The United Arab Emirates reportedly paid approximately €50 million and delivered several tons of weapons and ammunition to al Qaeda Sahel affiliate Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in exchange for three kidnapped foreigners, including two Emiratis, Jeune Afrique reported on Oct. 30.

What Happened: The United Arab Emirates reportedly paid approximately &euro;50 million and delivered several tons of weapons and ammunition to al Qaeda Sahel affiliate Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in exchange for three kidnapped foreigners, including two Emiratis, Jeune Afrique reported on Oct. 30. Alongside the ransom and weapons delivery, the agreement included a prisoner exchange, with between 37 and 65 jihadists released by the Malian junta in return for several dozen Malian soldiers previously held by JNIM.&nbsp;Why It Matters: If confirmed, the successful negotiation of a &euro;50 million ransom, coupled with the delivery of weapons and a prisoner exchange, represents a major strategic victory for JNIM. These gains are likely to substantially enhance the group&#39;s operational capacity, enabling it to leverage increased financial resources to recruit additional fighters and potentially acquire advanced weaponry and technologies such as drones for surveillance and coordinated large-scale offensives in Mali and the wider Sahel. This precedent is likely to incentivize further kidnappings of foreign nationals, particularly non-Westerners, while signaling to other armed groups the lucrative potential of adopting similar tactics.Background: The ransom payment for the three foreigners kidnapped in late September was reportedly negotiated down from &euro;100 million. The weapons delivered to JNIM were allegedly transported with the assistance of traders from the Toubou community operating in Chad and Libya. The freed hostages were flown to Bamako to meet junta leader Assimi Goita before returning to Dubai aboard a Gulfstream jet. JNIM has increasingly targeted non-Westerners for ransom.&nbsp;Read more:&nbsp;<ul><li><a href="/article/what-future-holds-russia-africa">What the Future Holds for Russia in Africa</a> (Sept. 5, 2024)</li><li><a href="/article/geopolitics-water-role-desertification-conflict-sahel">The Role of Desertification in Conflict in the Sahel</a> (Aug. 12, 2024)</li><li><a href="/article/what-mali-niger-and-burkina-fasos-exit-ecowas-means-west-africa">What Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso&#39;s Exit From ECOWAS Means for West Africa</a> (Feb. 7, 2024)</li><li><a href="/article/what-niger-crisis-means-frances-counterterrorism-strategy-africa">What the Niger Crisis Means for France&#39;s Counterterrorism Strategy in Africa</a> (Sept. 19, 2023) &nbsp;</li></ul>

Mali

United Arab Emirates

Military & Security

Politics

Mali, UAE: UAE Reportedly Pays €50 Million Ransom to JNIM Jihadists

Assessments

Guidance

A review of the world's most pressing geopolitical events and insight into what the coming week will bring.

An aerial view of a container vessel at Shanghai's Yangshan Deep-Water Port on Aug. 13, 2019. U.S. President Donald Trump announced a tariff hike on Chinese imports on Aug. 23.

