president to try to cement his rule by calling for <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/turkey-different-kind-presidential-vote" data-nid="279039" type="Assessments" title="In Turkey, a Different Kind of Presidential Vote" data-timestamp="1491943941">an early election</a>. (The vote is currently set for November 2019.)<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/rebalancing-power-middle-east" data-tid="616" type="Themes" title="Rebalancing Power in the Middle East">Turkey&#39;s boldness </a>will be on full display farther abroad, too. In northern Iraq, Turkey is likely to deepen its existing operations against Kurdish militants, risking sparking conflict with Shiite militia forces allied with Iran. The country will continue to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/eastern-mediterraneans-new-great-game-over-natural-gas" data-nid="287481" type="Assessments" title="The Eastern Mediterranean's New Great Game Over Natural Gas" data-timestamp="1519291825">press its claim to the eastern Mediterranean Sea</a>&nbsp;as Cyprus tries to drill for oil and natural gas beneath it. For now, Ankara will be undeterred by European threats to halt talks on Turkey&#39;s EU accession and on the expansion of their customs union if the Middle Eastern power does not stand down in the sea. Meanwhile, Turkey will actively reinforce its economic partnerships in Africa, alarming many of its Gulf Arab neighbors with their own interests to protect in the region.

Turkey's Resurgence

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will also be making some bold moves this quarter, even if most take place within its own borders as the bloc&#39;s members implement their visions for economic reform. The United Arab Emirates, led by Dubai, will forge ahead in adopting such key technologies as blockchain, creating new rules for cryptocurrencies and preparing for its first satellite launch.Saudi Arabia will concentrate on tech as well, working to attract investment in data storage and to equip the kingdom&#39;s private sector to become more competitive &mdash; in part by promising greater transparency. But in the wake of <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/saudi-arabia-where-ambition-and-geopolitics-align" data-nid="285176" type="Assessments" title="Saudi Arabia: Where Ambition and Geopolitics Align" data-timestamp="1510104230">a string of anti-corruption probes</a>&nbsp;that raised eyebrows late last year, it is unclear whether Riyadh will be able to balance the need for openness with its desire to control the economy and the flow of information at home. Though many young Saudis will welcome the social changes that accompany <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/spending-spree-means-fulfilling-saudi-vision" data-nid="286447" type="Assessments" title="A Spending Spree as a Means of Fulfilling the Saudi Vision" data-timestamp="1515052845">the kingdom&#39;s economic reforms</a>, such as the June removal of a ban on women driving, others will not. These undercurrents of dissent could someday empower the country&#39;s religious extremists.Meanwhile, the rifts that have long pulled the GCC&#39;s members apart will be made clear in the bloc&#39;s activities in <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/topic/yemen-civil-war" data-tid="520" type="Topics" title="The Yemen Civil War">Yemen</a> and Qatar. Amid a stalemate in the Yemeni civil war, countries belonging to the intervention force led by Riyadh will <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/yemen-coalition-cracks" data-nid="287038" type="Assessments" title="In Yemen, a Coalition Cracks" data-timestamp="1517360021">pursue their own priorities</a>: Saudi Arabia will focus on severing Houthi rebels&#39; access to Iranian funds and weapons, while <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/uaes-ulterior-motives-yemen" data-nid="285617" type="Assessments" title="The UAE's Ulterior Motives in Yemen" data-timestamp="1511894446">the United Arab Emirates</a>&nbsp;will try to keep Yemen&#39;s southern secessionist movement focused on fighting the Houthis and extremist groups. All the while, the problems underpinning <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/tiny-qatar-goes-its-own-way" data-nid="281835" type="Assessments" title="Tiny Qatar Goes Its Own Way" data-timestamp="1499418905">Qatar&#39;s ongoing diplomatic spat </a>with its fellow GCC members &mdash; and the blockade still in place against the tiny nation &mdash; will likely go unresolved. Nevertheless, the United States will advocate for a solution that offers all parties involved an opportunity to save face. Should the GCC take it, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/gulf-cooperation-council-will-never-be-same" data-nid="285835" type="Reflections" title="The Gulf Cooperation Council Will Never Be the Same" data-timestamp="1512555179">discord within the bloc</a> may dissipate over the next few months, allowing its members to set aside their differences for the time being.&nbsp;

The GCC: A Bloc Reformed?

Between the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea lies North Africa, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, a region of high youth unemployment, militancy, porous borders and resource scarcity. The Arab Spring may have empowered the region’s political opposition movements, which have since pushed for a variety of reforms, but governments are pushing back, some more successfully than others. Restructuring social contracts under such conditions will be difficult task, one that will test the stability of governments that naturally want to stay in power.

The Arab Spring may have empowered North Africa’s political opposition movements, which have since pushed for a variety of reforms, but governments are pushing back, some more successfully than others.

