Al Qaeda in Syria has more power today than ever before, but it is also contending with more threats to its existence than ever before. For one thing, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, is still on the losing side of the Syrian civil war. Loyalist forces are advancing, having secured Aleppo. The Syrian government is concentrating on regaining the territory it lost to the Islamic State while it was focused on the battle of Aleppo. But soon enough, loyalist armies will turn their attentions toward Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's stronghold in Idlib. A concerted loyalist advance, with ample backing from Iran and Russia, would put the group in a difficult position, forcing it to consider alternative means to maintain its resistance against Damascus, including guerilla and insurgent tactics.
For another, although Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is the most powerful opposition force in Syria, it cannot claim to represent the rebel cause as a whole. Numerous rebel groups, in fact, have joined forces against it, wary of the danger that al Qaeda poses in Syria and facing pressure from foreign sponsors. Even Ahrar al-Sham, the second-most powerful rebel group in Syria and a former close ally of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, has turned against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As the rebel landscape becomes more polarized, the group will find it increasingly difficult to recruit new allies.
Outside the rebel camp, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's enemies are also becoming more numerous. The group can no longer assume that its main foes are the loyalist forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. Washington has taken notice of al Qaeda's growing power in Syria and has begun ramping up targeted strikes on the group in response. The strikes have already frustrated the group's leaders and have forced them to adopt stifling protective measures.
More important, the rebel forces' traditional backers, including Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, increasingly view Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a threat to their goals in Syria. In the past, such countries more or less turned a blind eye to the rebels' cooperation with the group because, in their view, defeating Syrian President Bashar al Assad was more important than fighting al Qaeda in Syria. But their perspective changed as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's influence grew. The group has not only weakened their rebel allies, but it has also tarnished the rebellion's image, making it harder to rally international support against al Assad. As a result, Turkey and the GCC states have started taking measures against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, sometimes at the expense of the larger rebel cause. The countries, for example, have curbed their weapons and equipment shipments to Idlib province and have pressured the rebels to stop collaborating with the group. So despite its efforts to lie low, al Qaeda's affiliate group in Syria has had more and more trouble escaping the spotlight.