<h3>On the Record</h3><blockquote>In 3-5 years time, Huawei will be flowing with new blood. After we survive the most critical moment in history, a new army would be born. To do what? Dominate the world.Huawei founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei</blockquote><hr /><h3>On Our Radar</h3>&quot;Who is our bigger enemy, Jay Powell or Chairman Xi?&quot; U.S. President Donald Trump&#39;s Aug. 23 Twitter rage against China and U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jay Powell goes to show how the president&#39;s trade policy is stuck in a loop: His trade war with China, at 18 months and counting,&nbsp;is taking its toll on the global economy, and U.S. bond markets are sending out distress signals. Those recession fears then have the dual effect of compelling the Federal Reserve to cut&nbsp;interest rates and driving the White House to ease up ever so slightly on its tariff threats and search for other stimulus measures (payroll tax cuts?). But China, encouraged by the sight of a more panicky White House, ends up maintaining a hard line in the negotiations while a cautious Federal Reserve, waiting to see if the White House tempers its trade threats, avoids committing to drastic stimulus measures. Not getting his wish of a pliant Beijing nor a weaker dollar, Trump lashes out in search of more leverage, markets plunge on another spike in trade uncertainty and the cycle repeats itself. The $80 trillion question for the global economy is, how many more times can this pattern continue before it produces a recession?Here&#39;s what we&#39;re watching:Trump&#39;s Next Moves Against China.&nbsp;Trump announced that he would be raising existing tariffs on $250 billion worth of Chinese goods from 25 to 30 percent on Oct. 1 and increasing duties on a remaining $300 billion in imports from 10 to 15 percent starting Sept. 1 &mdash; some of those tariffs&nbsp;have been delayed to Dec. 15 to avoid hitting U.S. consumer prices during the holiday shopping season.&nbsp;On the spectrum of retaliatory options, this is relatively measured for Trump.China has already matched Trump&#39;s earlier tariff threats&nbsp;but could now also publish its long-awaited &quot;unreliable entity list&quot; that could blacklist firms like U.S.-based FedEx, electronics manufacturer Flex, British-based HSBC and other firms <a href="/article/decisive-moment-china-nigh-beidaihe-political-meeting">caught in the U.S.-China crossfire</a>, while Beijing is still waving the threat to restrict rare earth exports to the United States. U.S. companies like General Electric and Gulfstream, a subsidiary of General Dynamics, are also on Beijing&#39;s sanctions target list for their connection to U.S. defense deals with Taiwan. All eyes will be on how much the People&#39;s Bank of China allows the yuan to fall when markets open.Given China&#39;s growing compulsion to respond, we will need to keep watching for more Trump moves down the line. These could entail instating fentanyl-related sanctions against bigger Chinese targets and rescinding or ending early a temporary general license for U.S. companies to work with Huawei. He could also order additional Section 301 investigations over issues like currency intervention, access to China&#39;s cloud computing market&nbsp;and the country&#39;s self-designated developing status at the World Trade Organization (WTO). A far more extreme option would be for Trump to declare a national emergency through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977&nbsp;to try and impose restrictions on U.S. businesses that trade with and directly&nbsp;invest&nbsp;in China.When it comes to Trump&#39;s (likely ill-fated) mission to weaken the U.S. dollar, we&#39;re watching for any moves by the White House to impose a currency transaction tax or for the U.S. Treasury Department to use the <a href="/article/tracking-global-ripples-feds-rate-cut-trade-currency-manipulation-economic-cooling">External Stabilization Fund to sell&nbsp;dollars</a>.The G-7 Watch List. While central bankers at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, have been telegraphing to the world that they alone cannot save their economies from trade uncertainty, don&#39;t expect much reassurance from political leaders gathering in France for the G-7 summit. U.S. tensions with France and Germany will be on display over an array of issues: U.S. retaliatory threats against France&#39;s digital tax on U.S. technology giants (Trump has threatened a tariff of up to 100 percent on French wine), U.S. tariffs against the European Union over Airbus subsidies and a still-lingering threat by Washington to impose auto tariffs on the bloc. Trump will also take aim at German Chancellor Angela Merkel&#39;s resistance to fiscal stimulus and the European Central Bank&#39;s plans for monetary easing. Relatedly, we&#39;ll also be trying to parse through the European debate over an internal document on unilaterally imposing tariffs on the United States and on setting up an investment fund to help European industrial champions compete with U.S. and Chinese technology giants.With China increasing retaliatory tariffs against U.S. agricultural products, Trump is going to be very eager to announce some real progress in his trade talks with Japan when he meets with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Aug. 25. Even so, a U.S.-Japan trade deal is not going to provide that much relief to U.S. soy, corn and wheat farmers getting hammered by the U.S.-China trade war.Trump&#39;s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Aug. 25 may shed some light on how far the White House intends to take its trade threats against New Delhi. Like China, India is also a big target for a Section 301 investigation and tariffs on the country&#39;s self-designated developing country status at the WTO, as well as other trade complaints. We can also expect Modi to politely decline any attempts by Trump to mediate in India&#39;s simmering Kashmir dispute with Pakistan.The Hong Kong Airport &quot;Stress Test.&quot;&nbsp;Many observers breathed a sigh of relief early this week following <a href="/article/hong-kong-despite-lull-violence-city-remains-knife-edge-china">large, but mostly calm&nbsp;protests in Hong Kong last weekend</a>. But pay attention to who is leading the demonstrations:&nbsp;While the umbrella Civil Human Rights Front marches tend to be more peaceful, the student-led actions have much higher potential to trigger violence and also create more backlash to their movement. This weekend, student protesters are going to try to target Hong Kong International Airport again by overwhelming all transport options there. Beijing has been issuing warnings to the Hong Kong government to contain the unrest by the Oct. 1 anniversary of the founding of the communist state, but we still think Beijing will try to avoid rushing what would likely end up being a very messy crackdown ahead of the anniversary.Italy and Brexit Watch.&nbsp;Aug. 27 will be a big day for both Italy and the United Kingdom. We should know by then whether Italy&#39;s anti-establishment Five Star Movement and the center-left Democratic Party will be able to <a href="/article/three-political-outcomes-await-italy-league-eurozone-coalition">form a coalition government to stave off a general election</a> and leave the Euroskeptic League party in the cold. While there are several sticking points in their negotiation, the prospects for a coalition deal are looking pretty good going into next week. Markets will also be encouraged by the fact that the Democratic Party will act as a moderating influence on Five Star policies. Meanwhile, British Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn will be convening a cross-party meeting with Conservative Party backbenchers and leaders from the Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party and Green Party to see who will sign onto his <a href="/article/can-british-opposition-unite-stop-hard-brexit-boris-johnson-corbyn">plan for a no-confidence motion and caretaker government</a> to chart the path to an early general election. The biggest question is whether rebel Tories will be able to convince Corbyn to give up the idea of assuming the prime minister&#39;s role and agree on a consensus candidate instead.<hr /><h3>On Our Minds</h3>To Engage or Not to Engage With Russia? There was a lot of hubbub during the week over Trump&#39;s remarks that the G-7 should return to the G-8, and that Russia should be allowed back into the club. France and Germany predictably reiterated their condition for a resolution over the (still frozen) Ukraine conflict before readmitting Moscow. But the United States will be hosting the G-7 summit next year and Trump, as the host, could extend an invitation to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The idea is not all that radical when considering a serious debate among U.S. national security circles on the need to engage Moscow as a means to weaken a stronger Russia-China alignment against the United States. And with European concerns rising over an escalating U.S.-Russia arms race, France and Germany could even be more open to the idea when the summit comes around next year as both countries try to find ways to keep all sides engaged.Controlling the Arms Race Narrative. Russia, meanwhile, played it cool all week, taking care of controlling the narrative of the arms race and casting the United States as the aggressor following Washington&#39;s recent test of a ground-launched cruise missile (a type of missile that was previously prohibited under the now-suspended Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.) Remember, a big reason why the United States withdrew from the treaty was to more effectively compete with China, who has been building up its arsenal of ground-based cruise missiles. The United States will now focus on wary Pacific allies like Japan and South Korea (whose security and economic relationship deteriorated further this week as Japan vowed to increase export restrictions on South Korea and as Seoul ended an intelligence-sharing pact with Tokyo) <a href="/article/us-will-find-few-takers-western-pacific-its-missiles-china-russia">to host U.S. missiles as it tries to balance against China</a>. The United States has said that it has no intention of deploying these missiles in Europe, while Russia is saying it won&#39;t make a move unless the United States does so first. Still, we&#39;re watching for any quieter moves by Moscow in its western military district and any signs from Poland and the Baltic states that they are entertaining hosting U.S. missile deployments.Israel Leverages Its Technological Prowess. As a tiny country in a hostile neighborhood, Israel has to put a lot of energy and innovation into managing its relationships with foreign powers. One way Israel can make itself especially useful to other governments is through its cybersecurity advantage. According to a Reuters report citing an unnamed Israel defense official, Israel&#39;s Defense Ministry loosened some of its export control rules for certain (unnamed) countries to facilitate sales of offensive cyber tools. We&#39;ve already seen signs of Israeli-developed cyber tools falling into the hands of strategic Arab powers. The United Arab Emirates, for example, used Israeli-made cyber tools for monitoring Qatar&#39;s al-Thani royal family, and Saudi Arabia allegedly used these tools to spy on murdered journalist and political dissident Jamal Khashoggi. There is a large and growing market for offensive cyberweapons, and close ties between Israel&#39;s technology industry and national security establishment have enabled the country to compete at the level of global powers in the sector. As Israel targets potential buyers, it will do so with a geopolitical aim in mind: Israel will care far more about keeping stability among known actors in its neighborhood than any Western campaign to promote democracy in the Middle East.&nbsp;Over time, however, we could see growing political backlash and potential sanctions by some Western countries against major exporters of offensive cyber tools, such as Israel and China, as a result of enabling digital authoritarianism becoming increasingly visible.<hr /><h3>In Case You Missed It</h3><a href="/article/why-iraq-could-be-next-regional-powderkeg-israel-iran-us">Why Iraq Could Be the Next Regional Powder Keg</a><a href="/article/malaysian-rare-earth-processing-plant-looms-large-us-china-trade-spat">A Malaysian Rare Earth Processing Plant Looms Large in the U.S.-China Trade Spat</a><a href="/article/can-mozambique-shield-its-energy-investments-escalating-jihadist-islamist-terrorism-security">Can Mozambique Shield Its Energy Investments From Escalating Terrorism?</a><hr /><h3>On Our Calendar</h3>In the coming week, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif will visit China and Japan, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will travel to Moscow&nbsp;to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and U.S. Donald Trump will visit Poland.&nbsp;For more, see our <a href="/article/geopolitical-calendar">Geopolitical Calendar</a>.<hr /><h3>Stratfor Talks</h3>Stratfor&#39;s South Asia Analyst, Faisel Pervaiz, speaks with contributor Ambika Vishwanath <a href="/article/geopolitics-india-s-water-woes">for the Stratfor podcast</a> about India&#39;s escalating water crisis and the ways in which it will seep into each crevice of the country&#39;s domestic and foreign policy aims.Visit <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/media/podcasts">our podcasts page</a> for more conversations on geopolitics and world affairs with Stratfor&#39;s analysts, editors and contributors.

Highlights

Sub-Saharan Africa

Americas

Asia-Pacific

Europe

Eurasia

Middle East and North Africa

South Asia

Read this week's review of the world's most pressing geopolitical events and insight into what the coming week will bring.