Like its Gulf neighbors, Egypt will be <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/egypt-hopes-benefits-economic-reform-outweigh-risks" data-nid="269984" type="Assessments" title="Egypt Hopes the Benefits of Economic Reform Outweigh the Risks" data-timestamp="1477649542">fixing up its economy</a> this quarter. Having sidelined his political opponents, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is poised to win another term in office when voters <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/president-egyptian-militarys-choosing" data-nid="286877" type="Assessments" title="A President of the Egyptian Military's Choosing" data-timestamp="1516810042">head to the polls on March 28</a>. He will channel his fresh mandate into the implementation of economic reforms that the International Monetary Fund has recommended, including further subsidy cuts.But behind the scenes of a seamless re-election, questions about the president&#39;s legitimacy will linger. The country&#39;s seemingly intractable insurgency will spur power struggles among the Egyptian security forces and undermine the government&#39;s claim that only al-Sisi can protect the nation&#39;s security &mdash; as well as the social contract between ruler and ruled that rests upon it.In much the same way, Tunisia&#39;s local elections will fail to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/seven-years-later-tunisia-still-stands-apart" data-nid="286642" type="Reflections" title="Seven Years Later, Tunisia Still Stands Apart" data-timestamp="1515941595">live up to the expectations of its people</a>. Many citizens hope the May races will pump new blood into the national government. Yet the municipal vote will represent only a small step toward overhauling the country&#39;s economic and political structure, while the politicking before and after the elections will put new strain on the ruling coalition.

The Difficulties of North African Reform

South Asia

Everything that informs geopolitics can be found in South Asia: challenging demographics, geographic diversity, and contentious, ill-defined borders. The Himalayan Mountains form the northern border of South Asia, whose two main rivers, the Indus and the Ganges, support the region&rsquo;s great population centers. India is the region&rsquo;s dominant country, home to the world&rsquo;s fastest growing economy. But its rivalry with neighboring Pakistan, a fellow nuclear power and growing consumer market, has made South Asia one of the world&rsquo;s most dangerous nuclear flashpoints. The region is also a testament to how militancy and militarism can undermine the regional integration needed to unleash higher economic growth.

Everything that informs geopolitics can be found in South Asia: challenging demographics, geographic diversity, and contentious, ill-defined borders. 

During the second quarter of 2018, the competition between China and India will continue to play out across South Asia. <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/south-asia-bump-belt-and-road" data-nid="280124" type="Assessments" title="South Asia: A Bump in the Belt and Road" data-timestamp="1494925253">Beijing&#39;s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative</a>&nbsp;is helping to address South Asia&#39;s infrastructure deficiencies in a way that India cannot match and enabling China to forge deeper partnerships with countries that New Delhi would rather keep in its back pocket. Nevertheless, India has cards it can play against China.To counter China&#39;s naval expansion across the Indo-Pacific region, for example, India will strengthen <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/india-and-us-find-common-ground-indo-pacific" data-nid="286975" type="Assessments" title="India and the U.S. Find Common Ground in the Indo-Pacific" data-timestamp="1517216446">its security partnership with the United States</a>. New Delhi&#39;s interest in dominating the Indian Ocean to safeguard its trade and energy routes dovetails with Washington&#39;s interest in containing Beijing&#39;s maritime ambitions. In the second quarter, the two will advance their relationship, holding the first meeting of their defense and foreign secretaries in April in Washington. The meeting demonstrates India&#39;s intention to deepen its partnership with the United States beyond naval exercises and joint air force coordination. Even so, India is unlikely to sign the two outstanding foundational agreements the United States signs with its defense partners, the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement.Along with their bilateral cooperation, India and the United States have resurrected the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan and Australia. That framework will offer another forum through which New Delhi can challenge Beijing, this time by presenting a unified front with three of China&#39;s other maritime rivals. Progress in the group will be slow, though. As a collective platform whose participants vary in their capabilities, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue will probably move forward in fits and starts this quarter without yielding true military coordination. But even without help from its fellow members, India has made strides in expanding its maritime access along the Indian Ocean rim and is working to arrange new agreements with Oman, Iran and the Seychelles.On shore, New Delhi will work to improve its military readiness along the Himalayan frontier, another front line in the contest between India and China. Because warming weather eases troop mobility and roadbuilding on the Chinese side of the border, India will take steps to ensure a quick response in the event of <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/preparing-rematch-top-world" data-nid="286888" type="Assessments" title="Preparing for a Rematch at the Top of the World" data-timestamp="1516870832">another standoff in the region</a>.Spring weather also will give rise to more cross-border militant attacks in Kashmir and lead to more frequent exchanges of cross-border fire between Indian and Pakistani forces along the Line of Control, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/unrest-kashmir-sets-india-and-pakistan-edge" data-nid="269777" type="Assessments" title="Unrest in Kashmir Sets India and Pakistan on Edge" data-timestamp="1470388507">further straining relations between the archrivals</a>. Though the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi will work to prevent their border dispute from boiling over, the odds of a major conflict between the nuclear-armed rivals would increase in the event of another large militant attack in India or a miscalculation between their militaries. A significant militant operation in India, for example, would compel Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to pursue a military response, such as <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/india-military-strategy-guided-precision" data-nid="269939" type="Assessments" title="In India, a Military Strategy Guided by Precision" data-timestamp="1475746212">a cross-border surgical strike</a>.

India and China Go Head-to-Head

Beyond the military aspects of its competition with China, India will continue its quest for regional influence under Modi&#39;s &quot;Neighborhood First&quot; policy. Some of its efforts in this arena will focus on Nepal &mdash; a vital buffer for India&#39;s strategic defense &mdash; during the second quarter. Khadga Prasad Oli&#39;s return to power in Nepal in December 2017 is a cause for concern in New Delhi. Oli, after all, tried to forge closer ties with China <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/nepals-identity-politics-conquer-its-prime-minister" data-nid="269765" type="Assessments" title="Nepal's Identity Politics Conquer Its Prime Minister" data-timestamp="1470043223">during his last stint in office</a>. To prevent the Nepalese government from drifting too far into Beijing&#39;s orbit, India will reach out with a mix of diplomacy, aid and military cooperation. Oli, however, will probably cozy up to Beijing anyway, perhaps by reviving a $2.5 billion Chinese-funded dam project in north-central Nepal, to diversify the country&#39;s foreign partnerships.Elsewhere in its neighborhood, India will resist calls from Mohamed Nasheed, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/india-looks-maldives-and-sees-china" data-nid="287234" type="Assessments" title="India Looks at the Maldives and Sees China" data-timestamp="1518131007">exiled former president of the Maldives</a>, for a military intervention in his island country. Heeding his wishes would only reinforce India&#39;s image as a hegemon throughout South Asia and push the Maldives closer to China. Instead, New Delhi will keep appealing to the United Nations to pressure current Maldivian President Yameen Abdul Gayoom to uphold a Supreme Court ruling that would enable Nasheed&#39;s return to the country. And in Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will try to assuage New Delhi&#39;s concerns over her state&#39;s warming relations with Beijing while also courting Chinese-backed development projects to woo voters ahead of an election later this year.

Breaking China's Spell

An upcoming election in India will factor into New Delhi&#39;s stance toward China, too. Though Modi often touts the virtues of globalization, he probably will indulge in some selective protectionism as he prepares to run for re-election next year. The prime minister not only wants to create jobs but also protect existing ones against the threat of surging Chinese imports. To that end, New Delhi is considering a proposal to slap a 70 percent tariff on solar panels imported from China.Modi, now in the final stretch of his five-year term, is still India&#39;s most formidable politician. But<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/indias-own-worst-enemy" data-tid="618" type="Themes" title="India's Own Worst Enemy"> mounting challenges at home</a> &mdash; including slowing economic growth, stagnant job creation and unrest among agricultural workers &mdash; have eroded the standing of his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party&#39;s (BJP) in opinion polls. BJP, in fact, lost some electoral ground to the Indian National Congress (INC) in balloting in Gujarat late last year. As an April vote in Karnataka approaches, Modi and the BJP are hoping for a better performance. The outcome of the election in Karnataka &mdash; one of the few states still under the INC&#39;s control &mdash; will set the tone for the remaining state races this year in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Mizoram. It will also test the INC&#39;s ability, under new leader Rahul Gandhi, to challenge Modi and mount an effective opposition to the BJP. And, of course, the outcome of those races are important because state legislatures elect members to the upper house of Parliament, where a BJP majority would help Modi pass the measures he needs to help boost his country&#39;s economic growth.

It's the Economy

Pakistan, meanwhile, is in the final stretch of its own election season, and it&#39;s been a strange one. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the country&#39;s leading political figure and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/pakistan-military-country" data-tid="589" type="Themes" title="Pakistan: A Military With a Country">the powerful army&#39;s</a>&nbsp;most outspoken critic, is on trial on corruption charges. Ever since his ouster in July 2017, Sharif has portrayed himself as the victim of a military-judicial conspiracy. But whatever the court&#39;s verdict, the army will retain control over Pakistan&#39;s foreign policy &mdash; a reality that bodes ill for the country&#39;s relationship with the United States.In fact, while India&#39;s relationship with Washington will improve during the year&#39;s second quarter, Pakistani-U.S. relations will continue to deteriorate. The White House extended the suspension of $1.9 billion in aid to Pakistan as punishment for Islamabad&#39;s reluctance to take action against Taliban and Haqqani network leaders <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/trump-may-push-pakistan-wont-budge" data-nid="286491" type="Reflections" title="Trump May Push, but Pakistan Won't Budge" data-timestamp="1515193866">operating on its soil</a>. The Taliban, meanwhile, will launch their annual spring offensive across Afghanistan as Washington sends 1,000 more troops into the conflict, along with increased air power to back them. As violence there intensifies, U.S.-Pakistani relations will probably come under even greater strain. The growing animosity between the two allies will push Islamabad to strengthen its ties with regional partners such as Russia, China and Iran. Moscow, in turn, will continue using the war in Afghanistan to gain leverage against the United States, providing low-level support to the Taliban while also offering to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/does-road-kabul-run-through-moscow" data-nid="279042" type="Assessments" title="Does the Road to Kabul Run Through Moscow?" data-timestamp="1492154251">host peace talks</a>.