The Weekly Rundown: U.S. Tariffs on China, G-7 Summit in France and Russia's Arms Race Narrative

Argentina's peso and stock market plummeted this week after President Mauricio Macri finished a distant second to his leftist rivals in presidential primary voting on Aug. 11. The country's general election is Oct. 27.

<h3>On the Record</h3><blockquote>We&#39;re open for business, not for sale.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Greenland&#39;s Ministry of Foreign Affairs</blockquote><hr /><h3>On Our Radar</h3>After a Manic Week for the Markets, Some Perspective.&nbsp;First came the emerging market contagion fears when Argentina&#39;s Aug. 11 presidential primary elections triggered a massive currency and stock sell-off. Then came a big bounce when U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Aug. 13 that he would save Christmas and <a href="/article/china-us-partial-tariffs-rollback-trade-war">delay tariffs on China</a>. Those gains were quickly erased the next day when the bond markets warned of a recession with the 10-year Treasury yield inverting and dropping below the two-year yield. The slump continued through Aug. 15 as data out of China and Germany pointed to a deepening industrial slowdown. And then the week finally ended with a silver lining: U.S. retail data revealed still-strong consumer confidence despite a darkening global economic outlook.There are of course myriad factors that drive market behavior, but there is also no shortage of geopolitical factors driving market angst these days. As Bloomberg noted, investors had given a 99.994 percent probability that Argentine President Mauricio Macri would not get trounced in a primary election against his populist challenger Alberto Fernandez. And yes, polling in the lead-up to the vote was showing a tighter gap between the two candidates as the economy showed some glimmers of improvement. But, <a href="/article/why-argentinas-leader-tough-2019-macri-imf">as we&#39;ve been saying for the past 15 months</a>, Macri is a dead man walking into Argentina&#39;s Oct. 27 presidential election after he had to crawl back to the International Monetary Fund for a bailout. He announced a raft of populist measures this past week but they will likely end up being too little too late.Market ebullience over Trump&#39;s tariff delay may also have been a bit misplaced. Yes, this is a positive sign for retailers trying to avoid a Christmas tax on consumers. But the move was by no means a sign of progress in the U.S.-China trade negotiations. Instead, it was motivated by the White House&#39;s concerns about self-induced economic pain heading into a presidential election year. This was an encouraging sign for Beijing, which in planning its next moves on the trade front may want to test how much economic and political pressure Trump is willing to undergo as he seeks a second term. We&#39;ll be watching on Aug. 19 for what the White House does on Huawei: If it extends a &quot;temporary general license&quot; for U.S. companies to transact with Huawei and eases export restrictions against the embattled Chinese firm, Beijing may greenlight agricultural purchases to resuscitate the trade talks. (Citing sources familiar with the situation, Reuters reported on Aug. 16 that the U.S. Commerce Department plans to extend Huawei&#39;s reprieve another 90 days.) We&#39;re also watching for any showy moves by Beijing to crack down on Chinese chemical companies as a show of cooperation on Trump&#39;s demand to curb fentanyl sales. Stock markets will no doubt crave any hint of progress in the U.S.-China talks, but the impact of another U.S.-China truce will still be limited as deeper concerns grow over a wider industrial slowdown.Is Hong Kong Crossing Beijing&#39;s Red Line? A dramatic week of protests that succeeded in shutting down Hong Kong&#39;s international airport has <a href="/article/beijing-intervene-hong-kong-unrest">raised the potential for direct intervention by Beijing</a>. And right on cue, Trump has started waiving a veiled threat against Beijing over Hong Kong as he grasps for leverage in the trade talks. But any U.S. move, from condemnation to sanctions, is not going to help the trade talks, nor is it likely to factor heavily into Beijing&#39;s calculations on Hong Kong. With protests continuing for an 11th straight weekend, we&#39;re watching for signs of widening cracks in the protest movement as the situation turns more violent, especially now that major business tycoons are voicing their concern about the heavy economic toll the protests are incurring on the financial hub. If unrest spills into Macau on Aug. 19, as protesters are calling for, it would be another strong driver in assessing the potential for Beijing to intervene.The Taiwan Factor. Besides Hong Kong, there&#39;s another big complication to the U.S.-China trade talks: Taiwan. The Trump White House is moving ahead with an $8 billion sale of F-16V fighter jets to Taiwan. China already demonstrated its intent to restrict exports to U.S. defense companies over the sale of U.S. M1A2 Abrams tanks to Taiwan. The likelihood of U.S. defense suppliers getting in Beijing&#39;s crosshairs over the F-16 deal will also carry implications for their consumer businesses. For example, Gulfstream, which produces numerous civilian jets sold to China, is a subsidiary of General Dynamics, which is involved in manufacturing the Abrams tank. Honeywell, which makes the engine for the same tank, also produces numerous commercial and consumer products exported to China. Separately, we&#39;re watching <a href="/article/taiwan-enters-high-stakes-campaign-season-presidential-election-china-united-states-great-power-competition">the potential for U.S.-Taiwan trade talks to gain traction</a> as Taipei tries to get other key countries like Australia, India and Japan to risk Beijing&#39;s ire and engage in trade negotiations.Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo Convene. China will host a trilateral meeting on Aug. 21 with the foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea with an eye for a possible leadership summit by the end of the year. Amid <a href="/article/seoul-and-tokyo-stare-each-other-down-abe-moon-trade-war">simmering Tokyo-Seoul trade tensions</a>, a key thing to watch for in this summit is whether Beijing could act as something of a mediator that Washington has so far been unable to do. Beijing does benefit from emphasizing the discord within the U.S. alliance structure and some Chinese companies can also benefit from the fallout of the South Korea-Japan trade war. But Beijing certainly won&#39;t waste the chance to underscore its role as a stabilizer in the volatile East Asian theater. Building on the first Sino-Japanese strategic dialogue meeting in seven years on Aug. 10, this summit will also allow Beijing and Tokyo to talk through key bilateral issues, including de-confliction and potential economic cooperation in the East China Sea.The Problems With Labour&#39;s Brexit &quot;Brakestop&quot; Plan. The opposition Labour Party&#39;s <a href="/article/can-british-opposition-unite-stop-hard-brexit-boris-johnson-corbyn">plans to oust Prime Minister Boris Johnson and avoid a hard Brexit</a> include a no-confidence motion, followed by a temporary government led by Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, who will ask the European Union to delay Brexit so the United Kingdom can hold a general election. But there&#39;s a big problem: While most can agree that Johnson has to go and that a no-deal Brexit must be avoided, they don&#39;t want Corbyn to take his place. For a no-confidence motion to have a stronger chance of succeeding, we&#39;ll first need to see Corbyn put his ego aside and a consensus candidate emerge.While Italy Bickers Internally, Germany Resists Fiscal Stimulus. The next chapter of Italy&#39;s political crisis will be written on Aug. 20, when Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte gives a speech in Parliament that could be followed by a no-confidence motion triggered by the right-wing League party. The League&#39;s <a href="/article/italy-five-star-movement-democratic-party-block-early-elections-league-salivini">plan to trigger an early general election</a> is not going as planned, with the anti-establishment Five Star Movement working with the center-left Democratic Party to delay the election as much as possible. Despite the political drama, Italian borrowing costs are still low thanks to expectations of a European Central Bank stimulus package in September. For Germany&#39;s conservatives, this is all the more reason to stick to its sacrosanct &quot;black zero&quot; fiscal policy despite signs of an approaching recession.A Compromising Peace in Afghanistan. While the White House is reviewing <a href="/article/afghanistan-heads-toward-turning-point-us-taliban">a pending peace plan with the Taliban</a>, a blast in Pakistan targeting a mosque frequented by Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada raises questions over whether all of the insurgency&#39;s factions support Trump&#39;s peace push. Speculation is also rife that a cease-fire under the proposed peace deal could be limited to the United States and the Taliban. If true, this suggests the nearly 18-year-long war between the Taliban and Afghan security forces could continue, even enticing some elements of the insurgency to seek a military victory. Whatever the shape of a final deal, it will be important to see whether the Taliban&#39;s factions can maintain a unified posture on peace, and how Pakistan &mdash; the Taliban&#39;s primary external sponsor &mdash; uses its leverage over the group as it seeks to improve relations with the United States.<hr /><h3>On Our Minds</h3>Greenland Is Not for Sale. Amid rumors that President Trump had asked aides to look into the purchase of Greenland, what could easily become a political punchline actually shines a light on a very important region and emerging strategic objectives for resource security and beyond. The United States may very well be eyeing Greenland both for its abundant mineral resources as a potential alternative to China as the threat to the supply of rare earth elements remains and as a strategic part of its military strategy in the Arctic. U.S. allies Canada and Australia have mining companies active in Greenland. So too does China. China&#39;s activities in the semiautonomous Danish territory illustrate the importance of the island far beyond rare earths. Greenland is a large part of China&#39;s broader national and Arctic strategy and the country has been making aggressive inroads into Greenland for some time. Beijing is seeking to gain influence through investments in airports or former military bases. Though the Danish government has rejected recent efforts, China will continue to focus on Greenland to gain advantages on Arctic issues in the future. With both the United States and China eyeing the island, the future of Greenland could be heating up in more ways than just on the thermometer.The Color Revolution Threat. Chinese officials have used the term &quot;color revolution&quot; to describe the threat it faces from the Hong Kong protests. This is a phrase all too familiar to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who warned back in 2014 against the &quot;tragic consequences&quot; that come from Western-backed color revolutions. Both Beijing and Moscow will have their guard up against Western interference as their great power competition with the United States grows. In fact, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Russia and China plan to hold consultations over U.S. involvement in protests that have taken place in both Moscow and Hong Kong and that Moscow &quot;took seriously&quot; China&#39;s claims that the United States and other Western countries have &quot;directly participated in and organized unrest&quot; in Hong Kong. Given its experience in dealing with U.S.-supported color revolutions in its periphery and pro-democracy groups within its borders, we&#39;re studying what lessons Moscow may be able to offer Beijing on Hong Kong and in what ways these two powers may try to expand their security cooperation in the cyber realm and in protest management.Is Israel Expanding Its Military Reach? Three explosions in recent weeks in Iraq targeting Iran-allied Iraqi militia weapons stores appear to be the work of Israel, which has made a habit of striking similar targets in neighboring Syria. That would be a big expansion of Israel&#39;s strategic scope, bringing it back to a country it hasn&#39;t had a violent conflict with since the 1991 Gulf War when Baghdad launched Scud missiles against Israel. This is a very different Iraq, however, which has to balance a proliferation of Iran-allied militias that form a fundamental component of the country&#39;s security services with Baghdad&#39;s strong U.S. ties. Meanwhile, Iraq has few means to block Israeli strikes or retaliate against Israel itself. That means Iran-backed forces within Iraq could target U.S. or even Gulf Arab assets in retaliation for these kinds of incidents. With the White House already in a tricky spot between keeping heavy pressure on Iran while trying to avoid war, an Israeli uptick in attacks against Iranian assets could further complicate the U.S. position and make it that much harder to find a de-escalation path.<hr /><h3>In Case You Missed It</h3><a href="/article/when-populist-nationalists-tempt-geopolitical-fate-trump-modi-brexit-johnson">When Populist Nationalists Tempt Geopolitical Fate</a><a href="/article/facebook-s-cryptocurrency-well-may-already-be-poisoned-libra-blockchain-bitcoin">For Facebook&#39;s Cryptocurrency, the Well May Already Be Poisoned</a><a href="/article/russia-economic-caution-sets-stage-stagnation-putin-sanctions">Slow and Steady Won&#39;t Win Russia&#39;s Economic Race</a><a href="/article/indonesia-energy-reform-takes-back-seat-pragmatism-jokowi-oil-gas-subsidies">In Indonesia, Energy Reform Takes a Back Seat to Pragmatism</a><hr /><h3>On Our Calendar</h3>In the coming week, a &quot;temporary general license&quot; that allows U.S. companies to sell supplies to China&#39;s Huawei Technologies expires Aug. 19 unless it is extended, China hosts a trilateral meeting to mediate trade tensions between Japan and South Korea and the Group of Seven summit begins in Biarritz, France. For more, see our <a href="/article/geopolitical-calendar">Geopolitical Calendar</a>.<hr /><h3>Stratfor Talks</h3>Stratfor Chief Security Officer Fred Burton sits down with Mark Greaney and Lt. Col. H. Ripley Rawlings IV to discuss their new action thriller, Red Metal, <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/red-metal-authors-mark-greaney-and-lt-col-h-ripley-rawlings-iv">for the Stratfor podcast</a>.Visit <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/media/podcasts">our podcasts page</a> for more conversations on geopolitics and world affairs with Stratfor&#39;s analysts, editors and contributors.