Allies on the Outs

Mostly cut off from the West by economic sanctions and by soured relations, Russia has begun to build bridges with the East. To that end, Moscow has expanded its trade ties throughout the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with China, South Korea and Japan. But those ties come at a price: Moscow has begun to involve itself in the affairs of others, jumping into contentious regional issues to gain influence and to challenge the United States. Meanwhile, Eastern powers are also encroaching on Moscow’s sphere of influence in Far East Russia and in Central Asia — a presence Russia will struggle to curb as it spends more time and resources managing its long-term internal problems.

Cut off from the West by economic sanctions and by soured relations, Russia has begun to build bridges with the East.

In the second quarter of this year, Russia&#39;s shifting foreign policy will be the center of attention in Eurasia. The standoff between Moscow and the West shows no signs of abating, and in response, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/2018-annual-forecast" data-nid="286201" type="Annual Forecasts" title="2018 Annual Forecast" data-timestamp="1514289439">Russia is becoming increasingly active</a>&nbsp;in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. The trend, a marked change in Russian foreign policy, will continue in the coming months, as Russia tries to further insulate itself from the West.<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/echoes-cold-war" data-tid="582" type="Themes" title="Echoes of the Cold War">The United States</a> will present the biggest challenge for Moscow this quarter. <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/arms-race-toward-global-instability" data-nid="287464" type="On Geopolitics" title="An Arms Race Toward Global Instability" data-timestamp="1519146012">Arms control treaties</a>&nbsp;between the two powers will continue to deteriorate despite efforts to prevent the collapse of the current bilateral framework through diplomatic negotiations. Each side will accuse the other of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; the barrage of allegations could lead Russia to intensify its buildup of arms in Europe&#39;s borderlands and lead the United States to impose stronger military sanctions on Moscow. At the same time, Washington is all but guaranteed to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/russia-wont-sit-still-additional-us-sanctions" data-nid="286331" type="Assessments" title="Russia Won't Sit Still for Additional U.S. Sanctions" data-timestamp="1514485434">expand its economic and political sanctions</a>&nbsp;against Russia in the next few months to follow up the &quot;Kremlin Report.&quot; The document, released in January, highlighted more than 200 individuals as potential targets for additional sanctions. Barring a major development in the U.S. investigations into Russia&#39;s electoral meddling, however, Washington probably will limit the new measures to specific individuals and sectors. Consequently, the measures won&#39;t do much to hurt the Russian economy.

Negotiations to dispatch a United Nations peacekeeping force to&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/hints-shift-ukraine-conflict" data-nid="285418" type="Reflections" title="Hints of a Shift in the Ukraine Conflict" data-timestamp="1510940271">eastern Ukraine</a>, meanwhile, will pick up steam this quarter. After the March 18 Russian presidential election wraps up, the Kremlin will have more room to compromise over&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/topic/ukraine-conflict" data-tid="543" type="Topics" title="The Ukraine Conflict">the conflict in Ukraine</a>&nbsp;and will strike a more conciliatory tone with Washington to try to avoid more sanctions. But because Moscow won&#39;t agree to cede its strategic position in eastern Ukraine, any agreement the two sides reach over a U.N. deployment in Donbas will be modest in scope and gradual in implementation.As Russia and the United States lock horns over these issues, Moscow will work to strengthen its economic relationships with other countries instead. The annual St. Petersburg Economic Forum in May will provide an ideal venue for drumming up foreign business. French President Emmanuel Macron will attend the summit, a first for a French leader since the Ukraine conflict erupted in 2014. Macron&#39;s trip &mdash; which probably will include a stop in Moscow for his first official visit to Russia &mdash; could herald a resurgence of French business and investment in the country. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, too, will visit Moscow on his travels to the forum, which he will attend with a cadre of Japanese investors and businesspeople. Japan&#39;s leaders will set aside Tokyo&#39;s enduring dispute with Moscow over control of the Kuril Islands and focus on bolstering their bilateral ties, mainly through investments, to try to check Russia&#39;s budding alignment with China, which itself will send a large delegation to the economic forum. Sizable delegations from Saudi Arabia and Qatar will also attend. Negotiations on a host of projects with those states are underway. Among those projects is&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/russian-rivalries-tale-two-energy-firms" data-nid="283325" type="Assessments" title="Russian Rivalries: A Tale of Two Energy Firms" data-timestamp="1504787180">an expansion of the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline</a>&nbsp;to China.

Moscow Looks to the East

History shows that all too often the biggest threats to Russia come from within. Such is the case in the current era, a time when Moscow must manage a standoff with the West, a weak economy, limited financial resources, social unrest, demographic shifts and political infighting in the highest echelons of power. As its leaders try to prevent Russia from collapsing altogether, the country will cease to be the nominal democracy it is now and become an outright autocracy. But Moscow can use its alienation from the West to its advantage: Demonizing an external enemy is an effective way to shore up national support.

History shows that all too often the biggest threats to Russia come from within.

Russia will have no shortage of pressing domestic issues this quarter. <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/interactive-tracking-russian-dissent" data-nid="280069" type="Assessments" title="Interactive: Tracking Russian Dissent" data-timestamp="1494775150">Large but manageable street protests</a>&nbsp;will pop up across the country even after the presidential election, as Russians air their dissatisfaction over corruption and economic trouble. In Russia&#39;s population centers, authorities will try to contain the unrest primarily by cracking down on protests and offering concessions.Another strategy the Kremlin may use to stifle the protests in the long run is to co-opt opposition leaders by offering them advisory or other posts in the government. Figures such as Alexei Navalny, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin&#39;s most outspoken and dogged critics, are unlikely to fall for this ploy. Moscow may have better luck, however, using the tactic to keep opposition parties like Yabloko and the Communist Party &mdash; which stand to gain ground in future local and legislative elections &mdash; under its thumb.In the meantime, the Russian government will work on rolling out social and economic reforms to address some of the public&#39;s concerns. The Kremlin has expedited plans to raise the minimum wage this quarter, moving the initiative&#39;s start date from May to March. But making good on the promise will require subsidizing regional and state-run business budgets through the rest of the year. Between pledges like this one, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/russia-cleans-its-banks-borrowed-time" data-nid="285082" type="Assessments" title="Russia Cleans Up Its Banks on Borrowed Time" data-timestamp="1509741937">efforts to prop up struggling banks</a>&nbsp;and the upcoming soccer World Cup, which Russia will host in June and July, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/putin-russia-guns-butter-moscow-president-elections-poverty-weapons" data-nid="287677" type="Snapshots" title="Russia: Putin Promises Guns and Butter" data-timestamp="1519936641">the Kremlin&#39;s finances</a> will be tight this quarter. Still, Moscow will try to move forward with fiscal reforms and infrastructure improvements that will benefit the country down the road. In addition, it will consider launching a campaign against corruption, an issue galvanizing Russians across party lines.The prospective anti-corruption effort, in fact, may serve as the pretext for a reshuffle in the Russian government and security services this year. To ensure the continuing longevity of his nearly 20-year rule, Putin is turning his attentions to political and security reforms. These initiatives could include changes in the makeup and division of powers among various clans and security services. <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/russias-security-forces-prepare-power-grab" data-nid="287155" type="Assessments" title="Russia's Security Forces Prepare for a Power Grab" data-timestamp="1517907622">The Federal Security Service and National Guard</a>, for example, will firm up their respective investigative authorities this year, a process that will shift the balance of power between them. As the Kremlin rolls out these changes, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/us-sanctions-worry-russian-oligarchs-kremlin" data-nid="287505" type="Reflections" title="Russia's Business Leaders Prepare For U.S. Sanctions" data-timestamp="1519248757">Russia&#39;s political elite</a>&nbsp;&mdash; primarily government officials, oligarchs and members of Putin&#39;s inner circle &mdash; will be all the more on edge waiting for the United States to slap them with sanctions. Putin&#39;s administration will do what it can, though, to shield the country&#39;s wealthiest and most influential from financial harm in a bid to maintain their loyalty.