The Weekly Rundown: Market Turbulence, Hong Kong Protests and Eyeing Greenland

Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani signed contracts with various U.S. companies, including Boeing, Gulfstream and Phillips Chemical Co., among others, during a July 9 visit to the White House and a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump.

What Happened: Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani signed contracts with various U.S. companies, including Boeing, Gulfstream and Phillips Chemical Co., among others, during a July 9 visit to the White House and a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump.Why It Matters: Qatar plays a key role in Washington&#39;s strategy of confronting Iran, leading Doha to attempt to use its position to regain some initiative against the ongoing blockade by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt. However, Trump is under pressure from some conservative lawmakers to take a tougher line against Qatar and confront the country for its ties to Iran.Background: A large number of the signed contracts were already under negotiation before al-Thani&#39;s meeting with Trump.&nbsp;Qatar is attempting to win over the president&#39;s support through a variety of business contracts and demonstrating Qatar&#39;s economic value to the United States. However, it remains unclear whether Trump intends to increase pressure on U.S. allies in the Middle East toward ending the two-year blockade.Read More:<ul><li><a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/will-israels-shift-right-slow-warming-its-arab-neighbors">Will Israel&#39;s Shift Right Slow the Warming With Its Arab Neighbors?</a>&nbsp;(May 8, 2019)</li><li><a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/arab-gulfs-tall-task-transform-populace">The Arab Gulf&#39;s Tall Task to Transform the Populace</a>&nbsp;(March 15, 2019)</li><li><a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/qatar-doha-says-goodbye-opec">Qatar: Doha Says Goodbye to OPEC</a>&nbsp;(Dec. 3, 2018)</li></ul>

United States

Qatar

Rebalancing Power in the Middle East

Qatar, U.S.: Leaders Affirm Ties During Emir's Visit to Washington

Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara's use of two aircraft registered to U.S. companies could indicate that the United States is providing security assistance for him.

Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara flew to France on Aug. 24 for a two-week vacation, arriving on a Gulfstream G3 aircraft, tail registration N712AS, privately registered to Andalex Aviation II LLC, a company out of Wilmington, Del. On July 28, Ouattara flew to Washington, and on the following day met with the presidents of Benin, Niger, Guinea and the United States. On that visit, the Ivorian president arrived on a Gulfstream G5 aircraft, tail number N598F, registered to an apartment under the name Jet Greene LLC in Miami Beach, Fla. It is possible that the aircraft are registered to front companies for U.S. government agencies. Interestingly, Ouattara could have chartered a plane from companies based in countries closer to home or even Ivory Coast, which raises the question: Why would he need to charter a plane registered to an apartment in Miami Beach? Ouattara only recently assumed the presidency. Although he was democratically elected in 2010, he had to take Abidjan militarily before he could replace his predecessor, Laurent Gbagbo. He now faces threats, including those from the remnants of the Gbagbo regime, and even from within his own camp. The aircraft show that he has found the means by which he will mitigate those threats: U.S. patronage. The United States will use this patronage to ensure Ouattara's cooperation in its regional approach to counter al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and combat drug trafficking in West Africa. <h3>U.S. Support Before and After the Conflict</h3> While such a tactic is anomalous for the United States, it is not without precedent. In 2006, the U.S. government provided security personnel, including Diplomatic Security Service agents, to Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was elected in 2005 after Liberia emerged from its Second Civil War. The agents likely served only as long as it took to train Liberian forces for the task. In the case of Ivory Coast, the United States was a staunch supporter of Ouattara from the moment he won the controversial election. However, there is no evidence to support the idea that the United States was directly involved in the Ivorian conflict, unlike France. (Paris sent military assistance in the final siege of Abidjan, deploying attack helicopters to destroy Gbagbo's defenses <a href="/analysis/20110331-ouattaras-forces-pressure-gbagbo-cote-divoire">at his presidential compound</a>.) Indeed, U.S. support of Ouattara appeared to be rhetorical throughout the conflict. But if the United States is providing transportation to Ouattara through U.S. government offices or U.S. corporations, it could be a sign that Washington was more involved in the conflict than was previously thought. The United States is unlikely to approach Ouattara with gifts of private jets for no reason; it is likely that the two sides were in talks all along, and any talks would likely entail U.S. protection, given the violence surrounding Ouattara's ascension to power. <h3>Mitigating Potential Threats</h3> It is unsurprising that there could be <a href="/analysis/20110405-dispatch-ivory-coast-political-and-security-crisis" class="connectedContentTrigger">threats to the Ouattara regime</a>. Now that Ouattara is in power, assassination attempts by those loyal to the Gbagbo regime, unhappy to be out of power, are a danger. Also, dissatisfied members within Ouattara's former power base could pose a threat. Ibrahim Coulibaly, for example, was the leader of the militia that was instrumental in the fight to bring Ouattara to power. After Ouattara defeated forces loyal to Gbagbo, Republican Forces led by current Prime Minister Guillaume Soro killed Coulibaly in an <a href="/analysis/20110427-ivory-coasts-coulibaly-killed-soros-forces">offensive against his compound</a> in Abidjan's Abobo district. If Coulibaly's supporters perceive that Ouattara was responsible for his death, assassination attempts cannot be ruled out. Finally &mdash; and notably &mdash; there is the potential threat posed by Soro. The prime minister is a cunning political actor who is thought to have recently benefited from <a href="/analysis/20110818-burkina-faso-sending-presidential-security-forces-guinea-ivory-coast">Burkinabe presidential security forces</a> that will serve as his personal security detail. Ouattara has no doubt identified Soro, just under 40 years old, as a potential long-term threat and could seek to bolster his own security via the United States. Transportation would not be provided without the tacit permission of the U.S. government. If U.S. companies or agencies are transporting Ouattara, it is probable that the United States is providing additional security assistance to Ivory Coast. This would be in the form of anti-militancy assistance, VIP protection for the government and security training to the Ivorian presidential protection team. The United States has every incentive to take on these tasks, as it leads the fight against drug trafficking and AQIM operations in West Africa. In a multi-state effort to fight these operations, the Americans have likely also encouraged Burkina Faso's deploying security forces to serve on the personal protective detail of the Guinean president. Also, the Burkinabes have likely provided security for Soro to endear themselves to the West &mdash; particularly France, which is still involved in protecting its commercial interests in the West African country &mdash; and to position themselves as the West's regional enforcer. (Notably, the United States is taking the lead in supporting Ivory Coast, likely in an effort to outbid France.) With U.S. security assistance, Ouattara can be expected to survive the potential threats against him, which in turn will help him serve in office longer than he would without that assistance. In return, the United States has yet another ally in the region, one who will ensure that its interests in combating militancy and drug trafficking operations are met.

Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara flew to the United States and France in separate instances on aircraft registered to U.S. companies. STRATFOR believes the United States could be providing additional security to Ouattara, who will likely face threats after having emerged victorious from a recent civil conflict. Such a move is consistent with the U.S. approach to combat al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and drug trafficking in West Africa.

Summary

U.S. May Be Providing Security Assistance to Ivorian President 

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Increased monitoring and interdiction of air- and seaborne operations have changed the way Mexican cartels move their product. (With STRATFOR interactive map)

Mexico

Central America: An Emerging Role in the Drug Trade

Airborne early warning technology is becoming increasingly available and affordable.

Airborne Early Warning (AEW) technology is becoming increasingly available and affordable on the open market. Similarly, the number of countries acquiring or seeking to acquire this capability is seeing a dramatic rise.    AEW aircraft provide air forces with significantly improved airspace situational awareness. In times of crisis, AEW allows countries to monitor their borders closely for attack, and gives commanders a clearer understanding of — and in some cases a much more advanced capability to control and manage — both defensive and offensive operations.    During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were the principal designers and builders of such aircraft. While there were a few exceptions (like the British modification to the Shackleton airframe which was exported to South Africa), any foreign interest in that capability generally entailed a deal with Washington or Moscow.    Even then, there was a range of capabilities. One side of the spectrum was the large U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system — better known as the AWACS — that combined a powerful radar with an airborne command center capable of coordinating the efforts of aircraft in its area of responsibility. At the other end of the spectrum was the U.S. Navy's E-2 Hawkeye, a carrier-based AEW platform with a crew of only five and much more limited command-and-control capacity.    The E-2 was an attractive cheaper alternative AEW platform, which sold to Taiwan, Israel, Singapore and Egypt, among others. Israel would later re-export its Hawkeyes to Mexico, which is beginning to explore the technology's applicability to counternarcotics operations. (Airborne platforms are much better suited for spotting low-level smuggler flights.) But the real shift has come only recently. Though the Hawkeye is still a hot commodity on the export market, it is seeing increased competition from Saab, Boeing Co. and Elta Electronics.    Brazil, Sweden, Greece and Mexico now are all operating AEW platforms based on the Swedish-designed and -built Eireye radar. These designs are mounted on the Embraer 145. (Sweden uses its own Saab airframes.) This is a more rudimentary system noteworthy mostly for its affordability and the nascent AEW capability it is bringing to these countries for the first time.    Boeing's Wedgetail is a much more advanced offering. The Royal Australia Air Force will be the first to acquire Boeing's E-737 Wedgetail design. Its larger airframe can carry more electronics and a larger crew to facilitate more advanced airborne command-and-control functions. Turkey and South Korea already have decided to purchase this design; they probably will not be the last.    Israeli companies also have been tinkering with radar for years. The Phalcon system has been one of the key non-U.S. vectors of AEW proliferation. Though Washington successfully blocked a deal between Israel and Beijing to upgrade China's capabilities, Israel continues to expand sales. The Phalcon has been especially attractive because of its flexibility; for example, Israel has offered to install it on old Russian Il-76 Candid or already modified A-50 Mainstay airframes.      The Israeli Conformal Airborne Early Warning System    The Conformal Airborne Early Warning System, the most recent Israeli advance, is by far the most interesting new AEW design. Built onto a Gulfstream 550 airframe and slated for deployment in Israel and Singapore, the conformal bulges house four active electronically scanned arrays. Like the much larger Wedgetail design, this configuration is both simpler and more powerful than more traditional mechanically manipulated systems.    Obviously, not all these technologies are created equal; instead, they represent a broad swath of capability. This new renaissance of AEW technology is just the beginning. As Chinese systems mature, AEW platforms probably will become even more widely available to third-tier military powers that previously never imagined obtaining them.     Even so, the air dominance of the U.S. Air Force is not going to come under challenge anytime soon. Though command-and-control capability and situational awareness are important stepping-stones in air operations, they are hardly a cure-all. It means less advanced air forces soon will begin to have the physical capability to conduct more complex offensive and defensive mission profiles and be more watchful and aware of their own airspace. Training, tactics and doctrine will have to adapt, however. And new capabilities create new dependences, which in turn create new vulnerabilities. Global airspace situational awareness thus is experiencing a noteworthy rise, and bears considerable scrutiny.    

The market for Airborne Early Warning aircraft is undergoing a significant expansion in type, availability and number. What was once the purview of a select few nations is now becoming a fairly standard tool for second and even third-tier militaries. The change does not mean U.S. Air Force dominance will soon be threatened, however.

U.S.: The Expanding Airborne Early Warning Market

The Mexico Security Memo is a weekly summary report concerning instability and key incidents.

Targeting the Feds in Baja After several assassinations targeting police in central and northern Mexico, the Baja peninsula stood out this past week as a hot spot of violence against federal authorities. Minutes after a police officer in Tijuana, Baja California state, was killed Sept. 24, a group of armed men opened fire on a federal police headquarters in the city, wounding several agents inside. The gunmen, who were armed with assault rifles and traveling in sport utility vehicles, escaped after a 10-minute exchange of gunfire with police. Farther south, in La Paz, Baja California Sur state, a police commander was gunned down outside his house as he was leaving for work. This was the first targeted killing of a police officer in the state this year. These incidents demonstrate how Mexico's drug violence is reaching into every corner of the state, even typically tranquil places like Baja California Sur. They also suggest that the level of violence is getting worse. Information released by Mexico's attorney general shows that, by mid-September of this year, 2,308 drug killings had already occurred in the country &mdash; more than the total for 2006. Cartel retaliation against increasingly aggressive government forces explains the increase. Higher casualty counts are not how President Felipe Calderon hoped to begin his first term, but they are likely to continue as long as his administration keeps up its campaign against the country's drug traffickers. More Action in the Yucatan A Gulfstream II jet loaded with more than 3 tons of cocaine crashed this past week in a remote part of Yucatan state. The flight reportedly originated in Colombia and was monitored by Mexican military aircraft after it entered Mexican airspace. It is still unclear what caused the plane to crash. The pilot, a Mexican, survived and had fled the crash site by the time authorities arrived, though he was later apprehended. Two other individuals were arrested after they attempted to bribe Mexican soldiers, who were securing the site, to allow them to remove the cargo from the plane. The incident highlights one important way that drugs are being transported from South America to Mexico on their way to the United States. It also illustrates the Yucatan Peninsula's strategic value as a transshipment point for drug flights from Colombia and maritime shipments arriving in ports such as Cancun. While drug violence has been less common in the Yucatan compared to other regions in Mexico, the peninsula is not immune. In addition to the plane crash this past week, a Cuban man suspected of working with drug cartels was found dead in an abandoned car in the heart of Cancun's hotel district. On the same day, several hundred soldiers and federal police arrived in the area. The small size of the force, and the fact that the federal police are part of the Federal Preventive Police and not the Federal Investigative Agency, suggests its mission is to set up highway checkpoints and generally enhance security, rather than serve arrest warrants to high-ranking cartel members. <media nid="102979" align="center"></media> Sept. 24 <ul><li>Authorities in Cancun, Quintana Roo state, discovered the body of a Cuban man who had been shot once. An official described him as a suspected drug trafficker.</li></ul> Sept. 25 <ul><li>The city police director of San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas state, was suspended for his alleged participation in the abduction of a judge involved in a drug case.</li> <li>A group of gunmen shot and killed a woman in the tourist sector of Acapulco, Guerrero state. She was shot just before midnight as she traveled in her vehicle. </li> <li>A group of soldiers exchanged gunfire with armed men near Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. The firefight occurred during a high-speed chase.</li></ul> Sept. 26 <ul><li>The body of an unidentified man reportedly was discovered in Chinicuila, Michoacan state. The body had several gunshot wounds and showed signs of torture. </li> <li>The body of an unidentified man was found along a highway near Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. Police said the man was shot at least five times and was dressed in women's clothing. </li> <li>The body of a man was found in Arteaga, Michoacan state, with several gunshot wounds in his head. </li> <li>A man in Tizayuca, Hidalgo state, died after being shot once in the head. His body was dumped in a drainage canal. </li></ul> Sept. 27 <ul><li>More than 40 men armed with assault rifles stormed a hospital in Culiacan, Sinaloa state, and removed prison inmate Ruben "El Charrito" Beltran Leon from his room. The gunmen disarmed nine police officers guarding Beltran, who was recuperating from an injury he received in prison. He is believed to be linked to the Beltran Leyva crime organization. </li></ul> Sept. 28 <ul><li>Gunmen abducted two Coahuila state police officers from a supermarket parking lot in the capital city of Saltillo. The bodies of the officers were later discovered in an empty lot. </li></ul> Sept. 29 <ul><li>An unidentified man was shot to death in downtown Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. The man reportedly was armed with a pistol. </li></ul> Sept. 30 <ul><li>Nuevo Leon state police officials reported the discovery of at least 10 bodies in one location in the town of China. Initial reports indicated there had been a firefight in the town, but police concluded there had been no firefight and suggested the bodies had been dumped there. </li> <li>A police commander was shot to death outside his home in La Paz, Baja California Sur state. He was the first police officer killed in the state this year. </li></ul>