Russia's Internal Struggle

Like Russia, Ukraine will face an array of domestic political challenges in the second quarter. The government in Kiev is slated to adopt legislation to establish an independent anti-corruption court in the country by May. After repeatedly putting off the bill, which could put key government officials in the line of fire, the administration can no longer avoid enacting the measure, lest its inaction provoke protests or <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/ukraine-needs-more-money" data-nid="268523" type="Assessments" title="Ukraine Needs More Money" data-timestamp="1426110027">jeopardize the International Monetary Fund&#39;s financial assistance</a>. (Regardless, the bill won&#39;t take effect until sometime after this quarter.)Leaders in Azerbaijan, too, are facing a rocky few months. In April, the country will hold presidential elections, which longtime President Ilham Aliyev decided in February <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/azerbaijan-president-accelerates-election-timetable" data-nid="287154" type="Snapshots" title="Azerbaijan: President Accelerates Election Timetable" data-timestamp="1517861857">to move up by six months</a>. Aliyev will almost certainly emerge from the next vote victorious, but protests could break out in the run-up to and aftermath of the election in response to unpopular economic measures, such as a possible currency devaluation. Either way, Azerbaijan will stay on the same foreign policy course, juggling its relationships with Russia, Turkey and Iran while also working to pressure and isolate neighboring Armenia over <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/game-much-larger-nagorno-karabakh" data-nid="269509" type="On the Road" title="A Game Much Larger Than Nagorno-Karabakh" data-timestamp="1460898057">the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute</a>.

Dissent Brews in Ukraine and Azerbaijan

The quarter will be no less trying for the governments of Central Asia. The five countries that make up the region will contend with political, economic and security problems in the coming months, thanks to domestic dissent, the residual effects of low energy prices and the threat of militant attacks. In Turkmenistan in particular, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/viewing-turkmenistans-recent-car-ban-black-and-white" data-nid="286432" type="Reflections" title="Viewing Turkmenistan's Recent Car Ban in Black and White" data-timestamp="1515001021">a frail economy</a>&nbsp;could bring more intense food shortages, subsidy reductions and price hikes on staple goods such as flour and gasoline. The country&#39;s socio-economic factors, like those of its neighbors, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/themes/instability-central-asia" data-tid="586" type="Themes" title="Instability in Central Asia">will spark demonstrations</a> that will test, but not necessarily threaten, the national government.Notwithstanding their struggles, states such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will make some important political strides this quarter. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev will move forward with <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/kazakhstan-president-prepares-cede-some-power" data-nid="235129" type="Snapshots" title="Kazakhstan: President Prepares to Cede Some Power" data-timestamp="1485374401">his gradual succession process</a>. In anticipation of his eventual departure from office, Nazarbayev will delegate more powers to members of his Cabinet and family while also strengthening state institutions like the National Security Committee. Across the southern border in Uzbekistan, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev will redouble his efforts at economic and security reforms, having <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/uzbekistan-president-sidelines-former-opponent" data-nid="287054" type="Snapshots" title="Uzbekistan: President Sidelines Former Opponent" data-timestamp="1517431003">consolidated his power</a> in the first quarter of the year. Mirziyoyev will forge ahead with the measures to encourage investment and tourism in his country &mdash; an initiative that is also driving him to mend fences with neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over issues such as border demarcation and water management.

Similarly, Central Asian states will work together more closely this quarter to contain militancy and terrorism,&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/chinas-increasing-security-buffer-its-western-frontier" data-nid="286590" type="Assessments" title="China's Increasing Security Buffer on Its Western Frontier" data-timestamp="1515661200">with support from Russia and China</a>, which will boost their security presence in the region. Together, these countries will fortify military bases and conduct more joint exercises, counterterrorism training and diplomatic consultations under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Political Strides and Struggles in Central Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is a study in diversity. Covering an area that spans the entire width of the continent beginning at the Sahara Desert and ending at the southernmost tip of South Africa, the region is home to countless cultures, languages, religions, plants, animals and natural resources. It&rsquo;s no surprise that it captured the imagination of Europe&rsquo;s earliest explorers &mdash; and that it continues to capture the imagination of current world powers eager to exploit it. And yet despite the region&rsquo;s diversity, Sub-Saharan African countries have common challenges &mdash; transnational terrorism, rapid population growth, endemic poverty and corruption &mdash; that prevent them from capitalizing on their economic potential. The coming years will be critical for the region, especially as its political institutions mature in a rapidly globalizing world.

Covering an area that spans the entire width of the continent beginning at the Sahara Desert and ending at the southernmost tip of South Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to countless cultures, languages, religions, plants, animals and natural resources.

Much of the attention in sub-Saharan Africa this quarter will be focused on the region&#39;s southern states. Leadership transitions in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola will continue to take those countries in new directions.In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa &mdash; who entered office after his predecessor, Jacob Zuma, stepped down Feb.14 under pressure from the ruling African National Congress (ANC) &mdash; will try to <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/south-africa-moves-beyond-zuma" data-nid="287303" type="Assessments" title="South Africa Moves Beyond Zuma" data-timestamp="1518474106">steer the government on a new course</a>. Ramaphosa will try to use the power of the presidency to halt the ANC&#39;s drift into corruption and ineffectiveness. He will also try to jump-start South Africa&#39;s flagging economy, an endeavor that will require fostering more policy certainty in important sectors such as mining. At the same time, Ramaphosa and the ANC will strive to maintain <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/topic/post-apartheid-era-ends" data-tid="621" type="Topics" title="The Post-Apartheid Era Ends">the populist policies</a> necessary to appeal to the ruling party&#39;s voter base ahead of the next presidential election in 2019. That means finding a way to expropriate land, for example, without jeopardizing food security or spooking investors.Achieving these two priorities will be difficult for the new administration. Nevertheless, Ramaphosa&#39;s rise in the ANC will breathe new life into the party and stall its decline in popularity, if only temporarily. After gaining ground with voters over the past few years, South Africa&#39;s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, will come under fire in the second quarter over <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/cape-town-water-crisis-countdown-day-zero" data-nid="287058" type="Assessments" title="Cape Town Water Crisis: The Countdown to Day Zero" data-timestamp="1517477400">the water shortage in Cape Town</a>. The city&#39;s water supply will remain strained at least until the rainy season begins in April or May, giving the ANC political ammunition to use against the Democratic Alliance, which has been in power in Cape Town for over a decade.

The opposition in Zimbabwe, meanwhile, will face its own share of challenges in the second quarter. President Emmerson Mnangagwa has secured his place at the head of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), having taken over his country&#39;s top office in November 2017 after longtime President Robert Mugabe&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/calm-after-zimbabwes-coup" data-nid="285400" type="Assessments" title="The Calm After Zimbabwe's Coup" data-timestamp="1510911576">resigned under the threat of a coup</a>. In the next few months, Mnangagwa will try to lay the groundwork for a ZANU-PF victory in elections scheduled for August. Winning is, of course, a priority for the ruling party, but so is maintaining the appearance of a fair election. Western countries, after all, will be watching the contest and will base their support for Mnangagwa on whether he and the ruling party keep the elections aboveboard. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change, however, may not pose much of a threat this time around, since the Feb. 14 death of leader Morgan Tsvangirai has left the party reeling. Even so, Mnangagwa probably will do what he must to ensure ZANU-PF&#39;s continued dominance, despite his public calls to make Zimbabwe more democratic.In Angola, too,&nbsp;<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/topic/old-leaders-new-africa" data-tid="553" type="Topics" title="Old Leaders in a New Africa">a new leader is asserting his power.</a>&nbsp;Joao Lourenco, who won the presidency in late 2017 following Jose Eduardo dos Santos&#39; retirement after nearly 40 years in office, already has removed his predecessor&#39;s children from their posts at the head of Angola&#39;s crucial state oil company and as chief of its sovereign wealth fund. Next, he will turn his attention to improving the oil-rich country&#39;s financial straits by trying to diversify the Angolan economy. Brazil will help the cause by resuming funding for construction, energy and hydroelectric projects in Angola,<a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/brazil-and-africa-bridge-south-atlantic" data-nid="282353" type="Assessments" title="Brazil and Africa Bridge the South Atlantic" data-timestamp="1501146055">&nbsp;a fellow Portuguese-speaking state</a>. The reopened credit lines are just what Lourenco needs to demonstrate that he is pushing his country forward, and he will continue the conversation with his Brazilian counterpart, Michel Temer, during a visit in May to Brazil.

Southern Africa Grapples With Political Change

Just north of Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will grapple with a different challenge in its own political transition. President Joseph Kabila &mdash; now in his 18th year in power &mdash; has continuously <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/delaying-democracy-democratic-republic-congo" data-nid="270037" type="Assessments" title="Delaying Democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo" data-timestamp="1479891631">postponed the end of his tenure in office</a> over the past two years. His administration will stick with the strategy in the coming quarter, suppressing dissent to his rule while keeping up the appearance that it is trying to move forward with the transfer of power. Though the government in Kinshasa will tout its alleged success registering voters for the next election, scheduled for December, the financial and logistical obstacles that stand in the way of the vote loom as large as ever. The president&#39;s fractious alliance, moreover, has yet to name a successor to run in the race, and it&#39;s doubtful one will emerge by July, as the coalition claims. Otherwise, Kabila may appoint a weak successor to act as a puppet ruler while he continues to pull the strings, as a recent restructuring in the ruling party suggests he will. Either way, odds are that the results of the election will be severely flawed &mdash; if the contest goes forward as planned.In the meantime, the Congolese government will <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/congo-cobalt-copper-mining-kabila-batteries" data-nid="287711" type="Assessments" title="The Congo Is Set to Butt Heads With Mining Firms Over Cobalt" data-timestamp="1520173384">take on a bigger role</a> in the vital mining sector. Parliament passed new levies and royalties on minerals in January, and Kabila has announced his intention to sign them. The new measures could have global repercussions, since the country is a leading source of copper and <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/cobalt-metal-poised-peak" data-nid="286493" type="Assessments" title="Cobalt: A Metal Poised to Peak" data-timestamp="1515398415">cobalt</a>, essential minerals for electronics manufacturing and battery production. Forced negotiations or international arbitration with the government stemming from the legislation will signal increased uncertainty in a sector that so far has largely escaped the political upheaval in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Congolese Government Digs In Its Heels

Though Nigeria boasts Africa’s largest economy, its march toward prosperity has always been a struggle, shackled as it is by political division, ethnic rivalry, militancy, theft and corruption. Its single biggest source of revenue is oil, most of which is found in the Niger Delta, a hotbed of militants and disaffected residents. Solving this region’s problems would help to keep oil flowing, but it won’t give Nigeria what it needs to be truly prosperous: a more diverse economy.