Mexico Security Memo: Oct. 1, 2007

By Fred Burton More than half the residents of small Apex, N.C. (population 29,000) were forced to evacuate their homes after a fire broke out at a hazardous waste disposal facility late Oct. 5. Authorities ordered the evacuation of 17,000 people after it was reported that the fire was producing chlorine gas. This report later proved erroneous, though many other toxic chemicals doubtless were being released by the blaze. Several firefighters and Apex residents reported to the hospital with respiratory problems. Investigators from U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, an independent federal agency, are now investigating whether incompatible chemicals were improperly stored too close together at the Environmental Quality Industrial Services facility, causing the fire and several explosions. With the probe still under way, it is not clear whether the Apex fire was an accident or was intentionally set. Regardless, the North Carolina incident &mdash; like <a href="/chlorine_weapon">industrial fires</a> of the past &mdash; raises a number of questions about the vulnerability of chemical plants, storage sites and transportation vehicles in the United States, and the potential consequences if terrorists were to strike such facilities near a metropolitan area. In this analysis, it is crucial to recognize that the true targets in such an attack would be the populations of metropolitan areas; the chemical sites or transport carriers themselves would, like the aircraft used on 9/11, be harnessed as weapons. This consideration has some bearing on the possibility &mdash; as opposed to the mere technical viability &mdash; of an attack in a given location. If the targeting criteria that have been ascribed to al Qaeda in the past still apply (given the disruption of the organization and reconstitution of the threat since 9/11), strikes involving chemicals would be more likely to be attempted in metropolitan areas that carry symbolism or widespread name recognition within the Muslim world. Though vulnerabilities might apply broadly to facilities around the country, the risk in places like Jersey City, N.J., Houston, Texas, or New Orleans, La., would by this token be elevated. Chemical Plots Many militant groups have shown interest in developing and employing chemical weapons in their attacks. These range from <a href="/al_qaeda_and_threat_chemical_and_biological_weapons">Aum Shinrikyo</a>, which used chemical devices in several attacks in Japan, to domestic militants in the United States like Texan <a href="/ten_years_after_oklahoma_city_threat_remains">William Krar</a>, who in April 2003 was found in possession of a completed sodium cyanide device. Al Qaeda also figures prominently into this list. It should be recalled that the United States launched a cruise missile against Sudan's al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in 1998, where al Qaeda was believed to be trying to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. In 2001, Ahmed Ressam &mdash; the Algerian national who plotted to blow up Los Angeles International Airport &mdash; testified that al Qaeda members conducted tests using cyanide and other toxins to kill dogs at the Deronta training camp in Afghanistan. Videos recovered by U.S. troops after the invasion of Afghanistan supported this testimony, and al Qaeda training manuals that have been seized included recipes for making biological toxins and chemical agents. Terrorists and other criminals &mdash; indeed, anyone with an interest in chemical attacks &mdash; today have ready access, through the Internet, to information on how to make these kinds of substances. Recipes for toxins such as ricin, and instructions for creating chemical weapons such as <a href="/chemical_threat_subways_dispelling_clouds">sodium cyanide devices</a>, can be easily downloaded. Despite the fear that these substances engender, however, they often are quite ineffective as weapons. Clearly, Aum Shinrikyo's efforts to carry out chemical attacks were largely a flop, for all that the group spent many millions of dollars to develop its weapons program and had access to scientific facilities. Militants in <a href="">Madrid</a> killed far more people (191) with conventional explosives &mdash; and with far less time, effort and cost &mdash; than Aum Shinrikyo did in its Tokyo subway attack, which claimed 12 lives. One of the most significant challenges terrorists face in chemical weapon plots is the need to manufacture and transport chemicals in quantities sufficient to yield a significant body count. As military commanders learned on the battlefields of Europe during World War I, and during the Iran-Iraq war, chemical agents are volatile and quick to vaporize, and they tend dissipate quickly. As a result, deadly concentrations can be difficult to amass in a real-world setting. Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated, through many failed attacks both before and after the successful Tokyo strike, that small vinyl bags of chemicals simply don't cut it when the goal is to yield high body counts &mdash; even when those bags contain highly lethal chemicals like sarin and are placed in confined spaces, such as subway cars or train station restrooms. However, chemicals can be extremely dangerous if disbursed in large quantities that can produce deadly concentrations. Several U.S. government studies have concluded that an attack involving large quantities of toxic chemicals (which can be found in water treatments, industrial solvents and fertilizers, among other common uses) could easily kill thousands of people. The death tolls envisioned eclipse those of most scenarios involving <a href="/dirty_bombs_weapons_mass_disruption">dirty bombs</a> or improvised chemical weapons attacks against mass transit. Modalities of Attack Given the difficulties of making and transporting sufficiently large quantities of toxic chemicals for effective attacks, terrorists might instead look to exploit existing supplies of chemicals &mdash; especially when they are stored or being shipped close to large cities. Chemicals are used in many common manufacturing and municipal processes &mdash; for example, sewage and water treatment. Therefore, facilities that require large stores of <a href="/chlorine_weapon">chemicals</a> to be kept on hand abound. Chemicals are an integral part of modern, industrial societies, and the U.S. economy depends heavily on infrastructure and the ability to transport these substances rapidly and efficiently. However, knowing this, it is entirely possible that a group such as al Qaeda &mdash; which gravitates toward spectacular attacks with crippling economic effects &mdash; might at some point attempt an attack against a population center, using chemicals from either a storage facility or a tanker as a weapon. If al Qaeda &mdash; or a cell that wanted to emulate its tactics &mdash; were to attempt such a strike (and we are not suggesting that this is the most likely form of attack on U.S. soil), history provides examples of several possible modes: armed assault coupled with vehicular bombing, a suicide pilot who crashes an aircraft into the target or an "inside job." To date, there have been no known examples of al Qaeda deploying operatives to work and attack an industrial target from the inside, but in at least one prominent case, this was an entirely feasible possibility. It's not hard to imagine a terrorist cell adopting tactics that already have been used in places like <a href="/ongoing_struggle_against_al_qaeda_arabian_peninsula">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="/two_attacks_fail_yemen">Yemen</a> (where oil facilities were targeted): Operatives traveling in multiple vehicles &mdash; some of them converted into vehicular bombs &mdash; rammed barricades, shot at security guards with assault rifles and lobbed grenades. The failed strike at Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq facility involved trucks marked with company logos. A strike against a chemical storage site also might involve the use of explosives to damage storage tanks, or could be as simple as opening the valves or damaging pipes to release chemicals, in hopes of creating a toxic explosion or chemical cloud. Frankly, despite post-9/11 security improvements in the United States, many chemical manufacturing and storage facilities remain vulnerable &mdash; especially in the event of a well-orchestrated attack by heavily armed suicide operatives, or an attack using a suicide truck bomb. Some vulnerabilities were obvious even in the aftermath of the New York and Washington attacks: In 2002 and 2003, environmentalist groups penetrated several industrial sites, dropping banners from buildings as they protested against the chemicals industry. Though these actions were not orchestrated to prove a point to the Department of Homeland Security, they did lead to the implementation of tighter security measures &mdash; and protesting activists have not succeeded in penetrating chemical storage facilities in more recent times. Nevertheless, there are very few industrial or manufacturing facilities of any kind in the United States with security levels sufficient to withstand a determined attack by a committed group of armed militants. As has been frequently noted, al Qaeda historically has shown a fixation with <a href="/lessons_library_tower_plot">plots involving aircraft</a>, which means manufacturing or chemical storage sites are also vulnerable from the air. Crashing an aircraft (perhaps a rented or hijacked cargo jet, or a large private jet such as a Gulfstream V or Boeing business jet) into a facility would generate the kind of drama &mdash; if not the death toll &mdash; al Qaeda seeks. Alternatively, an attack could be staged as an "inside job." A number of trained engineers have become prominent members of al Qaeda in the past: Ziad Jarrah, one of the 9/11 pilots, was an aerospace engineering student at the University of Applied Sciences in Hamburg, Germany; Mohammed Atta studied civil engineering there in pursuit of an urban planning degree. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed trained as a mechanical engineer, and his nephew, Abdel Basit, earned a degree in electrical engineering. And there was <a href="/risks_hiring_infiltrators">Nidal Ayyad</a>, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kuwait of Palestinian parents. Ayyad graduated from Rutgers University in 1991 with a degree in engineering and was hired by Allied Signal Inc. in Morristown, N.J., where he worked primarily with chemicals used in pharmaceuticals and paints. At Allied Signal, he used company letterhead to place orders for powerful chemicals, which in turn were used to manufacture the explosives for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Conceivably, Ayyad could have used his position in another way: He could have helped the World Trade Center co-conspirators plan an attack against the facility where he worked. A knowledgeable insider would be aware of which chemicals were most dangerous and where they were located. Alternatively, an insider like Ayyad could have used his knowledge of and access to chemicals to create an intentional "Bhopal incident" &mdash; emulating the 1984 chemical disaster in India, where the accidental release of methyl isocyanate in a densely populated region claimed thousands of lives. Such an act of sabotage potentially could be more catastrophic than an armed attack by outsiders. Al Qaeda certainly has used insiders to assist attacks before: Three of the gunmen involved in the May 2004 assault against ABB Lummus Global's petrochemical facility in <a href="/saudi_arabia_homegrown_jihadists_press_their_agenda">Yanbu, Saudi Arabia</a>, worked at that facility. These operatives' security badges and familiarity with the layout of the site were key elements in the attack. The objective in this strike was to kill Westerners in Saudi Arabia (and the attackers did kill five) rather than to unleash a cloud of toxic chemicals, but it does stand as a cautionary tale for security professionals who guard sensitive industrial facilities. Separate from this, shipments of chemicals also are vulnerable to exploitation. More than 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials are moved along U.S. highways, railways and pipelines each day. Chemicals being transported by <a href="/railroads_and_chemical_shipments_potentially_lethal_combination">rail cars</a> &mdash; which move slowly along static routes and thus can be accessed easily &mdash; present a tremendous risk. Currently, rail tanker cars are marked in ways that make it easy for first responders, and by the same token, potential terrorists, to identify their contents in the event of an accident (though proposals to use more decoy tanker cars and thicker tank wall construction could help mitigate this risk). A successful breach of just one 90-ton tanker car could result in a chemical gas cloud measuring 41.5 miles long and four miles wide. (By way of comparison, fewer than 40 tons of chemicals are believed to have been released in the Bhopal accident.) A study conducted by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory estimates that, in a major city, an attack involving a railcar of volatile chemicals could cause up to 100 deaths per second as the toxic cloud spread throughout the area. Because of this, some cities have moved to ban the rail shipment of chemicals through their environs, although the legality of such a ban under interstate commerce rules is still being questioned. Even if the city were to reroute the tankers, suburban areas through which the tankers passed might still be attractive targets. Conclusion Al Qaeda clearly has a long and documented history of interest in weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Though al Qaeda's capabilities, as a cohesive organization or strategic force, are now more questionable than they were five years ago, the scenarios outlined here remain difficult for corporate and government security professionals to discount. A chemical attack clearly might not be the most effective means of striking at the United States, but the vulnerabilities of the system do make it a viable option. From a security standpoint, the true fear revolves around efficiency. On 9/11, al Qaeda used "outside the box" thinking to achieve tremendous results; the resources (commercial aircraft) of its enemy were commandeered and converted into guided missiles that caused large-scale destruction. Operatives did not have to design, build or steal actual missiles, which are much more tightly guarded than commercial jetliners. In business terms, the cost-to-risk ratio was highly favorable. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that al Qaeda or other jihadists with appropriate backgrounds would seek to commandeer another industrial asset (volatile chemicals) and convert it into a weapon to be used against a recognizable target like a major metropolitan area. Given the targeting criteria used in the past, it could be argued that emphasis would be placed on striking symbolic targets where possible &mdash; and few cities are, in and of themselves, as symbolic as individual buildings associated with U.S. political or economic power. However, the highest-value symbolic targets in the United States (and certainly those that, like the World Trade Center towers, also would yield high body counts) might well be beyond al Qaeda's reach. Thus, there are trade-offs to be considered: The cost and risk ratios involved in a chemical strike targeting a large city would parallel those of the 9/11 aircraft plot, and the potential death tolls easily could dwarf those yielded by striking an iconic building. Finally, in this way, the operatives would &mdash; like skillful judo practitioners &mdash; be once again turning the United States' economic power and inertia back upon the country as a weapon.