Nigeria's single biggest source of revenue is oil, most of which is found in the Niger Delta, a hotbed of militants and disaffected residents.

Nigeria&#39;s critical oil sector, by contrast, could have another quiet quarter. The militant groups of the oil-rich Niger Delta region have so far refrained from staging any attacks on energy infrastructure this year, though outfits such as the Niger Delta Avengers have expressed their dissatisfaction with government peace talks. Nigeria&#39;s government will try to maintain the uneasy calm in the region, with help from falling inflation and austerity measures that will give it more resources to devote to appeasing Niger Delta militants. Yet the threat of attacks will continue to hang over the country&#39;s oil industry.Besides militancy in the Niger Delta, the government in Abuja will have other issues to worry about in the months ahead. The next presidential election in 2019 fast approaches, and all signs indicate that President Muhammadu Buhari will run for a second term. Winning re-election promises to be a steep task, though, given <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/nigerias-president-back-maybe" data-nid="283191" type="Assessments" title="Nigeria's President Is Back -- Maybe" data-timestamp="1504256421">the lingering concerns over Buhari&#39;s health</a>&nbsp;and skepticism over his handling of Nigeria&#39;s financial troubles. Yet Buhari may still be the strongest candidate in the ruling All Progressives Congress, possessing enough clout to unify the party and secure the support of its powerful northern factions. Doubts about the president&#39;s fitness and competence may cause more ambitious politicians to defect from the All Progressives Congress to the opposition People&#39;s Democratic Party, which has nominated a candidate from northern Nigeria, Buhari&#39;s home turf, to try to split his support base.

Nigeria: Obstacles to Prosperity

Nearby in the Sahel region, security will continue to be the primary focus. The next few months will test the mettle of the Group of Five Sahel Force, <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/has-france-found-african-solution-african-problem" data-nid="282564" type="Assessments" title="Has France Found an African Solution to an African Problem?" data-timestamp="1501938802">a joint security effort </a>among Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Though seven of the force&#39;s battalions are supposed to be up and running by the end of March, operational problems will limit their effect on the region&#39;s degrading security. Violent extremist organizations in the Sahel have cultivated the expertise necessary to execute more sophisticated attacks on Malian and international forces through their ties to the Islamic State and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The transnational militant groups, in turn, are redoubling their recruitment efforts in the region. As militancy spreads in the Sahel, it will put more strain on Operation Barkhane, France&#39;s anti-insurgency campaign in the area, and on Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita&#39;s race for re-election. In an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the country&#39;s polls and institutions, extremist groups probably will ramp up their attacks as the election, set for July, approaches.

Security in the Sahel

East Africa also will be a battleground, albeit a figurative one, in the second quarter. Various countries in the Arab Gulf and beyond are vying for influence in the Horn of Africa and deepening their ties to its states. But the region&#39;s most prominent project this quarter is a local initiative: Ethiopia&#39;s multibillion-dollar Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which will be <a class="connectedContentTrigger" href="/article/river-runs-through-african-rivalry" data-nid="270117" type="Assessments" title="A River Runs Through an African Rivalry" data-timestamp="1483445424">the largest hydroelectric dam in sub-Saharan Africa</a>. Tentatively scheduled for completion by the end of this year, the dam will be a major boon for Ethiopia, helping to alleviate its electricity shortage while also drawing the eye of foreign investors such as China. The government in Addis Ababa hopes that the increased funding could subsidize future projects to connect the landlocked country&#39;s 100 million citizens to the Red Sea.

While the dam represents a major achievement for Ethiopia &mdash; and good news for Sudan, which stands to benefit &mdash; for Egypt, it&#39;s an unwelcome development. The North African state, downstream from the dam, has feared the project&#39;s effects on its water supply since Addis Ababa first announced the venture in 2011. The dam also highlights just how much influence Egypt has lost over its upstream neighbors. With these issues in mind, Cairo will continue to resist the project in the second quarter and beyond. Its efforts, however, will be in vain. Egypt lacks the leverage to bend Ethiopia to its will and, in fact, will have to return to the negotiating table with Addis Ababa in time.

2018 SECOND-QUARTER FORECAST

Eurasia

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