Chemical Risk: Mass Storage and Transport as Weapons, Not Targets

Madagascar has oil, according to a World Bank statement released in late May. Just larger than the state of Arizona, Madagascar &mdash; an Indian Ocean island off the southern African coast &mdash; is thought to have deep underground onshore reserves of heavy crude. However, the World Bank representative in Antananarivo said that the depth of the reserves makes their extraction cost too high for the time being.   The United States is likely to control most &mdash; if not all &mdash; development of the country's oil reserves for the foreseeable future. Five U.S. companies already are conducting explorations: U.S.-based Vanco has an offshore exploration license there, signed in March 2001, U.S.-based Hunt Oil has a share in two onshore oil and gas exploration concessions in the country, and both U.S.-based Triton and Cayman Island-registered Xpronet have offshore exploration licenses. The one non-U.S. company that had licenses in the country, Canadian firm Gulfstream, since has been acquired by U.S.-based Anadarko, which will take over Gulfstream's exploration licenses for both on- and off-shore concessions in Madagascar.  Moreover, Washington and Antananarivo have close working ties, and President Marc Ravalomanana's administration relies heavily on U.S. political support. In June 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush recognized Ravalomanana as the legitimate president, six months after a controversial election in which defeated President Didier Ratsiraka refused to step down. The move was a direct affront to France, the island nation's former colonial ruler. Paris backed Ratsiraka, and French mercenaries reportedly were involved in a plot to remove Ravalomanana after Ratsiraka was forced to flee the island.   Ravalomanana recently traveled to Washington to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. The two agreed to cooperate on anti-terrorism measures, and Powell said during a press conference after the meeting that Washington would support the president's economic and political reform program.   It is unclear how much oil the country might have or whether it will be commercially viable in the short to medium term. The abundance of U.S. oil companies already doing business there suggest that the rush is on &mdash; and the World Bank's announcement and the country's close ties with Washington likely will draw more prospectors in the near future.

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